The operation of a city park has been held to be proprietary in other cases from this jurisdiction. City of Tulsa v. Goins, 437 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1967), City of Guymon v. Finicum, 265 P.2d 706 (Okla. 1953), Oklahoma City v. Pratt, 185 Okla. 637, 95 P.2d 596 (1939), Oklahoma City v. State Industrial Commission, 147 Okla. 261, 298 P. 577 (1931). The State of Oklahoma is liable for tortious injury arising out of a proprietary function, and this jurisdiction is committed to the rule that operation of a park is a proprietary function of government. It follows that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Oklahoma ex rel. The Oklahoma Tourism and Recreation Department on the basis of governmental immunity.
Except for a limited lifting of liability by the "Governmental Tort Liability Act," 11 O.S. 1971 § 1751[11-1751] et seq. In support of his position, Appellant cites previous decisions such as Tulsa v. Goins, Okla., 437 P.2d 257 (1967), City of Sapulpa v. Young, 147 Okla. 179, 296 P. 418 (1931), and Adams v. United States, D.C., 239 F. Supp. 503 (1965). A reading of these cases discloses they are not in point as none involved alleged negligence by the city resulting in accidents on a public thoroughfare or failure to properly maintain a railroad crossing signal or traffic installation.
Resort should be made to a statutory construction which renders every word and sentence operative rather than one which negates a specific statutory provision. City of Tulsa v. Goins, 437 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1967). The Missouri court reached the same conclusion in the case of Pryor v. David, 436 S.W.2d 3, 4, 5 (Mo. 1969):
"It is a well established rule of statutory construction that a construction should be resorted to which renders every word and sentence operative, rather than one which renders some words in operative or nugatory." City of Tulsa v. Goins, Okl., 437 P.2d 257 259 (1967). Therefore, the hearing examiner's report is by law one basis of the Board's final decision in a case, and is a proper part of the record.
Such statutory language cannot be ignored. "It is a well established rule of statutory construction that a construction should be resorted to which renders every word and sentence operative, rather than one which renders some words inoperative or nugatory." City of Tulsa v. Goins, 437 P.2d 257, 259 (1967) . The power to actually determine an equivalent to the sixty (60) hour requirement is consistent with the Board's overall power given in Section 59 O.S. 396.17 [ 59-396.17], supra, to govern the field of embalming.
" It is well-settled that every statute must be interpreted to give meaning to every part. C. H. Leavell Company v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, Okl., 450 P.2d 211, 215 (1968). A construction should not be followed which renders some words inoperative or nugatory. City of' Tulsa v. Goins, Okl., 437 P.2d 257, 259 (1967). By focusing on a definition of "machinery" rather than "farm machinery" the Oklahoma Tax Commission disregards and renders inoperative both the title of the statute and the definition of "farm machinery" contained in the statute itself.