Similarly, property owners' claims of "violations of the statutory procedure set forth in Chapter 43 based on the City's failure to give proper notice of the [third public] hearing and failure to provide more than a draft service plan" have been rejected as "purely procedural defects." City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 84-85 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); see also Alexander Oil Co., 825 S.W.2d at 438 (holding that allegations regarding whether service plan was adequate and quorum was required to conduct hearing were matters that could be raised in quo warranto proceedings but not in a private challenge). As noted above, individuals have been allowed to bring private causes of action when challenging annexation of territory that (i) exceeds statutory size limitations, (ii) is within the corporate limits of another municipality, (iii) is not contiguous with current city limits, and (iv) has a boundary description that does not close.

The determination of whether an individual landowner, as opposed to the State in a quo warranto proceeding, has standing to challenge annexation turns on whether the challenge attacks a city's authority to annex the area or merely complains of a violation of statutory procedure. City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); Hardee, 70 S.W.3d at 210. Procedural irregularities in the exercise of a city's annexation power may render the annexation voidable, but do not render the annexation void.

The determination of whether an individual landowner, as opposed to the State in a quo warranto proceeding, has standing to challenge annexation turns on whether the challenge attacks a city's authority to annex the area or merely complains of a violation of statutory procedure. City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); Hardee, 70 S.W.3d at 210. Procedural irregularities in the exercise of a city's annexation power may render the annexation voidable, but do not render the annexation void.

"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Tha Dang Nguyen v. State, 359 S.W.3d 636, 645-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)); see Ex parte Salfen, 618 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ("It is well-settled that the constitutionality of a statute will not be determined in any case unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the case in which the issue is raised."); City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n, 185 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) ("[A] court will not rule on a constitutional question, although properly presented by the record, if there is some other ground upon which the case may be disposed.").

Historically, review of a private party's standing to challenge annexation inquires whether the challenge attacks the city's authority to annex the area in question or simply complains of some procedural irregularities. See City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied). Annexation of property that exceeds a municipality's statutory size limitations has been held to be a challenge to the city's authority to annex the area in question, thereby rendering the annexation void.

In so holding, we cited a number of cases similarly holding that alleged statutory or procedural errors render an order voidable, and not void. Id. at 579-80, citing City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Property Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 84 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2005, pet. denied)(statutory provisions that do not limit the area or type of land a city can annex, i.e., do not restrict the city's annexation authority, are procedural requirements that could make the annexation voidable, but not void); Gaston v. State, 63 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2001, no pet.)(failure by trial court to adhere to procedural requirements when entering judgment does not render a conviction void, but voidable). The State similarly points us to several unpublished opinions where defendants were convicted of violating a protective order and sought to collateral attack the protective order upon which their criminal conviction was based.

Whether a party other than the State has standing to challenge an annexation turns on whether the challenge complains of a violation of statutory procedure or attacks a city's authority to annex the area at issue. City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied); see also Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Lazy Nine Mun. Util. Dist., 198 S.W.3d 300, 310-11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (distinguishing "voidable" acts based on procedural irregularities, which must be challenged by quo warranto proceeding, from "void" acts, which may be challenged through other legal proceedings). A quo warranto proceeding is the "only proper method" to attack the validity of a city's annexation of territory, "unless the annexation is wholly void."

Defects in the “process of adopting an annexation ordinance” cannot be challenged outside of a quo warranto proceeding. City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied). For example, in City of Wilmer v. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc., a private party, who challenged a city's annexation conducted under section 43.024, complained that “[o]ne of the persons who signed the annexation petition was not an inhabitant of the area annexed.”

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.02 (Vernon Supp. 2009). However, these are all alleged statutory, procedural errors that render the expunction order voidable, not void. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Property Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 84 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (statutory provisions that do not limit the area or type of land a city can annex, i.e., do not restrict the city's annexation authority, are procedural requirements that could make the annexation voidable, but not void); Gaston v. State, 63 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) (failure by trial court to adhere to procedural requirements when entering judgment does not render a conviction void, but voidable). Appellees cite Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied), for the proposition that the failure to adhere to a statutory requirement can render an order void, but that case involved an interpretation of Section 410.258 of the Texas Labor Code, which specifically provided that "[a] judgment entered or settlement approved without complying with the requirements of this section is void."

Instead, once the Office of the Attorney General is notified of such a suit, it may choose to intervene and participate or to not do so. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Prop. Owners Ass'n Inc., 185 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (recognizing counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that H.B. 585 was unconstitutional could not be set or ruled on because Attorney General had not yet been permitted the required forty-five days' notice to intervene); State v. Fernandez, 159 S.W.3d 678, 688 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (recognizing Attorney General may intervene in a proceeding involving a charitable trust); Lone Starr Multi Theatres, Inc. v. State, 922 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, no writ) (holding fact that the Attorney General must be given notice of a suit to declare a statute unconstitutional does not suggest that the Attorney General is the proper party to sue in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief). Additionally, the Office of the Attorney General was not, under rule 39 of the rules of civil procedure, a "person needed for just adjudication" in TDFPS's filed suit for temporary managing conservatorship of baby A.A.