Opinion
NUMBER 13-16-00478-CV
04-26-2018
SHAKERIA CLARK, Appellant, v. MAURICIO P. BLANCO AND VERONICA R. ARRELLANO, Appellees.
On appeal from the 135th District Court of Calhoun County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
Appellant Shakeria Clark appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of appellees Mauricio P. Blanco and Veronica R. Arrellano. By two issues, appellant contends that there is more than a scintilla of evidence that appellees were not bona fide purchasers and that appellees should have intervened in a prior suit. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant entered into an earnest money contract to purchase a parcel of land in Calhoun County, Texas. Subsequently, and without appellant's knowledge, the seller of the land sold the property to appellees. Appellant sued the seller in a separate suit. Appellee prevailed in her claims against the seller, but appellant did not include appellees in that suit. After notifying appellees of her judgment against the seller, appellant sued appellees for tortious interference with an existing contract, assisting or encouraging common law fraud, and for a declaratory judgment seeking to clear title to the property and a declaration that appellees were not bona fide purchasers in good faith.
On January 19, 2016, the trial court signed a notice of setting of a trial on the merits for May 4, 2016. On that date, in a bench trial, the trial court heard testimony from several witnesses including, among others, appellant and appellees. After hearing the evidence, the trial court rendered a judgment against appellant. This appeal followed.
II. THE JUDGMENT
Appellant contends that she is appealing from the trial court's ruling on appellees' motion for summary judgment, and she cites the standard of review regarding summary judgments and focuses her entire first issue on whether she raised a genuine issue of material fact in her response to appellees' motion for summary judgment. However, based on our review of the record, the judgment from which appellant appeals is not a ruling on a summary judgment. Accordingly, we need not address appellant's argument that she produced more than a scintilla of evidence raising a question of fact regarding whether appellees were bona fide purchasers. We overrule appellant's first issue.
The trial court set the case for a trial on the merits that was heard on May 4, 2016. The trial court's docket sheet entry and reporter's record indicate that a trial on the merits occurred on May 4, 2016. In addition, at the May 4, 2016 proceeding, the trial court heard testimony from several witnesses. See Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex.1998) (per curiam) ("Oral testimony cannot be adduced in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment.") (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) ("No oral testimony shall be received at the hearing.")). Finally, in its final judgment, the trial court stated that appellant "take nothing by her suit" and that she "take nothing on all of her claims and causes of action against" appellees.
Appellant claims that she raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether appellees knew about the contract appellant entered to purchase the property. She argues that an issue of fact was raised because at a hearing in her prior cause against the seller, the trial court asked, "Do they know that this is going on," and the seller replied, "No sir. But they told me I can literally forfeit the contract [with appellant] over there at that Stuart [sic] place because she wasn't fulfilling her agreement." However, based on our review of the record it does not appear that this evidence was admitted at the trial on the merits.
Moreover, at the trial in this cause, Blanco testified that prior to purchasing the property from the seller, he had not known of appellant and that no one told him that there was a prior contract with appellant and the seller regarding the property. Blanco testified that although he met the seller at Stuart Title Company, he was not present when the seller spoke to the employees. In addition, during his testimony, evidence was presented that appellees did not contact the seller after learning about appellant's claim because they did not know about the contract between appellant and the seller.
Appellant does not challenge the propriety of the judgment resulting from the bench trial.
III. INTERVENTION
By her second issue, appellant contends that "appellees waived their claim" by failing to intervene in appellant's lawsuit against the seller. Appellant does not specify which claim appellees allegedly waived. Presumably, appellant takes issue with appellees' assertion that they were bona fide purchasers.
We note that appellant's brief does not contain a clear or concise argument for this Court to reverse the trial court on the basis argued in her second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Nonetheless, we will do our best to address the issue as presented.
Appellant cites, and we find, no case law stating that appellees were required to intervene in her lawsuit against the seller to preserve their bona fide purchasers defense. Moreover, in this cause, appellant requested for the trial court to determine whether appellees were bona fide purchasers, and the trial court did so. Specifically, appellant sought "a declaration that [appellees] were not bona fide purchasers in good faith." We cannot conclude that the trial court erred by doing what appellant requested. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice Delivered and filed the 26th day of April, 2018.