Clark v. Fed Land Bank

4 Citing cases

  1. Byerlein v. Shipp

    182 Mich. App. 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 7 times

    [ First National Bank of Utica v Ramm, 256 Mich. 573, 575; 240 N.W. 32 (1932).] See also Vollmer v Coenis, 309 Mich. 319, 324; 15 N.W.2d 654 (1944); Clark v Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 167 Mich. App. 439, 444; 423 N.W.2d 220 (1987); Sylvania Savings Bank v Turner, 27 Mich. App. 640, 644-645; 183 N.W.2d 894 (1970). Quite obviously it is in plaintiff's best interest to keep her mortgage lien alive, and her intent to do so will be implied absent an expressed intent to the contrary.

  2. Union Bank v. Farmwald

    450 N.W.2d 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 4 times

    Next, Johnson Carpet claims that, under the merger doctrine, Union Bank's mortgage interests in both Rum Creek lots were extinguished and discharged by Farmwald's prior conveyance of the mortgaged premises to Union Bank. In Clark v The Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, 167 Mich. App. 439, 444; 423 N.W.2d 220 (1987), this Court, quoting from Titus v Cavalier, 276 Mich. 117, 120-121; 267 N.W. 799 (1936), discussed the doctrine of merger of estates: There is no doubt about the general rule that when the holder of a real estate mortgage becomes the owner of the fee, the former estate is merged in the latter.

  3. U.S. Leather, Inc. v. Mitchell Mfg. Group, Inc.

    276 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 2002)   Cited 10 times
    Interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 69

    We agree that equitable considerations preclude Mitchell Automotive from avoiding merger when the effect is not to protect its own interests from the creditors of the Lamont Group (the mortgagor), but rather to prefer the debt owed to its parent corporation over the debt owed to USL as a third party. Mitchell Corp. continues to rely on the cases of Union Bank Trust Co. v. Farmwald Development Corp., 181 Mich.App. 538, 450 N.W.2d 274 (1989), and Clark v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 167 Mich. App. 439, 423 N.W.2d 220 (1987), to argue that USL is not a "third party" entitled to equitable protection. While the intention to avoid merger was given effect in those cases, the rationale in each case was to protect the first mortgagee against claims of another mortgagee or creditor of the mortgagor. This rationale has no application here since Mitchell Automotive, the mortgagee, is not seeking protection against junior claims of Lamont's creditors; but is itself the debtor seeking to avoid collection of the judgment entered against it.

  4. Reserve at Heritage Vill. Ass'n v. Warren Fin. Acquisition, Llc.

    305 Mich. App. 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 30 times
    In Heritage Village, the condominium association pursued judicial foreclosure, MCL 600.3101 et seq.; therefore, the litigation took place at a point in time when there had yet to be a foreclosure or sheriff's sale, which could have produced a purchaser to satisfy the condominium-fee debt.

    In Union Bank & Trust Co., NA v. Farmwald Dev. Corp., 181 Mich.App. 538, 547–548, 450 N.W.2d 274 (1989), this Court concluded that a third party's rights “were not affected by the intention to keep the mortgage alive inasmuch as it was already aware that its mortgage was junior to [the bank's] mortgage.” See also Titus v. Cavalier, 276 Mich. 117, 121, 267 N.W. 799 (1936) (concluding that where the individual knew he was receiving a junior mortgage, his rights were not affected by the intent to keep the mortgage alive); Clark v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul, 167 Mich.App. 439, 445, 423 N.W.2d 220 (1987) (concluding that “plaintiff's rights were not affected by the intention to keep the mortgage alive, for she knew her judgment lien was subject to a first mortgage pursuant to the judgment of divorce”). In Tower v. Divine, 37 Mich. 443, 446 (1877), the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the junior mortgagee's position was “made no worse....”