The conclusion of an expert witness on the ultimate issue of fact does not necessarily create an issue for jury determination. Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694 ( 340 S.E.2d 627) (1986); Barnett v. First Fed. Savings c., 169 Ga. App. 396 (3) ( 313 S.E.2d 115) (1984). "Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694, 696 (1) ( 340 SE2d 627) (1986). Nor do we agree that Mrs. Bruscato had a special relationship with Dr. O'Brien based upon privity giving rise to a duty to aid or protect. Citing to Purcell v. Breese, 250 Ga. App. 472, 476 (3) ( 552 SE2d 865) (2001) and Ga. Osteopathic Hosp. v. O'Neal, 198 Ga. App. 770, 773-774 (3) ( 403 SE2d 235) (1991), Bruscato argues that separate and apart from the Bradley Center framework, a duty exists if there is privity between the decedent and the physician or hospital.

Finally, a doctor's acceptance of a telephone call from a patient he treated for a previous, unrelated matter established no doctor-patient relationship because the doctor did not undertake "to render his medical expertise available to her." Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694, 697 (2) ( 340 SE2d 627) (1986). The established test in Georgia for determining the initial creation of a physician-patient relationship is well within the comprehension of the average layman, in that it more nearly involves the application of non-expert concepts of a contractual nature rather than any expert medical principles.

Consequently, expert testimony was not required. See Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694, 695-696 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 627) (1986). We find no error. The trial court properly denied Grant's motion for new trial.

See generally Minster v.Pohl, supra 620-621(2). Although "there is no rule of law that requires a physician to undertake the treatment of every patient who applies to him," when, as in this case, a defendant undertakes for compensation to consult on the care of a patient for four and one half years, such undisputed facts and circumstances create a professional relationship and duty of care. Buttersworth v. Swint, supra at 604; accord Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694, 696-697(2) ( 340 S.E.2d 627) (1986). Thus, defendant "knowingly accept[ed] [Kim] as a [consultation] patient," even though she did not intend to create a legal relationship as psychologist-patient; by undertaking intentionally to act as a consultant in the care and treatment of the plaintiff, the defendant created the legal relationship of psychologist-patient.

In reversing the superior court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment, this court found that there was a limited relationship created, because neither the nurse and hospital, nor Lively consented to a patient-health care provider relationship. See also Payne v. Sherrer, 217 Ga. App. 761 ( 458 S.E.2d 916) (1995); Rogers v. Coronet Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App. 46, 49 (3) ( 424 S.E.2d 338) (1992); Minster v. Pohl, 206 Ga. App. 617 ( 426 S.E.2d 204) (1992); Peace v. Weisman, 186 Ga. App. 697 (1); Brumbalow v. Fritz, 183 Ga. App. 231 (1) ( 358 S.E.2d 872) (1987); Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694 ( 340 S.E.2d 627) (1986). In this case, we find that the requisite consensual relationship was established between South Fulton and the Poes, and that the denials of the motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were proper. Unlike Clough, Clanton, and the cases cited above, the Poes did not limit the relationship with South Fulton in any manner — they desired and sought out any medical assistance they needed for their baby.

A party may not bolster his [case] as to the ultimate issue with expert testimony when the jury could reach the same conclusion independently of the opinion of others."(Citations and punctuation omitted). Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694, 695-696 ( 340 S.E.2d 627) (1986) Here, the officer testified as to his observations at the scene of the accident, testified that Melton's vehicle was traveling between 35 and 45 mph, and testified that the maximum safe speed for any vehicle under the conditions prevailing at the time of the accident was 30 to 35 mph. "Where . . . it is possible for . . . the jury to take the same elements and constituent factors which guide the expert to his conclusions and from them alone made an equally intelligent judgment of their own, independently of the opinion of others, then . . . it [is] their province, their right and duty, to form their own conclusions as to the ultimate fact of negligence, uninfluenced by the opinion of the [expert] witness."

Although "[t]he opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions shall always be admissible," OCGA § 24-9-67, "the scope of what is admissible as expert opinion testimony is not unlimited." Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694, 695 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 627) (1986). No professional skill or specialized medical knowledge is necessarily required to resolve the issue whether a doctor-patient relationship existed.

The patient-health care provider relationship is a consensual one wherein the patient knowingly seeks the assistance of a health care provider. Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 201, supra; Buttersworth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 603, 604 ( 186 S.E. 770); Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694 ( 340 S.E.2d 627). Thus, as the uncontroverted evidence shows that Lively declined to enter into a patient-health care provider relationship any broader than necessary to accomplish the drawing of a blood sample, no relationship was created which gave rise to the level of professional duty advocated by appellees.

ford Hospital and his departure from Northside the following day, Baldwin had not harmed or threatened to harm anyone other than himself, nor had he previously expressed to his mother or sister an intention to harm anyone else. Although the printed language in the Form 1013 specified that Baldwin presented a substantial risk of imminent harm "to himself or other," it is apparent from the handwritten language that what prompted the execution of the form was Baldwin's threat to commit suicide. Thus, in contrast to the Bradley Center case, there is no basis upon which any of the defendants in the present case can reasonably be charged with the breach of a duty to foresee and prevent an injury to third persons. Under the circumstances, the affidavit submitted by the appellant's expert to the effect that the appellees were guilty of professional malpractice in their handling and treatment of Baldwin establishes no basis for a recovery against them by anyone other than Baldwin himself. Cf. Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694 ( 340 S.E.2d 627) (1986). We accordingly conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the appellees with respect to the merits of the appellant's claim.