Summary
applying discovery rule in medical malpractice action
Summary of this case from Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc.Opinion
No. 83-723
Decided February 15, 1984.
Malpractice — Physicians — Statute of limitations — Discovery rule applicable — Summary judgment improperly granted, when.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
Plaintiff-appellant, Steven J. Clark, was involved in a serious automobile accident on or about June 25, 1979. He was transported to the emergency room of defendant Hawkes Hospital of Mt. Carmel, for treatment of injuries sustained in the accident. At the time of admission into the hospital, appellant was assigned defendant-appellee, Kathleen Musser, M.D., a general surgeon, as his attending physician.
Appellant, in his malpractice action against defendants brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, asserts that while under the care of appellee, and allegedly as a result of her negligent treatment, he contracted a staphylococcal infection. Clark further alleges that Dr. Musser inappropriately and negligently treated the infection causing various additional injuries and medical complications including staphylococcal endocarditis. Appellant was in and out of the hospital for treatment of the complications arising from this staph infection from July 1979 until on or about May 4, 1981. Dr. Musser was not his attending physician during this entire period. She had transferred appellant to other physicians more experienced in the area of infectious disease during the month of July 1979. The last notation made by Dr. Musser on the medical record of appellant appears in the progress note for July 28, 1979.
Based on these facts the court granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the doctor-patient relationship between appellant and appellee had terminated more than one year before the institution of this suit. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, based upon the termination rule of Wyler v. Tripi (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 164 [54 O.O.2d 283].
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. Russell H. Volkema and Mr. Hans Scherner, for appellant.
Komito, Nurenberg, Plevin, Jacobson, Heller McCarthy Co., L.P.A., and Mr. William A. Davis, for appellee.
Since the entry of summary judgment in the case sub judice, Wyler v. Tripi, supra, has been overruled. See Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 111. The lower courts applied the termination rule of Wyler to the facts in this case, using the termination of the doctor-patient relationship as the accrual point for the commencement of the one-year statute of limitations contained in R.C. 2305.11(A). The trial court granted the doctor's motion for summary judgment finding that the action was not timely commenced. The court of appeals affirmed. We are compelled to reverse this judgment based on the recent move to the discovery standard for medical malpractice claimants adopted in Oliver.
No longer may courts apply the termination of the doctor-patient relationship as the accrual point for medical malpractice causes of action. The court in Oliver expressed that under the discovery standard, "[a] cause of action for medical malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the patient discovers, or, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have discovered the resulting injury." Id. at the syllabus.
Oliver's adoption of the discovery standard requires reversal and remand for further proceedings consistent with such standards. The facts which are before the court are not sufficient to determine whether the appellant discovered or should have discovered his resulting injuries more than one year before he commenced this action. In cases such as this courts must carefully examine a full record which addresses the discovery standard before entering any judgment.
Appellant and appellee each addressed this case based upon the old Wyler standard of termination. On remand the trial court will provide the parties the opportunity to address the appellant's actual or constructive discovery of the infection as a resulting injury of appellee's alleged malpractice. The statute of limitations contained in R.C. 2305.11(A) commences to run when a patient actually discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have discovered an injury which is the result of malpractice. The standard of reasonable care and diligence required by this test is that which is employed by an ordinary reasonably prudent person in like circumstances.
Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN and J.P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.