Opinion
Civil Action 22-49
06-15-2023
CHAD E. ST. CLAIR Plaintiff v. FAYETTE COUNTY PRISON, PRIME CARE MEDICAL, JOHN LENKEY, Warden Fayette County Prison, C.O. RUTHERFORD, C.O. AKERMAN, DR. RITA CAMACHO, RONALD DELEROSA, CAROL YOUNKIN, TERESEA JANE DOE, Defendants.
ECF No. 77
Fischer, District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Akerman, Fayette County Prison, John Lenkey and Rutherford (ECF No. 77) be granted in part and denied in part. The partial motion should be granted as it relates to Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief, punitive damages against the individuals in their official capacities, procedural due process against Warden Lenkey, negligence against Warden Lenkey, and the claims against Fayette County Prison. The motion should be denied as it relates to the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Akerman, Rutherford, and Lenkey, the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Lenkey for violation of equal protection, failure to train/supervise against Warden Lenkey, and the negligence claims against Rutherford and Akerman. The Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force against Akerman and Rutherford remain. The claims for punitive damages against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities also remain. It is also recommended that the Fayette County Prison be dismissed as a party defendant.
II. REPORT
A. Relevant Factual Allegations
Presently before the Court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Fayette County Prison (“FCP”), Warden John Lenkey (“Lenkey”), Corrections Officer Rutherford (“Rutherford”) and Corrections Officer Akerman (“Akerman) (ECF No. 77). All individual defendants are named in their official and personal capacities. Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 72 ¶ 12.
Prior to his incarceration, on January 27, 2021, Plaintiff, Chad E. St. Clair (“Plaintiff”), underwent reconstructive surgery to his right shoulder where his clavicle was reattached to his collarbone with a surgical screw. Id. ¶ 13. After the surgery, the shoulder began to heal normally. Id. ¶ 14.
On February 24, 2021, Plaintiff was arrested. Before being committed to the FCP, his shoulder was examined at the Uniontown Hospital to determine whether his shoulder was injured during the arrest. X-rays revealed no damage to his shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. That same day, Plaintiff was committed to the FCP and evaluated by Prime Care employees. Plaintiff was placed on D Block in medical lock to protect his healing shoulder. Plaintiff's arm was still in a brace. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. On medical lock, Plaintiff was confined to his cell for 23 hours per day. At 2:00 p.m., he was permitted one hour of recreation to shower, exercise and make phone calls. Id. ¶ 19.
On March 6, 2021, in response to a medical issue, Defendant Akerman “drug Plaintiff face down by his feet, catching Plaintiff's right arm in the door, [and] yanking Plaintiff's feet until the arm broke free of the door.” Akerman continued to drag Plaintiff approximately 40 feet until Plaintiff was off the block. Defendant Nurse Teresea Jane Doe instructed Akerman and Defendant Rutherford to “throw” Plaintiff back in his cell as it was nearing a shift change and Plaintiff was conscious. Although Plaintiff's right arm was still in a brace, Defendants Rutherford and Akerman each grabbed one of Plaintiff's arms, and yanked him from the floor, injuring Plaintiff's right shoulder. Although Plaintiff was screaming in pain, Defendants Rutherford and Akerman continued carrying Plaintiff and tossed him back in his cell. Id. ¶¶ 2024.
The next day, Plaintiff was denied his prescribed pain medication because he was “acting like an asshole.” Id. ¶ 25. Though the skin was not broken on his shoulder, the screw meant to hold the clavicle flush against the collarbone “was visible pushing through the skin on Plaintiff's shoulder making it obvious” that he had a serious injury. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that he reported to every prison official and Prime Care employee that he encountered that he was injured and in extreme pain. His complaints were ignored. Id. ¶ 29.
On March 10, 2021, Plaintiff was escorted to the prison medical department and evaluated by Dr. Camacho. Dr. Camacho saw the screw pushing out of Plaintiff's shoulder, indicating “Oh my, that can't be good.” Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Dr. Camacho ordered an X-ray and restarted Plaintiff's pain medication. Id. ¶ 34. The X-ray showed that the screw was displaced so far that the threads on the screw could be counted. Dr. Camacho indicated that an appointment would be set up with an orthopedic surgeon as soon as possible. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
Thereafter, Plaintiff's recreation time was changed from 2:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. when the prison inmate phones are terminated, allegedly to prevent Plaintiff from complaining to his family about his lack of medical care. Id. ¶¶ 39-40.
On March 17, 2021, Plaintiff was escorted from his cell to the medical department where Dr. Camacho wrote a report blaming the corrections officers for his injury. Thereafter, Dr. Camacho explained to Plaintiff that an employee of Prime Care forgot to schedule his appointment with the surgeon but assured Plaintiff that it would be set up that day. Plaintiff was sent back to medical lock for approximately six (6) weeks before he was taken to an outside doctor. Plaintiff filed several grievances concerning his medical needs during this time, but all were denied. Eventually, he was placed on grievance restriction. Id. ¶¶ 41-45.
Plaintiff continued to report his pain to all prison officials with whom he came into contact, including the corrections officers and Warden Lenkey. All his requests went unanswered. He also wrote to Fayette County's President Judge Wagner. That letter was answered by Attorney Shane Gannon. Gannon told Plaintiff that he would make some inquiries in an attempt to assist Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 46-49.
On April 18, 2021, Plaintiff was taken to West Virginia University Medicine in Waynesburg, West Virginia. The doctor, however, was not informed about Plaintiff's new shoulder injury (screw pushing out of Plaintiff's shoulder) and consequently, was unable to treat Plaintiff. This doctor informed Plaintiff that he should have been seen by a surgeon immediately after the injury occurred. Plaintiff was returned to FCP untreated. Id. ¶¶ 50-53.
On April 29, 2021, Plaintiff was evaluated by a doctor at West Virginia University Medicine in Morgantown, West Virginia. The doctor explained that too much time had elapsed since the injury, and that the damage to his shoulder could not be corrected with surgery. The clavicle fused to the collarbone slightly out of place. The next day, the doctor removed the screw from Plaintiff's shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 54-57.
On December 15, 2021, Plaintiff started physical therapy at SCI Laurel Highlands. He received physical therapy for one (1) hour a day, three (3) days per week for two (2) months. Thereafter, an additional month of physical therapy was added because Plaintiff's results were unsatisfactory. Rather than achieving 180-degree range of motion, Plaintiff's shoulder tested at 118 degrees. A doctor explained that because his injured shoulder was left untreated, scar tissue built up, causing limited range of motion. Id. ¶¶ 58-63.
Relevant to these moving Defendants, Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs against Defendants Lenkey, Rutherford and Akerman. He also alleges a Fourteenth Amendment claim for violation of his rights to equal protection against Lenkey for moving his recreation time to that period when Plaintiff could no longer use the prison telephones. He alleges a state law negligence claim against these moving Defendants. He also alleges a claim for negligent hiring, training and supervision against Warden Lenkey and FCP, and a § 1983 claim on the same bases against Warden Lenkey and FCP. Id. ¶¶ 73-79, 8689. Plaintiff also alleges a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation against Warden Lenkey for placing Plaintiff on grievance restriction. Defendants have not moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force against Rutherford and Akerman.
Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering all Defendants to cease violating the rights of prisoners, and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 95-97.
B. Legal Standards
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward
with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Court also recognizes that in a civil rights action, a court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so, when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
C. Analysis
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
1. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs against Defendants Lenkey, Rutherford and Akerman
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs must be dismissed because at all relevant times, Plaintiff was being treated by medical professionals inside and outside FCP. Plaintiff responds that all Defendants were aware that Plaintiff suffered a serious injury and that all Defendants either ignored Plaintiff's injury or failed to respond properly. He also argues that as Warden of FCP, Defendant Lenkey is “legally responsible for the welfare and safety of all inmates housed at FCP.” ECF No. 82 at 3.
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). An inmate must allege two elements: (1) that he was suffering from a “serious medical need,” and (2) that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical need. Id. at 106.
The first showing requires the Court to objectively determine whether the medical need was “sufficiently serious.” A medical need is “serious” if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff's needs were serious.
The second prong requires a court to substantively determine whether the official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Deliberate indifference may be manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, a denial of prescribed medical treatment, or a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury. Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346). A prisoner must demonstrate that the official acted with more than mere negligence. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). It is a “well-established rule that mere disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth Amendment claims.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, a court may not substitute its own judgment for diagnosis and treatment decisions made by prison medical staff members. Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979).
As to the second prong of the test, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). The Spruill court continued that “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eight Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Id.
Defendants are correct that when a prisoner is being treated by healthcare professionals within the prison, non-medical prison officials cannot be deliberately indifferent for failing to intervene in the medical care of an inmate. Plaintiff alleges, however, that immediately after his injury, he was screaming in pain when Akerman and Rutherford threw him back into his cell at the direction of a nurse because it was nearing the end of her shift and she didn't want to be bothered with him. At this point, Akerman and Rutherford would have had reason to believe that medical was mistreating Plaintiff. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. It was not until four (4) days after his injury that Plaintiff was treated in medical by Dr. Camacho, who ordered an X-ray and restarted Plaintiff on his pain medication. Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged facts to suggest that Defendants Rutherford and Akerman were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this claim as to Akerman and Rutherford should be denied.
As to Defendant Lenkey, Plaintiff's argument sounds in respondeat superior liability and must fail as a matter of law. He argues that Defendant Lenkey, as Warden of FCP, was “legally responsible for the welfare and safety of all inmates housed at FCP.” ECF No. 82 at 3. Vicarious liability has no place in § 1983 jurisprudence, and therefore, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official's own actions, violated the constitution. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Plaintiff, however, also alleges that he reported his pain to Warden Lenkey but his “requests went unanswered.” ECF No. 72 ¶¶ 46-47. By this time, Plaintiff was being treated in medical and waiting for approximately six (6) weeks before he was taken to his outside appointment with a specialist. He alleges that he informed Lenkey via “several request slip forms addressed to the Warden explaining that he was not receiving medical attention.” He further alleges that all his requests went unanswered. Therefore, Lenkey would have had actual knowledge or at least reason to believe that Plaintiff was not being treated, or that he was being mistreated. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs against Lenkey should also be denied at this time.
2. Equal Protection/Class of One against Warden Lenkey
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's equal protection/class of one claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff alleges no comparators. Plaintiff responds that his comparator's are the rest of the prison population whose recreation time was not changed so as to prevent them from using the prison phones.
In order to make out a class of one claim, a plaintiff must aver facts to plausibly suggest that “(1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Overly v. Garmon, 599 Fed.Appx. 42, 43 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006)).
At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. He alleges that the Warden treated him differently than all other inmates housed at FCP when the Warden changed his recreation time to 8:00 p.m. when prison telephone privileges are terminated. He also alleges that no other inmates at FCP had their recreation time changed to that time when phone privileges are no longer available. He also suggests that there was no rational basis for the treatment. That is, he alleges that his recreation time was changed so he “could not contact the world outside of FCP for help.” ECF No. 82 at 2. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff's equal protection/class of one claim should be permitted to move forward. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on this issue should be denied.
3. Failure to Train/Supervise against Warden Lenkey
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Failure to Train/Supervise claim against Warden Lenkey. They argue that Plaintiff has not alleged “the specific training necessary that would have reduced the overall risk of a constitutional injury.” ECF No. 77 ¶ 8. Plaintiff responds that Warden Lenkey is legally responsible to ensure that all employees hired at FCP are properly trained to handle medical emergencies and to exercise due care when necessary. ECF No. 82 ¶ 8.
As noted above, respondeat superior liability has no place in § 1983 jurisprudence. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, unless the Warden was personally involved in violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Plaintiff must allege that his constitutionally cognizable injury was caused by a custom or policy of FCP. See id. at 690-91. The Warden will be liable in his official capacity “when the policy or custom itself violates the Constitution or when the policy or custom, while not unconstitutional itself, is the ‘moving force' behind the constitutional tort of one if its employees.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)).
Where a plaintiff alleges that a failure to train or supervise employees causes a constitutional injury, liability under § 1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom those employees come into contact. Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)). Deliberate indifference requires that the municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his actions. Ordinarily, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” is necessary “to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. A pattern of violations puts decisionmakers on notice that different training is necessary, and continuation of the same approach to training “that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action the -- ‘deliberate indifference' -- necessary to trigger municipal liability.” Bd of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997).
Here, Plaintiff's allegations in the Third Amended Complaint suggest a pattern of similar violations by FCP employees that would have placed Warden Lenkey on notice that the current employee training program at FCP was deficient. He alleges facts to suggest that Lenkey was on notice that Plaintiff's serious medical issues were being ignored by FCP employees and that he was being mistreated by corrections officers and prevented from contacting those outside of FCP to obtain assistance for his serious injury and pain. Although a close question, Plaintiff's claim for failure to train/supervise should be permitted to go into discovery. Previous instances of similar conduct as to other inmates is in possession of Defendants.
Therefore, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim for Failure to Train/Supervise be denied.
4. Procedural Due Process against Warden Lenkey
Defendants argue that as a matter of law, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a prison grievance system and cannot state a constitutionally cognizable claim if his access to a grievance system is restricted, or if his grievances go unanswered. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute Defendants' arguments. The law is clear that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to access prison grievance procedures. Simonton v. Tennis, 437 Fed.Appx. 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011); Heleva v. Kramer, 214 Fed.Appx. 244, 247 (3d Cir. 2007).
Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on this claim should be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
5. Fayette County Prison as an Improper Party
Defendants argue that FCP is not a proper party as a matter of law. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute Defendants' arguments. Defendants are correct that prisons are not proper parties in a § 1983 civil rights action. That is, they are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Pavalone v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-1444, 2011 WL 3794885, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2011) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on this claim should be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
6. Negligence claims against Lenkey, Akerman and Rutherford
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claims and argue that they are immune from any claim for negligence pursuant to the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 8541, et seq. The general provision with respect to governmental immunity provides as follows: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damage on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or any employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8541. The statute further provides for eight (8) exceptions to this immunity, none of which are applicable here. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8542(b)(1)-(8). Section 8550, however, provides that if “it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such act constituted . . . actual malice or willful misconduct,” immunity will not apply. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 8550, 8542(a)(2). Willful misconduct has been defined as being synonymous with an intentional tort. Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 315 (2006).
Here, Plaintiff's allegations suggest as to Akerman, that his actions in dragging Plaintiff out of his cell by his feet and catching his right arm in the door and continuing to drag him until his arm broke free of the door, would constitute willful misconduct. Similarly, the actions of Rutherford and Akerman in yanking Plaintiff from the floor by Plaintiff's arms while his right arm was still in a brace, carrying him to his cell and tossing him in while Plaintiff was screaming in pain, and allegedly reinjuring his shoulder would also constitute willful misconduct. Therefore, local governmental immunity should be denied as to Akerman and Rutherford at this time. As to Warden Lenkey, Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level of actual malice or willful misconduct. Therefore, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss on the negligence claim as to Warden Lenkey be granted and denied as to Rutherford and Akerman.
7. Injunctive Relief
Defendants also argue that because Plaintiff is no longer housed at FCP, he may not seek injunctive relief. Plaintiff responds that although he is no longer incarcerated at FCP, he “seeks injunctive relief for future inmates at FCP whom may be in a similar situation as Plaintiff.” ECF No. 82 at 4, ¶ 15. Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief must fail as a matter of law. An inmate's transfer to another institution moots any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “[a]s a non-attorney, Plaintiff may not act as an attorney for other individuals and may only represent himself in this Court.” Szubielski v. Pierce, 152 F.Supp.3d 227, 233 (D. Del. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Osei-Afriye v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991) (non-lawyer appearing pro se may not act as attorney for his children)). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on this claim should be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
8. Punitive Damages
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages against the individuals in their official capacities must fail as a matter of law. Plaintiff has sued all individuals in their official and personal capacities. Official capacity claims are just another way of pleading an action against the government entity of which the individual employees are agents. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1977). Here, the government entity employing the individuals is Fayette County. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that punitive damages may not be recovered against a municipality in a § 1983 civil rights action. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Therefore, it is recommended that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the claim for punitive damages against the named individual Defendants in their official capacities be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law. The claims for punitive damages against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities remain.
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Akerman, Fayette County Prison, John Lenkey and Rutherford (ECF No. 77) be granted in part and denied in part. The partial motion should be granted as it relates to Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief, punitive damages against the individuals in their official capacities, procedural due process against Warden Lenkey, negligence against Warden Lenkey, and the claims against Fayette County Prison. The motion should be denied as it relates to the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Akerman, Rutherford, and Lenkey, the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Lenkey for violation of equal protection, failure to train/supervise against Warden Lenkey, and the negligence claims against Rutherford and Akerman. The Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force against Akerman and Rutherford remain. The claims for punitive damages against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities also remain. It is also recommended that the Fayette County Prison be dismissed as a party defendant.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.