Opinion
6:22-cv-00845-MK
05-12-2023
LASHONDA LYNN CLARK, Plaintiff, v. CT CORPORATION SYSTEM on behalf of GENESIS FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC.; and AP FURNITURE INC., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro Se Plaintiff Lashonda Lynn Clark (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Defendants CT Corporation System OBO Genesis Financial Solutions, Inc. (“GFS”) and AP Furniture, Inc. (“AP”). See Compl., ECF 1. Defendant GFS filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asking the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. ECF 38. For the reasons that follow, GFS's motion should be GRANTED in part. Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on June 10, 2022, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) as well as causes of action under the Truth-inLending Act (“TILA”), and a state law claim for invasion of privacy. After GFS filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings on February 10, 2023, Plaintiff failed to file a response by the deadline of March 10, 2023. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on May 3, 2023, advising Plaintiff that if she did not file a response by May 5, 2023, the Court would take GFS's motion under advisement without the benefit of a response from Plaintiff. As of the date of these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff has not filed a response. GFS's motion was taken under advisement as of May 8, 2023.
STANDARD
After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is “functionally identical” to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the same standard of review applies to both motions. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989).
“Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 979). The court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, id., but the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations allow the court to infer the defendant's liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than “the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 678.
Although Twombly dealt with a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), as noted above, the same standard of review applies to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dworkin, 867 F.2d at 1192.
DISCUSSION
GFS argues that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate because Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading standards set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Plaintiff's complaint includes a “Statement of Claim,” which states the following:
1. AP Furniture, Inc. failed to provide full disclosure in the Consumer Credit Transaction on June 22, 2022, Financed by Genesis Financial Solutions, Inc., and used misleading misrepresentations.
2. Genesis Financial Solutions, Inc. failed to properly respond to my notice of claims and debt validation [and] has not be [sic] met pursuant to Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S. Code 1692g, and Truth in Lending (Regulation Z).
3. Defendants have not proved they put their own assets at risk or loaned monies in its possession or incurred a loss.
4. Genesis Financial Solutions, Inc. used tactics of harassment and coercion with numerous unwanted notices, emails, and telephone calls in attempts to collect payment.
5. July 2021 Genesis Financial Solutions, Inc. began furnishing adverse information to my credit reports without proper authorization.
6. The unlawful actions of the defendants caused a great deal of damage to my person, reputation, property, livelihood, creditworthiness, and invasion of privacy.Complaint, ECF 1, at 5. GFS argues that Plaintiff's allegations in the “Statement of Claim” and throughout the Complaint fail to present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff has not alleged that either named defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA; (2) Plaintiff fails to specify which TILA disclosure she did not receive in violation of TILA; (3) Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim for “furnishing adverse information to my credit reports without proper authorization” or alleged that GFS “put [its] own assets at risk or loaned monies in its possession or incurred a loss” as alleged in Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the “Statement of Claim”; and (4) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees.
This requirement ensures the defendant receives “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rule 8(a)(2) also ensures a plaintiff “with a largely groundless claim” may not “unlock the doors of discovery . . . armed with nothing more than conclusions” and “take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.” Id.
I. Debt Collector Element of FDCPA
GFS first argues that Plaintiff's claims under the FDCPA should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege that GFS is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA. GFS also argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege with specificity which parts of the FDCPA GFS has violated. To establish a violation of the FDCPA, a claimant must show (1) she was a consumer (2) who was the object of a collection activity arising from a consumer debt, (3) the defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA, and (4) engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. Miranda v. Law Office of D. Scott Carruthers, 2011 WL 2037556 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) (citing Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2004)). Because Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege that either named defendant is a debt collector, she has failed to plead the elements of a FDCPA claim. Therefore, Plaintiff's FDCPA claims should be dismissed.
II. Failure to Specify TILA Disclosure
GFS next argues that Plaintiff's TILA claim should be dismissed because she fails to allege which disclosure she did not receive. TILA requires creditors to provide disclosure of credit terms to borrowers before they are bound so that a consumer can more readily compare credit terms and avoid the uninformed use of credit. See 15 U.S.C. 1601(a). To state a claim for a TILA violation, a claimant must allege specific facts showing that she did not receive a required disclosure or that the disclosures she received were not clear and conspicuous. Here, Plaintiff's statement of claim alleges:
2. Genesis Financial Solutions, Inc. failed to properly respond to my notice of claims and debt validation [and] has not be [sic] met pursuant to Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S. Code 1692g, and Truth in Lending (Regulation Z).ECF 1 at 5. While courts liberally construe pleadings from a pro se plaintiff, pro se pleadings must still allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine whether a claim has been stated. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Vague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 268. Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the Rule 8 pleading requirements to state a claim under TILA. Plaintiff's second claim for relief should therefore be dismissed.
III. Paragraphs 3 and 5
Defendant next argues that paragraphs 3 and 5 of Plaintiff's Statement of Claim have no basis in law and should be dismissed. Those paragraphs allege:
3. Defendants have not proved they put their own assets at risk or loaned monies in its possession or incurred a loss.
5. July 2021 Genesis Financial Solutions, Inc. began furnishing adverse information to my credit reports without proper authorization.Here, Plaintiff has cited no legal basis to show that she is entitled to relief for either of these alleged actions by defendants. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, provides for a private cause of action against a data furnisher for failure to reasonably investigate a consumer's dispute of credit-reported information after a consumer disputes that information with a credit reporting agency and after that dispute is forwarded to the data furnisher. See Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mort. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff's third and fifth claims fail to allege appropriate facts to state a claim under the FCRA or any other statute, these claims fail to meet the pleading standard set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and should be dismissed.
IV. Invasion of Privacy
GFS argues, finally, that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against either defendant for invasion of privacy. Paragraph six of Plaintiff's Statement of Claim alleges:
6. The unlawful actions of the defendants caused a great deal of damage to my person, reputation, property, livelihood, creditworthiness, and invasion of privacy.ECF 1 at 5. In Oregon, state law tort of invasion of privacy can also be pled under a theory of intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of another's name or likeness, false light, or publication of private facts. Perez-Denison v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 868 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1089 (D. Or. 2012). To state a claim for invasion of privacy under intrusion upon seclusion, for example, a claimant must allege intrusion of such a character as to be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. at 1089. Here, without further allegations as to the offensiveness of defendants' alleged conduct, Plaintiff's sixth claim for relief does not plead sufficient facts to state a claim under Oregon law for intrusion upon seclusion. Plaintiff has also failed to plead sufficient facts to show an invasion of privacy under a theory of false light or publication of private facts. Plaintiff's sixth claim should therefore be dismissed.
V. Leave to Amend
A court may grant leave to amend in response to a Rule 12(c) motion if the pleadings can be cured by further factual enhancement. See Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 311 F.Supp.2d 898, 903 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (because motions for judgment on the pleadings are analyzed under the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings may give leave to amend); Kemp v. Regents of University of Cal., 2010 WL 2889224 at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (“[b]ecause motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are ‘functionally identical' [citation omitted], leave to amend should be granted unless amendment would be futile.”) (citing Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)).
GFS argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims without leave to amend because additional factual allegations could not resuscitate Plaintiff's potential claims against defendants. With respect to Plaintiff's FDCPA claims, for example, GFS argues that Plaintiff's claims cannot succeed because neither named defendant is a “debt collector” for the purposes of the FDCPA, because Plaintiff's exhibits conflict with her factual pleadings regarding which defendant financed the transaction at issue. With respect to Plaintiff's FCRA claim, GFS argues that “Plaintiff well knows” that a dispute process required by the FCRA did not occur. ECF 38 at 14. GFS also argues that Plaintiff has not pointed to any TILA disclosure and confuses debt validation under the FDCPA with TILA disclosures; and that Plaintiff offers no supporting facts to substantiate an invasion of privacy claim.
Here, because Plaintiff's Complaint contains conflicting allegations of material facts and fails to state a claim for relief, GFS's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims should be granted. However, it is unclear to this Court whether, if given leave to amend, Plaintiff could successfully plead the elements of an invasion of privacy claim or plead that the dispute process required by the FCRA did in fact occur. For these reasons, it is not clear to this Court that leave to amend would be futile. See Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc., 911 F.2d at 247. The Court therefore recommends that this case be dismissed without prejudice, and with leave to amend within 60 days of this Findings and Recommendation becoming final.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, defendant's motion for judgment on the Pleadings (ECF 38) should be GRANTED in part. Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).