On July 9, 2012, defendant appealed, arguing he was not proved to be the owner of the property during the time period alleged in the City's complaint. City of Virginiav. Mitchell, 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 2, 991 N.E.2d 936.¶ 3 On July 27, 2012, the City filed a second complaint against defendant, alleging defendant was liable for failure to register a vacant building, the property, in violation of the City Code for the period of June 20, 2012, to July 27, 2012.
To be valid, a deed must "specify the estate being conveyed, be in writing, and be signed by the grantor, who may not be under duress, a minor, or of unsound mind" and it must be "delivered to, and accepted by, the grantee." City of Virginia v. Mitchell, 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 29, 991 N.E.2d 936, 942 (citing Gallagher v. Girote, 23 Ill. 2d 170, 174, 177 N.E.2d 103, 106 (Ill. 1961)). "A deed meeting these minimum requirements is not void and will effectively pass title."
Plaintiffs note that the deed lacked a legal description of the property to be conveyed or correct PINs for the condos. ¶ 34 Section 1 of the Conveyances Act (765 ILCS 5/1 (West 2008)) requires that a deed intended to convey title to a piece of real property specify the estate being conveyed, be in writing, and be signed by the grantor, who may not be under duress, a minor, or of unsound mind. City of Virginia v. Mitchell, 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 29. Our supreme court has further required that a deed be delivered to, and accepted by, the grantee. Gallagher v. Girote, 23 Ill. 2d 170, 174 (1961).
765 ILCS 5/10 (West 2014). We presume that, in executing the deed, the grantor intends to convey the property he or she owns. City of Virginia v. Mitchell , 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 32, 372 Ill.Dec. 446, 991 N.E.2d 936. If the land cannot be located from the description in the deed, the deed is void for uncertainty. Id . The purpose of this description is to identify the deed's subject matter, and the description is sufficient if it allows a competent surveyor to identify it with reasonable certainty.
In re Cook Cnty. Treasurer, 185 Ill. 2d 428, 433, 235 Ill.Dec. 910, 706 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also City of Virginia v. Mitchell, 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 27, 372 Ill.Dec. 446, 991 N.E.2d 936 ("a deed need not even be acknowledged . . . in order for it to pass title"). As between the parties thereto, a validly executed deed is binding and irrevocable immediately upon "delivery" (Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n v. Yablong, 20 Ill.2d 204, 206, 170 N.E.2d 145, 146 (1960)), and a deed need not be recorded to be delivered (Williamson v. Williamson, 306 Ill. 533, 540, 138 N.E. 166, 169 (1923)).
As alluded to above, the nature of the claims of title by both parties allowed the trial court to consider ownership germane to the issue of possession. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 IL App (3d) 110930, ¶ 15; Jaworski, 2017 IL App (2d) 160466, ¶ 13. ¶ 21 Under Illinois law, a deed conveying real property must specify the estate, be in writing, and be signed by the grantor while he or she is not under duress, a minor, or of unsound mind. City of Virginia v. Mitchell, 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 29; 765 ILCS 5/1 (West 2016). A deed must also be delivered to and accepted by the grantee.
Even if the trustee's deed was voidable, as opposed to void, Amorous would still be able to convey a mortgage using it until the deed was set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. See City of Virginia v. Mitchell, 372 Ill.Dec. 446, 991 N.E.2d 936, 940 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (citing Logue, 40 N.E.2d at 81-82).
City of Virginia v. Terry D. MitchellLower Court: 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, 372 Ill.Dec. 446, 991 N.E.2d 936 Disposition: Denied.
The Elm State Property court neither explicitly stated nor implicitly suggested that the name on a title or mortgage was "essentially irrelevant" when deciding ownership of property. See, e.g., City of Virginia v. Mitchell, 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 35 (finding that a deed was evidence of ownership of real property). ¶ 21 In any event, the trial court's determination that Kevin owned the condo was not exclusively based on his name on the title. Although the trial court correctly observed that it was "undisputed" that Kevin purchased the condo and was the only party listed on its title, that was not the sole underpinning of the court's determination, as is suggested by Dana. Rather, the trial court then discussed the testimony and evidence presented at trial regarding, among other things: the frequency of Kevin's visits, including visits without Dana present; Kevin's participation in discussions regarding condo improvements; the fact that Kevin did not have a key but was regularly given one during his routine visits until 2016; the parties' payment of "roughly similar amounts" toward the mortgage and HOA dues at the time of the trial in November 2018; the parties' text messages; and Kevin's eventual move to Ohio in 2015 and
Notarizing a deed is not necessary to transfer the property interest. City of Virginia v. Mitchell, 2013 IL App (4th) 120629, ¶ 27 (a deed need not even be acknowledged in order for it to pass title). Recording a deed is likewise not necessary to transfer the property interest.