Spring v. Ward, 140 Tex. 609, 169 S.W.2d 151 (1943) (breach of contract action in which engineer sued to recover for services rendered); City of Houston v. Finn, 139 Tex. 111, 161 S.W.2d 776 (1942) (breach of contract action in which architect sued to recover for services rendered); City of Nederland v. Callihan, 299 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (breach of contract action for reimbursement of installation cost of water and sewer lines); City of Kirbyville v. Smith, 104 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1937, no writ) (breach of contract action in which attorney sued to recover reasonable value of services rendered); Dale Oil Ref. Co. v. City of Tulia, 25 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1930, no writ) (breach of contract suit to recover amount due on sale of oil to city); City of Orange v. Moore, 246 S.W. 1099 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1922, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (breach of contract action in which contractor sued to recover damages for wrongful delay); City of Van Alstyne v. Morrison, 33 Tex.Civ.App. 670, 77 S.W. 655 (1903, no writ) (suit for city's breach of contract in cutting off citizen's water supply).Jones v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 397 S.W.2d 304, 306-307 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming summary judgment in favor of navigation district because statute which provided "[a]ll navigation districts established under this Act may, by and through the navigation and canal commissioners, sue and be sued in all courts of this State in the name of such navigation district" did not waive governmental immunity).
It has also been held that the pleadings on an appeal from a justice's court to the county court are governed by the rules applicable to justices' courts, and that parties to an action originating in the justice's court were entitled to replead in the county court without complying with the rules of pleading applicable to cases originating in the county court (Threadgill v. Shaw, 130 S.W. 707; Barnes v. Sparks, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 451, 131 S.W. 610), and, in the same connection, that the parties in an action originating in the justice's court may orally replead in the county court (Loomis v. Broaddus Leavell, 134 S.W. 743), and, further, that pleadings on appeal from justice's court need not be in writing, and oral amendments can be made (Daniel v. Brewton, 136 S.W. 815). It has also been held that on appeal from justice's court pleadings may be amended G., H. S. A. R. Co. v. Herring, 28 S.W. 580; Clements v. McCain, 49 S.W. 122; Von Boeckmann v. Loepp, 73 S.W. 849; City of Van Alstyne v. Morrison, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 670. 77 S.W. 655; Fowler v. Michael, 81 S.W. 321. Also it has been held that a new cause of action or defense cannot be pleaded in the county court. Wright v. Dodson, 93 S.W. 1075; Wooley v. Corley, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 229, 121 S.W. 1139; Amarillo Corn. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. G. Ry. Co., 140 S.W. 377.
Appellant's second amended petition did not set up a new cause of action from that pleaded in Justice Court below, but was the same identical cause of action against the same identical defendant stated in a more amplified and explicit manner in writing than was pleaded orally in Justice Court, and it was error for the court to sustain defendant's first special exception to it. Wright v. Dotson, 93 S.W. 1075; City of Van Alstyne v. Morrison, 33 Texas Civ. App. 670[ 33 Tex. Civ. App. 670]; City of Dallas v. McAllister, 30 S.W. 452; Hunter Lee v. Hatler Osborne, 1 Texas App., Civ., 592; Porterfield v. Taylor, 60 Tex. 264. Kennedy Robbins, for appellee.
R.S. art. 1819, subd. 2. Appellee's contention is based on the theory that the jurisdiction of this court is determined by the amount of value in controversy in the justice court, and that appellant's amendment of his demand in the county court was improper and ineffective to confer appellate jurisdiction on this court. The rule is well established that a party seeking recovery in the justice court either by suit or cross-action, may amplify and enlarge his allegations of damage on appeal to the county court, provided such enlargement does not constitute a new cause of action and provided the recovery sought does not exceed the jurisdiction of the court below. Ft. W. D.C. Ry. Co. v. Underwood, 100 Tex. 284, 285, 286, 99 S.W. 92, 123 Am.St.Rep. 806; Shaw Rogers v. Dockery (Tex.Com.App.) 272 S.W. 437, 438; Texas Power Light Co. v. Hale (Tex.Com.App.) 283 S.W. 495 et seq.; City of Van Alstyne v. Morrison 33 Tex. Civ. App. 670, 77 S.W. 655, 656; Von Boeckmann v. Loepp (Tex.Civ.App.) 73 S.W. 849; Brown Grain Co. v, Tuggle (Tex.Civ.App.) 141 S.W. 821, 822; Watson v. Corley (Tex.Civ.App.) 226 S.W. 481, 482; Dowell v. Rettig (Tex.Civ.App.) 186 S.W. 281.
Ry. Co. v. Stock Farm, 91 Tex. 628, 45 S.W. 375; Willett v. Herrin, 161 S.W. 26. And we do not think he erred when he overruled appellant's motion to strike out appellee's amendment to his account filed after the appeal was perfected to the county court, by which for the first time he sought a recovery against appellant of $5.70 on account of seed ribbon cane. The suit was on the contract covering the renting of the land, and the $5.70 was the value of seed cane appellee claimed to be entitled to as rent under that contract. Therefore we think the amendment did not set up a new cause of action, but was within the rule applied in Von Boeckmann v. Loepp, 73 S.W. 849; City of Van Alstyne v. Morrison, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 670, 77 S.W. 655, and like cases. But we think the trial court did err:
Where the law implies damages such as necessarily result from a wrongful act, proof is required to show the extent and amount of damages. City of Van Alstyne v. Morris, 77 S.W. 655; Davis v. Texas Pac. Ry. Co., 42 S.W. 1008; International G. N. Ry. Co. v. Simcock, 17 S.W. 47; Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Curry, 64 Tex. 87. The bond given by J. W. W. S. Adkins, was void for the want of a consideration to support the same.