Opinion
No. 3D20-1717
12-01-2021
Jones & Adams, P.A., and W. Steven Adams, Matthew L. Jones, Jorge E. Porro and Daniel Haydar; Levy & Partners, PLLC, and Ely R. Levy and Omar Salazar II (Hollywood), for appellant. Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP, and Michael Diaz, Jr., Ahmand Johnson and Zhen Pan, for appellee.
Jones & Adams, P.A., and W. Steven Adams, Matthew L. Jones, Jorge E. Porro and Daniel Haydar; Levy & Partners, PLLC, and Ely R. Levy and Omar Salazar II (Hollywood), for appellant.
Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP, and Michael Diaz, Jr., Ahmand Johnson and Zhen Pan, for appellee.
Before SCALES, HENDON and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Dadic v. Schneider, 722 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (recognizing that "[n]o authority supports a cause of action" for charging an excessive legal fee); Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (stating that a violation of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct governing a lawyer's responsibilities neither creates a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor gives rise to a cause of action); Salit v. Ruden McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d 381, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ("An attorney who represents a corporation is ‘not in privity with and therefore owes no separate duty of diligence and care to an individual shareholder absent special circumstances or an agreement to also represent the shareholder individually.’ " (quoting Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) )).