Civil Serv. Emp. v. Love

57 Citing cases

  1. Dempsey v. Romer

    825 P.2d 44 (Colo. 1992)   Cited 27 times
    Evaluating whether a statute setting maximum monthly salary levels for state employees violates constitutional protections

    Colorado Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Department of Highways, 809 P.2d 988, 991 (Colo. 1991); Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 446, 448 P.2d 624, 628 (1968). The initiative called for the creation of a Civil Service Commission with authority to appoint, promote, discipline and discharge state employees "according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained by competitive tests of competence."

  2. Colorado Ass'n Public Emp. v. Dept. of Highways

    809 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that shifting job duties from classified state employees to private vendors violates the state constitution and the statute governing personal services contracts

    The voters sought to safeguard the merit system by incorporating it into the state constitution. Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 446, 448 P.2d 624, 628 (1968). Those exceptions are not applicable to this case.

  3. Develop. Pathways v. Ritter

    178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008)   Cited 49 times
    Noting that the General Assembly is tasked with appropriating funds for the Ethics Commission but nevertheless concluding that "the nature of the Amendment suggests that the voters wanted to minimize legislative involvement"

    Colo. State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 444, 448 P.2d 624, 627 (1968). On the other hand, a challenge to a provision that is not self-executing fails to present a justiciable issue because the provision does not create a privately enforceable right. Cf. Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that a treaty must be self-executing for it to create a privately enforceable right of action).

  4. Reale v. Bd., Real Est. Appraisers

    880 P.2d 1205 (Colo. 1994)   Cited 23 times
    Finding the expressio unius maxim "inapt" when used to imply a limitation in a state constitution because the "powers not specifically limited [in the constitution] are presumptively retained by the people's representatives"

    All power which is not limited by the constitution is vested in the people and may be exercised by them via their elected representatives so long as the constitution contains no prohibition against it. Colorado State Civil Serv. Employee Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1964). This principle supports the conclusion that the legislature does not have the power to impose additional qualifications for holding the office of county assessor.

  5. Passarelli v. Schoettler

    742 P.2d 867 (Colo. 1987)   Cited 20 times
    Relying on Lee, court held that sovereign immunity did not bar an award of prejudgment interest in an action under the GIA

    See, e.g., Colorado Ass'n of Public Employees v. Lamm, 677 P.2d 1350 (Colo. 1984); Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968). Courts must, whenever possible, construe statutes to conform to constitutional standards.

  6. Gieck v. Office of Info. Tech.

    467 P.3d 1277 (Colo. App. 2020)

    The amendment originally exempted, among other employees, "[t]he governor's private secretary and three confidential employees of his office." Colo. Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n v. Love , 167 Colo. 436, 442, 448 P.2d 624, 626 (1968) (emphasis added). In 1968, the supreme court in Love interpreted "confidential employees" to mean "employees of the Governor whose functions are confined to his office and whose duties are concerned with the administration thereof," which is the language that was adopted in the 1969 amendment to the Civil Service Amendment and included above.

  7. Taylor v. State Personnel Bd.

    228 P.3d 273 (Colo. App. 2010)   Cited 1 times
    Rejecting “contention, made in a conclusory fashion and without argument or citation to any authority”

    Moreover, the likelihood of Taylor's prevailing on such a future claim is, at this point, speculative at best. At oral argument, in response to the division's questions concerning authority supporting the remedy that she is seeking, Taylor's counsel stated that Colorado State Civil Service Employees Association v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968); Salas v. State Personnel Board, 775 P.2d 57 (Colo.App. 1988); and the Board's decision in Melle II best support her position. None of these authorities, however, provides for the type of declaratory judgment that Taylor is seeking here. Moreover, each of these cases is distinguishable.

  8. Thompson v. Heineman

    289 Neb. 798 (Neb. 2015)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Thompson, parties opposed to the construction of an oil pipeline brought an action against state officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that a statute allowing pipeline carriers to bypass the regulatory procedures of the Public Service Commission and obtain approval to exercise the power of eminent domain for the building of the pipeline from the Governor was unconstitutional.

    (emphasis supplied), quoting Howard v. Boulder, 132 Colo. 401, 290 P.2d 237 (1955).Id. at 567–68, 276 N.W.2d at 215, quoting Civil Serv. Emp. v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968), and citing Portmann v. Board of Elections, 60 Ohio App. 54, 19 N.E.2d 531 (1938), and Abbott v. Iowa City, 224 Iowa 698, 277 N.W. 437 (1938). In Cunningham, we concluded that this exception, which permitted citizens to challenge unlawful statutes and ordinances, applied even more strongly to an action challenging the validity of a constitutional amendment:

  9. Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc.

    338 P.3d 1002 (Colo. 2014)   Cited 35 times
    Observing that under federal law, "[a]bsent special circumstances . . . standing cannot be based on a plaintiff's mere status as a taxpayer" (quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011))

    So-called “citizen standing,” under which a citizen has standing to challenge the “actual form of government” under which he is required to live, is not at issue here. See, e.g.,Colo. State Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 442–44, 448 P.2d 624, 626–27 (1968) (determining that plaintiffs had standing to challenge a legislative act reorganizing the departments of state government); Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401, 403–04, 290 P.2d 237, 238 (1955) (determining that plaintiffs had standing to challenge an initiated charter amendment changing the method of electing Boulder city councilmen from an election at large to an election from geographically created councilmanic districts). B. Respondents Lack Taxpayer Standing

  10. Ainscough v. Owens

    90 P.3d 851 (Colo. 2004)   Cited 104 times
    Reciting the "two prongs of Colorado's test for standing: the plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact, to a legally protected interest"

    Colo. State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 444, 448 P.2d 624, 627 (1968). In Love, we held that citizens may sue to protect a "great public concern" regarding the constitutionality of a law.