We do find an issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs, as they contend, had a vested right to the continuation of R-II zoning of this property. Although the various jurisdictions appear to be in sharp conflict on the issue, this court, in Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 ( 149 S.E.2d 489), has recognized that a property owner may under some circumstances acquire a vested right to the continuation of zoning regulations applicable to the land when he purchased it. See also, 58 AmJur 1034, Zoning, §§ 173, 174; Anno. 138 ALR 501-503.
This is the second appearance of this case. See Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 ( 149 S.E.2d 489). In the former appearance this court reversed the judgment of the trial judge sustaining a general demurrer to the petition.
" Therefore, Cooper's claim is that if the current zoning classification prohibited his solid-waste transfer station, that zoning classification would be unconstitutionally applied to him because of his vested rights. Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 258 ( 149 S.E.2d 489) (1966). "The doctrine of vested rights is based on constitutional grounds.
Compare Bundo v Walled Lake, 238 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 1976), and Bosselman, Inc. v. State of Nebraska, 432 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 1988), where the Michigan and Nebraska supreme courts ruled that a licensee had a constitutionally-protected interest in obtaining a renewal of a liquor license. 10. Relying on Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 ( 149 S.E.2d 489) (1966), appellants claim they acquired vested rights to the continued re-issuance of alcohol and adult entertainment licenses for the same location because each of them spent substantial sums of money in reliance upon the initial issuance of the licenses. It is a tenet of zoning law that a property owner may acquire a vested right under a zoning ordinance which precludes retroactive application of zoning ordinances:
Testimony at an administrative hearing established that Don Daniel, owner of several of the parcels in issue here, was a member of the Banks County Land Use Advisory Committee which was involved in the promulgation of the April 1991 zoning ordinance. Rather than applying this rule, the majority opinion follows the minority rule, see 4 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning Planning (4th ed.), § 50.03 [1], that the act of applying for a building permit or a prerequisite to such a permit, such as a certificate of zoning compliance, see Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 (2) ( 149 S.E.2d 489) (1966), is sufficient without more to vest in the landowner the right to use the property under the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the filing of the application for the permit. This rule is set forth in WMM Properties v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436 ( 339 S.E.2d 252) (1986), rendered 11 months after this Court in Corey Outdoor Advertising, supra, quoted at length from the majority rule, as set forth in Barker, supra.
Similarly, a purchaser who contracts to buy land conditioned upon its being rezoned has a right to be issued a certificate of zoning compliance (a prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit) in accordance with a zoning amendment obtained by the purchaser. Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 ( 149 S.E.2d 489) (1966). (c) Right to Rely upon Approved Development Plan. (1) Formallyapproved. A landowner has a right to develop the property pursuant to a development plan duly approved by the county zoning authority pursuant to powers delegated to it by the county commission even though the development plan varied the existing zoning, where the landowner has expended large sums of money in furtherance of the development and has dedicated land for use as parks and schools in reliance upon its approved development plan. DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 232 Ga. 238, 244 ( 205 S.E.2d 864) (1974).
The house appellee leased from relatives to operate her facility served as her residence, and no modifications were made to the dwelling. Cf. Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 ( 149 S.E.2d 489) (1966). Moreover, the expenditures that were in fact made by appellee do not show an unequivocal commitment toward establishing an elementary school, grades 1 through 3.
3 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, § 57-3; See, 49 ALR3d 13, § 3. We pronounced this general rule a "sound principle of law" in Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 258 ( 149 S.E.2d 489) (1966). A different rule was implied in Keenan v. Acker, 226 Ga. 896 ( 178 S.E.2d 196) (1970).
The law in this state is clear that a property owner acquires a vested right to the continuation of a zoning classification when he incurs expenses in acquiring property and developing it in reliance upon the zoning classification. This rule is stated in such cases as Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 ( 149 S.E.2d 489) (1966); Craig v. City of Lilburn, 226 Ga. 679 ( 177 S.E.2d 75) (1970); and DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 232 Ga. 238 ( 205 S.E.2d 864) (1974). Under the facts of this case we find no error in the trial court's grant of the mandamus absolute.
The controlling issue in this case is whether the evidence presented was sufficient to show that the developer had acquired a vested property right in the mobile home classification. In Clairmont Development Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 489) this court said that similar facts were sufficient to show such a vested property right because the developer had there relied on the rezoning ordinance, had made substantial expenditures in consequence thereof, and because the Constitutions of the State of Georgia and the United States protect such vested property rights. Code Ann. § 2-102; Code § 1-815.