Opinion
1:19-cv-01759-CL
02-23-2023
CHARLES CLARK, an individual, Plaintiff, v. LOANDEPOT.COM, LLC, a Delaware limited company, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK D. CLARKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an 80-year-old resident of Southern Oregon who built his home in Shady Cove, Oregon. Declaration of Charles Clark ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 33 (“Clark Decl.”). In 2016, Plaintiff refinanced his mortgage with Defendant. Id. ¶ 3.
The Deed of Trust (the “Deed”) states that“[p]ayments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at such other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15.''Declaration of Scott S. Anders, Ex. G at 4, ECF No. 39 (“Anders Decl.”). Section 15 of the Deed provides:
Any notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to Lender's address stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower. Any notice in connection with this Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually received by Lender. If any notice required by this Security Instrument is also required under Applicable Law, the Applicable Law requirement will satisfy the corresponding requirement under this Security Instrument.Id. at 10. The Deed lists the Lender as “LoanDepot.Com, LLC” and the Lender's address as “26642 TOWNE CENTER DRIVE, FOOTHILL RANCH, CALIFORNIA 92610.” Id. at 1. In a note dated August 2016, Plaintiff agreed to “make [his] monthly payments at P.O. BOX 60085, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90060-0005 or at a different place if required by the Note Holder.” Id., Ex. H at 20, ECF No. 39. Plaintiff's monthly payment was set at $1,540. Id.
Plaintiff made all his monthly payments from September 2016 through September 2017. Clark Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 33. In July 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a loan statement advising Plaintiff that his monthly loan payment would increase to $ 1,826.38 effective August 1, 2017. Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 1, ECF No. 32 (“July 2017 Statement”). At the top of the statement, Defendant's return address was listed as“PO Box 77404, Ewing, N.J. 08628.” Id. In the upper right box, Defendant's customer service address was listed as “PO Box 77423, Ewing, N.J. 08628.” Id. The payment coupon contained an address for “PAYMENT PROCESSING CENTER” at “PO BOX 11733, NEWARK, N.J. 07101-4733.” Id. The July 2017 Statement also advised Plaintiff that his payment would increase to $1,903.38 effective August 17, 2017. Id.
In September 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a loan statement advising Plaintiff that his monthly loan payment of $2,006.97 was due on October 1, 2017. Id., Ex. 3 (“September 2017 Statement”). At the top of the statement, Defendant's return address was listed as “PO Box 77404, Ewing, N.J. 08628.” Id. In the upper right box, Defendant's customer service address was listed as “PO Box 77423, Ewing, N.J. 08628.” Id. The payment coupon contained an address for “PAYMENT PROCESSING CENTER” at“PO BOX 11733, NEWARK, N.J. 07101 -4733.”Id. The September 2017 Statement also advised Plaintiff that his monthly loan payment would increase to $2,083.97 effective October 17, 2017. Id.
Between August and October 2017, Plaintiffs monthly loan payment increased by $262.59. Clark Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 33. Plaintiff, a retiree on a fixed income, “was unable to immediately make [his] October and November 2017 mortgage loan payments on such short notice of such a large increase.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 8.
In October 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a “Delinquent Notice” advising Plaintiff that his “Ioan payment due on October 01, 2017 remains unpaid and a late charge has now been assessed.” Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 4 at 1, ECF No. 32 (“October 2017 Notice”). The Notice instructed Plaintiff to “[p]lease send the following amount at once:... $ 2078.97[.]” Id. The Notice also stated that “Qualified Written Requests, notifications of error or requests for information concerning your loanmustbe directed to: PO Box 77423, Ewing, N.J. 08628.” Id. Plaintiff notes that the “Notice did not contain an address in which to send delinquent payments” and that Plaintiff was “so confused on what [he] heeded to do[.]” Clark Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 33.
In November 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a Notice “to inform [him] that [he has] defaulted in [his] obligations under the terms of a Note and Mortgage on the mortgaged property[.]” Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 5 at 1, ECF No. 32 (“November 2017 Notice”). The Notice advised Plaintiff that he had “the right to cure the default on or before the date identified below by sendingthe required amount of $4080.94 to: Loan Servicing, PO Box 986, Newark, N.J. 07184-0986.” Id. The Notice also stated that “[t]he Cure Amount must be received at our office on or before December 26,2017, or if that day is a weekend or holiday, the following business day.” Id. at 2.
On December 4, 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter “in connection with [Defendant's] attempt to once again work with [Plaintiff] in resolving [Plaintiffs] loan delinquency.” Id., Ex. 6 at 1. The letter instructed Plaintiff to “[p]lease contact our office immediately.” Id. The letter also stated that “Qualified Written Requests, notifications of error, or requests for information concerning your loan must be directed to: PO Box 77423, Ewing, N.J. 08628.”Id. The letter was signed by the “Loan Workout Department.” Id. At the time, Plaintiff “still did not understand why [his] monthly mortgage loan payment had increased.” Clark Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 33. However, Plaintiff was able to “save up enough money to make [his] delinquent October and November 2017 mortgage loan payments as well as [his] regular December 2017 monthly mortgage loan payment.” Id.
On December 7, 2017, Plaintiff sent a cashier's checkpayable to Defendant in the amount of $6,087.91 along with his October, November, and December 2017 payment coupons. Id. “Due to all of the various addresses [he] had received from [Defendant], [Plaintiff] decided to send [his check] to [Defendant's] CFO.” Id. Plaintiff “looked on the internet and identified the CFO as Brian Sullivan who had a contact address on the web page of P.O. Box 77408 Ewing, New Jersey.” Id. Plaintiff addressed the letter to “loanDepot Workout Department, Attn: CFO Brian Sullivan.” Id. The letter was received by “CENLAR” on December 14,2017, in Trenton, New Jersey. Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 8, ECF No. 32. Cenlar is a loan servicer for Defendant. Clark Decl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 33; Pl.'s Resp, Ex. 20, Deposition of Raymond Crawford 6:20-22, ECF No. 32 (“Crawford Dep.”).
On December 14, 2017, Plaintiff received another letter from Defendant's “Loan Workout Department” asking Plaintiff to send an enclosed form to: “Loan Workout Department, P.O. Box 77408, Ewing, N.J. 08628-6408.''Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 9 at 1, ECF No. 32. The letter also stated that “[q]ualified written requests, notifications of error, or requests for information concerning your loan must be directed to: PO Box 77423, Ewing, N.J. 08628.” Id.
On December 14, 2017, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant's Loss Mitigation Department directing him to send information about Plaintiff s financial hardship to: “PO Box 77408, Ewing, N.J. 08628-6408.” Id., Ex. 10 at 2. The letter also stated that “[q]ualified written requests, notifications of error, or requests for information concerning your loan must be directed to: PO Box 77423, Ewing, N.J. 08628.” Id. at 1.
In January 2018, Plaintiff called Defendant and “informed them that [he] had sent them on December 7, 2017, a Cashier's Check in the amount of $6,087.91 to cure any loan deficiencies.” Clark Decl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 33. “Thereafter, [Plaintiff] continued to make [his] monthly mortgage loan payments, but [Defendant] returned each andevery payment [Plaintiff] made unprocessed claiming that [he] was in default.” Id. For example, in February 2018, Defendant returned Plaintiff s check in the amount of $2,078.97 “because it is not sufficient to bringthe loan current” as the “amount required to bring [the] loan current is $10,288.35.” Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 11 at 1, ECF No. 32.
In March and April 2018, Defendant sent Plaintiff letters regardinghis application to Defendant's financial assistanceprogram. See id., Ex. 12 at 2-3 (“March 2018 Letter”); see also id., Ex. 13 at 2 (“April 2018 Letter”). Both letters stated that “Qualified Written Requests, notifications of error, or requests for information concerning your loan must be directed to: PO Box 77423, Ewing, N.J. 08628.” Id. The April 2018 Letter stated “[i]n order to avoid a negative impact to your credit rating resulting from late payments and to avoid foreclosure, it is important that you continue to make your mortgage payment by its scheduled due date” and the letter instructed Plaintiff to “[p] lease send your payment in the total amount due to: Loan Workout Department, PO Box 77408, Ewing, N.J. 08628-6408.” Id., Ex. 13 at 2. Plaintiff notes this “is the same address [his] Cashier's Check was delivered to” in December 2017. Clark Decl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 33. Plaintiff continued making his payments in April and May 2018. Id. ¶ 21.
On June 14, 2018, Plaintiff received a “Reinstatement Quote” from Clear Recon Corp advising Plaintiff that, in order to reinstate his loan, Plaintiff needed to pay $21,428.91 by June 29,2018. Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 14 at 1, ECF No. 32. The beneficiary was listed as “LoanDepot.com, LLC” and the servicer was listed as “Cenlar, FSB.” Id. The letter instructed Plaintiff that “[p]ayment should be made in the form of a cashier's check made payable to: Cenlar FSB.” Id. at 2. On July 16, 2018, Plaintiff received another “Reinstatement Quote” from Clear Recon Corp with the same instructions, except this time the amount owed had ballooned to $23,193.63 with a deadline of July 31,2018. Id., Ex. 15 at 1. Plaintiff was again instructed to make his check payable to Cenlar FSB. Id. at 2
In July 2018, Plaintiff “secured financing from the State of Oregon to pay the delinquency and avoid foreclosure” and “paid CENLAR $23,653.59 to save [his] home.” Clark Decl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 33. Plaintiff argues he was “required to pay late fees and foreclosure fees [he] should not have had to pay.” Id.
After he reinstated his loan, Plaintiff “discovered that [Defendant] falsely reported that [Plaintiff] failed to make payments on [his] mortgage from October 2017 through July 2018.” Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff asserts this reporting was false because he only missed two payments in October and November 2017, which he paid in full on December 7, 2017. Id. Plaintiff s credit score was lowered as a result of Defendant's reporting. Id. Plaintiff sent a Notice of Dispute to credit reporting agencies, see Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 17, ECF No. 32, and TransUnion and Equifax sent Plaintiff letters acknowledging receipt of his Notice of Dispute, see id., Ex. 18 at 1-4.
In April 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Jackson County Circu it Court and asserted a breach of contract claim and a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) claim against Defendant. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In November 2019, Defendant removed the case to federal court. See Def.'s Removal Notice, ECF No. 1. In October 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion. See Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 29 (“Def.'s Mot”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file, if any, show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue determines the materiality of a fact. T. W. Elec. Servs., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass‘n, 809F.2d 626, 630(9th Cir. 1987). Whetherthe evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party determines the authenticity of the dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Special rules of construction apply when evaluating a summary judgment motion: (1) all reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved against the moving party; and (2) all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues: (1) summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim because Plaintiff failed to deliver his payments to Defendant's correct address; and (2) summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiffs FCRA case because all credit reporting by Defendant was accurate. Def.'s Mot. 5-11, ECF No. 29. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
I. Breach of Contract
Defendant argues summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim because: (1) Plaintiff admits missing his October and November 2017 payments; (2) Plaintiff sent his payment to an address other than one directed by Defendant, thereby rendering Plaintiff's remittance ineffective. See Def.'s Mot. 5-6, ECF No. 29. Plaintiff argues Defendant was not entitled to initiate foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff because Plaintiff sent his payment to Defendant on December 7,2017. Pl.'s Resp. 9, ECF No. 32. Plaintiff emphasizes that Defendant's loan documents and correspondence contained many different addresses. Id. at 9-10.
In Oregon, “[t]o state a claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must allege the existence of a contract, its relevant terms, plaintiffs full performance and lack of breach[,] and defendant's breach resulting in damage to plaintiff.” Moyer v. Columbia State Bank, 316 Or.App. 393,402-03, 505 P.3d 26, 34 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Slover v. Or. State Bd. of Clinical Soc. Workers, 144 Or.App. 565, 570, 927P.2d 1098,1101 (Or. Ct. App. 1996)) (alteration in original).
Defendant concedes that Plaintiffs “[p]ayment of amounts owed would defeat [Defendant's] defense of non-payment” but argues that “Plaintiffs attempt to pay did not reach fruition because Plaintiff mailed the payment to an improper address which was notan address maintained by [Defendant].” Def.'s Mot. 5, ECF No. 29 (emphasis in original). Defendant also argues that Defendant “provided specific addresses for payments, correspondence, and other departments of loanDepot for the mailing of those items [b]ut Plaintiff chose not to use those addresses.” Id. at 6. The Court disagrees.
First, Defendant's loan documents and correspondence with Plaintiff contained seven different addresses: a street address in Foothill Ranch, California; P.O. Box 60085 in Los Angeles, California; P.O. Boxes 986 and 11733 in Newark, New Jersey; and P.O. Boxes 77404, 77408, and 77423 in Ewing, New Jersey. See, e.g., Anders Deci., Ex. G at 1, ECF No. 39 (Deed); id., Ex. H at20 (August 2016 Note);Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 1, ECF No. 32 (July 2017 Statement); id., Ex. 3 (September 2017 Statement); id., Ex. 4 (October 2017Notice); id., Ex. 5 (November 2017 Notice); id., Ex. 6 (Dec. 4, 2017 Letter); id., Ex. 9 (Dec. 14, 2017 Loan Workout Letter); id., Ex. 10 (Dec. 14, 2017 Loss Mitigation Letter); id., Ex. 12 (March 2018 Letter); id., Ex. 13 (April 2018 Letter). These loan documents, notices, and letters often did not specify to which address Plaintiff needed to send his payment-if they specified any address at all. See, e.g., id., Ex. 4 at 1 (October 2017 Notice). Although Defendant claims that that “[Defendant] directed [Plaintiff] to make payments ata specific address,” Defendant did not actually provide Plaintiff with one specific address for payments. Def.'s Mot. 6, ECF No. 29.
Second, Plaintiff mailed his payment to an address both listed in Defendant's correspondence with Plaintiff and maintained by Defendant's loan servicer. In December 2017, Plaintiff mailed a cashier's check covering his October, November, and December 2017 payments to P.O. Box 77408 in Ewing, New Jersey. Clark Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 33. The check was received by Cenlar, Defendant's loan servicer, on December 14, 2017. See Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 8, ECF No. 32; see also Crawford Dep., 6:20-22, ECF No. 32. Defendant later instructed Plaintiff to send his payments and financial hardship documents to the same address. See, e.g., Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 9 at 1,ECF No. 32 (Dec. 14, 2017 Loan Workout Letter). In April 2018, Defendant specifically instructed Plaintiff to “[p] lease send your payment in the total amount due to: Loan Workout Department, PO Box 77408, Ewing, N.J. 08628-6408.”Id., Ex. 13 at 2. Plaintiff had already done so in December 2017.
Defendant's claim that “[Defendant] directed [Plaintiff] to make payments at a specific address” is unsupported by the evidentiary record. Def.'s Mot. 6, ECF No. 29. As explained, Defendant provided Plaintiff with numerous addresses. Additionally, Plaintiff mailed his late October and November 2017 payments to Defendant's loan servicer at P.O. Box 77408 and Defendant later instructed Plaintiff to send his payments to P.O. Box 77408. At a minimum, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff properly sent his payments to Defendant. Defendant's motion should be denied as to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim.
II. FCRA
Defendant argues summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's FCRA claim because: (1) all credit reporting by Defendant was accurate; and (2) Defendant was never contacted by a credit reporting agency (“CRA”). Def.'s Mot. 9-10, ECF No. 29. Plaintiff argues that: (1) Defendant falsely reported to CRAs that Plaintiff failed to make monthly payments from October 2017 through July 2018 when Plaintiff had only missed two payments; and (2) Plaintiff submitted a dispute to CRAs and those CRAs were legally obligated to forward Plaintiffs dispute to Defendant. See Pl.'s Mot. 13-14, ECF No. 32.
“The FCRA arose out of ‘congressional concern over abuses in the credit reporting industry.'” Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 891 F.3d 749,755 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995)). The purpose of the FCRA is “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)).To effectuate its purpose, the FCRA imposes duties on credit reporting agencies and on “furnishers” of credit information. Id. at 1153-54. A furnisher cannot report “any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the [furnisher] knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A).If a consumer disputes reported information, the furnisher, upon receiving notice of the dispute, must conduct a reasonable investigation and report its findings to the credit reporting agencies. Gorman, 584F.3d at 1156-57.
Consumers may bring a private right of action under the FCRA against a furnisher who, after receiving notice of a dispute, fails to conduct a reasonable investigation or continues to provide inaccurate information following an investigation. Id. at 1162 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)). A furnisher's duties are triggered “after the furnisher received notice of dispute from a CRA; notice of a dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger the furnisher's duties under subsection (b').” Id. at 1154. “By its ordinary meaning, an ‘investigation' requires an inquiry likely to turn up information about the underlying facts and positions of the parties, not a cursory or sloppy review of the dispute.” Id. at 1155. “[A] credit entry can be ‘incomplete or inaccurate' within the meaning of the FCRA ‘because it is patently incorrect, or because it is misleadingin such a way and to such an extentthat it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.'”Id. at 1163 (quoting Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Defendant first argues that all credit reporting by Defendant was accurate. See Def.'s Mot. 9, ECF No. 29. As discussed, Plaintiff mailed his late October and November 2017 payments to Defendant's loan servicer at P.O. Box 77408 and Defendant later instructed Plaintiff to send his payments to P.O. Box 77408. Defendant also provided Plaintiff with numerous addresses in its loan documents and correspondence. As such, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's credit reporting was accurate when Defendant reported that Plaintiff failed to make his monthly payments after November 2017.
Defendant also argues that it “was never required to conduct an investigation into Plaintiff's dispute because it was never contactedby a CRA." Def.'s Mot. 10, ECF No. 29 (emphasis in original). It is true that a furnisher's duties are triggered only “after the furnisher received notice of dispute from a CRA” and that “notice of a dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger the furnisher's duties under subsection (b).” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154; see also Peasley v. Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC, 364 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1202 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (“Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, a violation of § 16 81 s-2(b) only occurs where the furnisher of information has been contacted by a credit reporting agency.”). However, once a consumer notifies a CRA about a dispute, the CRA “shall provide notification of the dispute to any person who provided any item of information in dispute” within five business days. 15U.S.C. § 1681 i(a)); see also Gross v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246,1251 (9th Cir. 2022) (“If the consumer finds something amiss on the credit report, one option is to file a dispute with the credit reporting agency, which in turn notifies the entities that ‘furnished' information about the consumer's debt.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681 i(a)).
Here, Plaintiff sent a document titled “Credit Report Dispute” to TransUnion and < Equifax. See Pl.'s Resp., Ex. 17, ECF No. 32. Equifax sent Plaintiff a letter dated December 14, 2018, acknowledging Plaintiff's dispute and stating the following:
If we were able to make changes to your credit report based on the information you provided, we have done so. Otherwise, we contacted the company reporting the information to Equifax for them to investigate your dispute.
In this situation: [1] We requestthat the reporting company verify the accuracy of the information you disputed; [2] We provide them with any relevant information and supporting documentation you provided us with the dispute to consider as part of the investigation; and [3] We request that they send Equifax a response to your dispute and update their records and systems, as necessary. [...]
When the reporting company replies to us, they certify that they have followed Equifax's instructions and the law; considered all information and documentation provided; and updated your information, as necessary.Id., Ex. 18 at 2.
Because Plaintiff notified CRAs about his dispute, this Court presumes the CRAs notified Defendant about Plaintiff s dispute pursuant to a CRA's obligations under Section 1681 i(a).See Gross, 33 F.4th at 1251 (notingthat a consumer can file a dispute with CRA “which in turn notifies the [furnisher]” about the consumer's dispute). This notice triggered Defendant's duty to conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1) (“After receiving notice pursuant to section 1681 i(a)(2) of this title of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a [furnisher] to a consumer reporting agency, the [furnisher] shall... conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information [.]”); see also Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 690 F.3d 1100,1106-07 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that CRA's letter to furnisher stating that consumer “has advised our office that a fraudulent application was submitted to your company with the consumer's identification, but without, [the consumer's] knowledge and consent” was sufficient to trigger furnisher's duties under FCRA). At a minimum, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether and when a CRA notified Defendant of the disputed information. Defendant's motion should be denied as to Plaintiff's FCRA claim.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) should be DENIED.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order.
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).