Opinion
A152464
06-25-2018
THE CITY OF VALLEJO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. YEN L. WANG, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCS049197) MEMORANDUM OPINION
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to the California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853-855.)
Yen L. Wang (appellant) appeals from an order requiring her to abate substandard conditions on three rental properties and appointing a receiver with respect to those properties. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 17980.6, 17980.7.) We affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant owns the three residential rental properties in Vallejo that are at issue in this case: 229 Evelyn Circle, 537 Swan Way and 146 Calhoun Street. Inspections conducted by local agencies have revealed a number of code violations on the properties, which have not been remedied by appellant.
A. 229 Evelyn Circle
The house at 229 Evelyn Circle was damaged in a fire on January 3, 2017, and the Vallejo Fire Department "red-tagged" the property after it was determined to be uninhabitable. Also on January 3, the Solano County Environmental Health Division (Health Division) inspected the property and deemed it uninhabitable due to fire damage, electrical issues, mold and the presence of numerous holes in the walls. New tenants moved into the house, and during an inspection on May 31, 2017, a City code enforcement officer found that the violations continued and the fire damage had only been superficially covered.
On June 6, 2017, a City code enforcement officer posted a notice and order to repair on the property pursuant to section 17980.6, identifying the following violations: visible mold growth, lack of adequate heating, electrical system hazard, interior surfaces not maintained, walking surfaces not maintained, attractive nuisance, refuse containers, and maintaining the property to constitute a public nuisance. The notice, which required appellant to contact the enforcement agency with her plan to abate the conditions, was mailed to appellant at her address and advised her that if repairs were not commenced within seven days, the City would file an action in superior court seeking an order of abatement and the appointment of a receiver. Appellant did not contact the City or request permits for work on the property.
B. 537 Swan Way
In 2014, the City's Building Division inspected the house at 537 Swan Way due to habitability complaints by the tenant. The occupants were found to be using a stove for heat because the heating unit was inoperable. The building inspector issued a correction notice to appellant and reinspected the property twice in 2015, finding broken windows, unpermitted electrical work, doors without locks to the outside, and a heater that was still broken. Correction notices were issued to appellant after each inspection.
The tenant complained again on April 18, 2017. A City building inspector identified twenty-five violations during an inspection of the property on April 26, 2017, including inoperable doors, broken windows, lack of smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, improperly installed electrical equipment, termites, weatherproofing violations and the failure to maintain walking surfaces. The inspector issued a notice of violation giving appellant 30 days to obtain permits and abate the violations, but appellant did not obtain the permits. On May 26, 2017, a City building inspector posted and mailed a notice and order to repair pursuant to section 17980.6, which directed appellant to contact the Building Division with plans for abatement of the listed violations and to commence abatement within seven days. Appellant did not respond to the notice.
C. 146 Calhoun Street
The property at 146 Calhoun Street was inspected in 2016 following tenant complaints, and was found to suffer from an inoperable heating unit, visible mold growth, lack of smoke detectors, holes in the wall, a leaking bathroom sink, and clogged fixtures. The Health Division mailed a second notice of violation to appellant on November 29, 2016, after she failed to correct conditions identified in a prior notice.
On December 8, 2016, a building inspector from the City's Building Division inspected the property following a tenant complaint and identified several code violations with respect to the water heater, plumbing issues, exterior wall damage and an inoperable heater. On that same date, the inspector issued a notice giving appellant thirty days to correct the violations.
On May 30, 2017, a City code enforcement officer inspected the interior of the property and found a broken heating system, boards covering the heating vent, a damaged water heater, missing and inoperable smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, ceiling deterioration due to a bathroom leak, and an open wire that caused one wall to be hot to the touch. On June 6, 2017, the code enforcement officer placed a notice and order to repair on the property pursuant to section 17980.6, identifying the various code violations and directing appellant to contact the code officer within seven days with a plan for abatement of the violations. Appellant did not respond, nor did she obtain permits for the repairs.
D. Abatement Action and Appointment of Receiver
On July 12, 2017, based on the code violations discussed above, the City filed a petition for orders to abate the substandard building conditions at the three properties and to appoint a receiver for those properties. Appellant filed an answer on August 1, 2017. On August 7, 2017, the court granted the petition and issued an order appointing a receiver and directing the receiver to take specific steps to ameliorate the code violations on the properties.
Appellant filed a motion to set aside that order on August 21, 2017, accompanied by an unverified declaration stating that the summons had been initially served on appellant's husband rather than appellant, and that appellant was not actually served until July 28, 2017. The motion was denied.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant argues a receivership was not appropriate because she was in the process of correcting the code violations and other, less drastic remedies existed. Appellant also suggests she was not properly served with the petition for abatement and appointment of a receiver that was filed by the City. We disagree.
Preliminarily, we reject any suggestion that the judgment must be reversed because appellant was not properly served with the petition. Appellant made a general appearance when she filed an answer to the petition, which operated as consent to jurisdiction over her person and waived any challenge to defects in the service of process. (City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670, 679.)
Nor are we persuaded that the court erred by appointing a receiver. We review the order for abuse of discretion, and will find such an abuse only when the decision was not supported by substantial evidence or was based on an improper legal standard. (City of Crescent City v. Reddy (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 458, 466 (Reddy).) "[W]hen a building is maintained in a manner that violates state or local building maintenance regulations and 'the violations are so extensive and of such a nature that the health and safety of residents or the public is substantially endangered' ([]§ 17980.6), the local enforcement agency may issue a notice and order requiring repair or abatement of the unlawful conditions. [Citation.] If the owner of the building thereafter fails to comply with the notice and order in a reasonable period of time, the enforcement agency can seek an order from the trial court appointing a receiver to oversee compliance." (Id. at pp. 465-466, citing City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 919-921.)
Ample evidence supports a determination that the three buildings at issue had extensive code violations posing a risk to their residents and to the public in general, which appellant failed to address in a reasonably timely manner. Appellant argues that she was in the process of correcting the violations, but this was contradicted by the evidence presented by the City and is little more than a request that we reweigh the evidence in contravention of our deferential standard of review. (Reddy, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466-467.)
Appellant suggests a receiver was unnecessary because there was no mortgage on any of the properties and thus no third party whose financial interest must be protected. She misapprehends the reason for the remedial provisions of sections 17980.6 and 17980.7. "The obvious and stated purpose of section 17980.6 [and section 17980.7] is to protect the health and safety of residents who might be substantially endangered by unsafe building conditions." (City and County of San Francisco v. Jen (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 305, 311.) This purpose was served by the appointment of a receiver in this case, regardless of whether some third party mortgagee might also benefit.
We also reject appellant's contention that a receiver should only be appointed when less drastic remedies are not available. Section 17980.7 contains no such requirement, and "[t]he Legislature presumably concluded that uncorrected substandard building conditions present a sufficient danger to justify appointment of a receiver without regard to less invasive alternatives." (Reddy, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 467.) The cases cited by appellant in support of her claim regarding the need to show the unavailability of less drastic alternatives involve receiverships imposed under different statutory schemes. (E.g. Rowe v. Rowe (Tex.App. 1994) 887 S.W.2d 191, 200 [affirming order denying appointment of receiver " 'to conserve the assets and business of the corporation' " under Texas Business Corporation Act].) In any event, appellant's failure to respond to notices issued by the City demonstrates that a receivership was necessary to address the numerous code violations, and that a less drastic alternative would not have sufficed.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.
/s/_________
NEEDHAM, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
BRUINIERS, J.