Paragraphs (b) and (c) are not at issue here; the language critical to our decision is "designed to be transported * * * upon the highways." That language has not been construed previously by this court, but the term "designed" has been discussed in the interpretation of a similarly phrased county zoning ordinance in Clackamas County v. Dunham, 282 Or. 419, 579 P.2d 223, appeal dismissed 439 U.S. 948 (1978). The ordinance construed in that case defined "trailer house" as "a building designed in such a manner that it may be moved from one location to another."

The court's first task is to interpret the Deschutes County ordinance. See Clackamas County v. Dunham, 282 Or. 419, 579 P.2d 223 (1978). See, e.g., the diverse ordinances involved in the following decisions concerning "conditional uses": Archdiocese of Port. v. Co. of Wash., 254 Or. 77, 458 P.2d 682 (1969); Christian Retreat Center v. Comm. for Wash. Co., 28 Or. App. 673, 560 P.2d 1100 (1977); Desler v. Lane County Commissioners, 27 Or. App. 709, 557 P.2d 52 (1976); Jackson v. Clackamas County Comm., 26 Or. App. 265, 552 P.2d 559 (1976); Kristensen v. Eugene Planning Com., 24 Or. App. 131, 544 P.2d 591 (1976); The Inn v. City Council, Portland, 16 Or. App. 497, 519 P.2d 390 (1974); Hill v. Marion Co. Bd. of Comm., 12 Or. App. 242, 506 P.2d 519 (1973); Sammons v. Sibarco Stations, Inc., 10 Or. App. 43, 497 P.2d 862 (1972).

After concluding that under its statutes the word "designed" referred to the initial manufacturing design of a mobile home, the Oregon court held that despite the fact that the mobile home was attached to realty, the structure "was and remained a `mobile home'" because "a building that is a mobile home as it leaves the manufacturer probably `is forever a mobile home.'" Id. at 545, 684 P.2d at 3 (quoting Clackamas County v. Dunham, 282 Or. 419, 426, 579 P.2d 223, 226, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 948, 99 S.Ct. 343, 58 L.Ed.2d 340 (1978)). Despite plaintiff's argument, the assumption that Pennington "no longer intended to operate [the mobile home] upon the highway" does not nullify defendant's properly perfected security interest in the mobile home.

See IC 6-1.1-7-1(b)(2). Citizens also refers us to Clackamas County v. Dunham (1978), 282 Or. 419, 579 P.2d 223 for the proposition that the trial court should not have found that the home was a fixture. The law of property was not involved in that case.