Similarly, property owners' claims of "violations of the statutory procedure set forth in Chapter 43 based on the City's failure to give proper notice of the [third public] hearing and failure to provide more than a draft service plan" have been rejected as "purely procedural defects." City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 84-85 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); see also Alexander Oil Co., 825 S.W.2d at 438 (holding that allegations regarding whether service plan was adequate and quorum was required to conduct hearing were matters that could be raised in quo warranto proceedings but not in a private challenge). As noted above, individuals have been allowed to bring private causes of action when challenging annexation of territory that (i) exceeds statutory size limitations, (ii) is within the corporate limits of another municipality, (iii) is not contiguous with current city limits, and (iv) has a boundary description that does not close.

The determination of whether an individual landowner, as opposed to the State in a quo warranto proceeding, has standing to challenge annexation turns on whether the challenge attacks a city's authority to annex the area or merely complains of a violation of statutory procedure. City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); Hardee, 70 S.W.3d at 210. Procedural irregularities in the exercise of a city's annexation power may render the annexation voidable, but do not render the annexation void.

The determination of whether an individual landowner, as opposed to the State in a quo warranto proceeding, has standing to challenge annexation turns on whether the challenge attacks a city's authority to annex the area or merely complains of a violation of statutory procedure. City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); Hardee, 70 S.W.3d at 210. Procedural irregularities in the exercise of a city's annexation power may render the annexation voidable, but do not render the annexation void.

Defects in the “process of adopting an annexation ordinance” cannot be challenged outside of a quo warranto proceeding. City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied). For example, in City of Wilmer v. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc., a private party, who challenged a city's annexation conducted under section 43.024, complained that “[o]ne of the persons who signed the annexation petition was not an inhabitant of the area annexed.”

We review the trial judge's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied). A quo warranto proceeding is the "only proper method for attacking the validity of a city's annexation of property" unless the annexation is wholly void. Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin, 825 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. 1991); see City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 627 (Tex. 2008) (decision in Alexander Oil affirmed rule that unless annexation is void or Legislature has expressly granted private right to challenge annexation in some manner, quo warranto proceeding brought by State is only proper means of attacking municipality's annexation in court).

The Town cites City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Property Owners Ass'n, in support of its contention that Spiritas lacks standing. 185 S.W.3d 74, 85-86 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied). However, that case involved property that was already included in the city's three-year annexation plan; thus, the arbitration right set forth in section 43.052 was not applicable.

The Town cites City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Property Owners Ass'n, in support of its contention that Spiritas lacks standing. 185 S.W.3d 74, 85-86 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied). However, that case involved property that was already included in the city's three-year annexation plan; thus, the arbitration right set forth in section 43.052 was not applicable.

It being well established that standing is a necessary component of subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear Reed's suit seeking the removal of the sheriff. See City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. OwnersAss'n, 185 S.W.3d 74, 85 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. filed). Claim For Damages Not Within Waiver Provision of TTCA