The decision whether to grant a motion for a mistrial is a matter submitted to the trial court's sound discretion. Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 661, 385 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1989); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Futrell, 209 Va. 266, 274, 163 S.E.2d 181, 187 (1968); seeRose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 157, 597 S.E.2d 64, 76 (2004); Robertson v. Metro. Wash. Airport Auth., 249 Va. 72, 77, 452 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1995). This broad discretionary power reflects in part the principle that a jury is presumed to have followed a timely and explicit cautionary instruction directing it to disregard an improper remark or question by counsel.

A customer shopping at a business is perhaps the paradigmatic example of an invitee for purposes of premises liability. See Clark v. Chapman, 385 S.E.2d 885, 892 (Va. 1989)). Here, the record demonstrates (and the parties do not dispute) that Wallace was an invitee at the Ruther Glen Love's location.

A review of other Virginia case law reveals a possibility that a Virginia court or jury could find that a moving truck on a loading dock, which Ragland did not observe or hear coming toward him, was not an open and obvious danger. See Clark v. Chapman, 385 S.E.2d 885, 892-93 (Va. 1989) (affirming jury verdict in favor of grocery store customer who brought negligence action against store and store employee to recover for injuries she suffered when the employee pushed a loaded produce cart into her, finding that the moving produce cart, which plaintiff did not observe or hear coming toward her, did not pose an open and obvious danger);see also Miracle Mart, Inc. v. Webb, 137 S.E.2d 887, 890 (Va. 1964) (affirming holding that evidence raised a jury question whether store breached duty to warn customer of foreign substance on store floor where customer's view of the floor where the substance was located was completely obstructed, making it impossible for her to see the substance). Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty that Ragland cannot establish the facts necessary to support his claim that Sysco was negligent for failing to exercise reasonable care for his safety.

Such an award is usually proper under Virginia law." Corrigan, 609 F. Supp. at 732-33; see also Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 662, 385 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1989). Musick has not worked since the accident.

First, we have held that expert testimony regarding future lost income is too speculative to go to the jury when the expert's opinion is based upon too scant of a work history. Compare Cassady v. Martin, 220 Va. 1093, 1095–96, 1100, 266 S.E.2d 104, 104–05, 108 (1980) (8 weeks of work history insufficient to make 21 year old decedent's 44 years of future lost income not speculative), with Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 665–67, 385 S.E.2d 885, 891–92 (1989) (6 weeks of work history, in addition to a minimal and intermittent string of jobs, sufficient to make 41 year old plaintiff's 11 years of future lost income not speculative).

"A mistrial should not be granted for minor irregularities and mistakes in a trial which can be cured by a direction from the trial court to disregard the irregularity or mistake." Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 661, 385 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1989) (citations omitted). Rather, its purpose is to end the proceedings and begin anew when "there is a manifest probability that objectionable evidence or statements before the jury are prejudicial to the adverse party."

We have repeatedly held that expert testimony must be based upon an adequate foundation. Lawson v. Doe, 239 Va. 477, 482-83, 391 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1990); Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 664-65, 385 S.E.2d 885, 891 (1989). Expert testimony is inadmissible if such testimony is speculative or founded upon assumptions that have no basis in fact.

[1-2] Expert testimony is admissible in civil cases to assist the trier of fact, if the testimony meets certain fundamental requirements, including the requirement that it be based on an adequate factual foundation. See Code §§ 8.01-401.1 and -401.3; Lawson v. Doe, 239 Va. 477, 482-83, 391 S.E.2d 333, 336 (1990); Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 664-65, 385 S.E.2d 885, 891 (1989). Expert testimony is inadmissible if it is speculative or founded on assumptions that have no basis in fact.

Several heavy bolts of fabric leaning against a table is not so remarkable or patent a danger that an invitee unfamiliar with the nature of the danger posed thereby would naturally seek to avoid it. Absent clear knowledge by O'Brien of the danger this condition presented, the jury properly could have found that she was privileged to browse the display floor without guarding herself from being struck by a falling bolt of fabric. See Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 667-68, 385 S.E.2d 885, 892-93 (1989). Since we conclude that the factual issues were properly submitted to the jury, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the jury's verdict, and enter final judgment for the plaintiff on this verdict.Reversed and final judgment.

The occurrence complained of must be of such character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way. See Schuttler v. Reinhardt, 17 N.J.Super. 480, 86 A.2d 438 (App.Div. 1952); Back v. Duncan, 246 Ark. 494, 438 S.W.2d 690 (1969); Kresel v. Giese, 231 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1975); and Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 385 S.E.2d 885 (1989). The standard set forth by the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Reed v. Wimmer, 195 W. Va. 199, 465 S.E.2d 199, 207 (1995), a personal injury action, is representative: