Opinion
1:21-cv-01769-CL
01-19-2023
ELIZABETH CLARK, Plaintiff, v. ANDREA JANNY, Defendant.
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
MARK D. CLARKE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Plaintiff Elizabeth Clark, a self-represented litigant, seeks to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") in this action against Defendant Judge Andrea Janny. For the reasons below, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs amended complaint (ECF No. 8) be DISMISSED with prejudice.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in a United States District Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, a court must assess whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standards, the complaint must include a short and plain statement of the claim and "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl, Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard ... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A court is not required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true. Id.
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v, Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). That is, a court should construe pleadings by a. pro se plaintiff liberally and afford a. pro se plaintiff the benefits of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep 't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Id.
DISCUSSION
Here, Plaintiffs claims are subject to absolute judicial immunity and are barred by the Rooker-Feldmcm doctrine. Additionally, this Court previously gave Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in her first complaint, see Order, ECF No. 5, but Plaintiff has not done so in her amended complaint. For these reasons, Plaintiffs complaint cannot be cured by amendment, and it should be dismissed with prejudice.
First, Judge Janny is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Judges are generally immune from civil actions for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief based on judicial acts performed in their judicial capacity. Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996); Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist, of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385,1388 (9th Cir. 1987). To determine whether a particular act is judicial in nature, a court examines the following factors: "(1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity." Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Meek v. Cty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999)). Judges have "absolute immunity even when their actions are erroneous, malicious, or in excess of judicial authority." Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 576 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs claims arise out of a parental custody case in the Klamath County Circuit Court and Judge Andrea Janny's rulings in that case. Judge Janny is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for the decisions made in her courtroom.
Additionally, Plaintiff cannot challenge a state court judgment in federal court. Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction "when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court judgment," Kongasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136,1140 (9th Cir. 2004), Though it is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks a reversal of Judge Janny's decision and judgment, they are at the heart of the harm she alleges. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges the state court judgment is her legal injury, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars her claims.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8) should be DISMISSED with prejudice.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order.
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991)