Opinion
2 CA-CV 2023-0167
11-18-2024
CITY OF TUCSON, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. MIRAMAR PROPERTY INVESTORS, L.L.C., AN ARIZONA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Defendant/Appellant.
Nossaman LLP, Tucson By Christopher Kramer, Brian Imbornoni, and Ashley M. Mahoney Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Stubbs & Schubart P.C., Tucson By Thomas M. Parsons Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. C20203880 The Honorable Christopher Browning, Judge
Nossaman LLP, Tucson By Christopher Kramer, Brian Imbornoni, and Ashley M. Mahoney Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Stubbs & Schubart P.C., Tucson By Thomas M. Parsons Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Sklar and Vice Chief Judge Eppich concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BREARCLIFFE, JUDGE
¶1 This matter concerns the determination of just compensation in a condemnation action under A.R.S. § 12-1122. Appellant Miramar Property Investors, L.L.C., contends the trial court erred by, among other things, excluding evidence of the impact of the widening project on its property valuation. We see no error and affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict. Pima County v. Gonzalez, 193 Ariz. 18, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). On September 11, 2020, the City of Tucson (the City) filed a Complaint and Application for Immediate Possession of Miramar's property by eminent domain. The property being condemned was a portion of Miramar's commercial strip mall located at the intersection of Grant Road and Palo Verde Boulevard ("the Property"). The City sought to acquire the Property "for the widening and improvement of Grant Road and related improvements and for a temporary construction easement" (TCE).
¶3 The parties stipulated to the City's immediate possession of the Property and TCE upon posting a cash bond of $121,300. They stipulated that the Property was "being taken for a public use" and "that the taking [was] necessary for such use." The trial court held a show-cause hearing on the application for immediate possession, at which Miramar did not appear. Based on the parties' stipulation, the court granted the City's application, and the City posted the bond.
The transcript of the show-cause hearing is not in the record on appeal; therefore, we deduce what occurred from the clerk's minute entry and the resulting order.
¶4 Miramar thereafter filed its answer and, consistent with its stipulation, admitted that "road widenings are authorized by law and that the taking is necessary for a road widening." Miramar also admitted that the City had "the right and authority to acquire real property by eminent domain" for the purposes described in its complaint, "pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-1111, et seq. and § 9-276, et seq." Miramar requested that the Property be valued and that the trial court enter a judgment for "just compensation" and for damages "for the diminution in value of the remaining property not taken."
¶5 In late December 2022, six months after the setting of the March 2023 trial date, Miramar moved under Rule 15(d), Ariz. R. Civ. P., to "supplement" its answer based on events that had occurred after it filed its answer. It asserted that a new Miramar restaurant tenant had obtained a permit to install a grease trap on the Property and claimed its supplemented answer would now allege that "the project is not located consistent with [the] greatest public good and least private injury." Miramar further averred that it would challenge "the City's right to take land that the City is not using, on the grounds there is no public use and the City offers no plan for future use." The trial court denied the motion, noting, among other factors, that Miramar's motion to supplement came "roughly one and a half years after its tenant's application for a grease trap was approved"; the "events" at issue had been the unilateral actions of a tenant; trial was set to begin a couple months after the motion to amend had been filed; trial was set for March 7, 2023, a date that had been set over seven months prior; and Miramar had been ultimately "dilatory in filing its Motion to Supplement its Answer."
¶6 At the close of discovery, the City filed a number of motions in limine, among them to preclude Miramar from presenting "project influence" (or "condemnation blight") evidence-evidence of the impact of the widening project on Miramar's property values-and evidence of certain purported comparable properties. On the matter of project influence/condemnation blight evidence, the trial court stated it would "essentially grant" the motion and would "admonish counsel and their witnesses not to use" the term condemnation blight "or that notion, or that concept." However, it stated that it would postpone ruling until an objection was made, at which point the court would "look at the context, and rule on an objection as it comes."
¶7 After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding just compensation for Miramar to be $332,000. The trial court entered a final judgment under Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P., and Miramar appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Discussion
I. Waiver
¶8 Under A.R.S. § 12-1127(B), a condemnee who is "entitled to the money paid into court upon any judgment may demand and receive the money at any time thereafter upon an order of the court." Once a condemnee withdraws those funds, however, "[s]uch payment shall be deemed an abandonment of all defenses, except the party's claim for greater compensation." Id. Miramar raises a number of issues on appeal in addition to its claim that it was awarded insufficient compensation. As discussed below, pursuant to § 12-1127(B), Miramar has abandoned such claims.
¶9 In October 2020, when the trial court entered an order for immediate possession, it instructed the City to deposit a cash bond worth $121,300 with the clerk of the court. Then, after the jury rendered its verdict for $332,000, the court ordered the City to deposit an additional $210,700 plus interest and ordered that "the Clerk without further order of the Court, shall release all funds on deposit to" Miramar's counsel's trust account. On page one of its opening brief, Miramar notes that the City had posted its initial bond of $121,300, and that Miramar withdrew these funds "after trial on August 7, 2023." The City, in its answering brief, asserts that "Miramar withdrew the judgment funds on deposit" and refers to the same page one of Miramar's opening brief. In its reply, Miramar does not dispute that it withdrew the judgment funds. Rather, Miramar only disputes whether its claims constitute claims for greater compensation and therefore avoid abandonment.
¶10 Because Miramar does not dispute that it withdrew the funds posted in accordance with § 12-1127(B), it has, as it obliquely concedes, abandoned all claims but for "greater compensation." Of Miramar's manifold arguments raised on appeal, therefore, those that do not bear on Miramar's claim for greater compensation, such as those identified below, are deemed abandoned. See id.
¶11 In addition to statutory abandonment under § 12-1127(B), Miramar has waived many of its claims by failing to develop sufficient arguments. Miramar, in its opening brief, employs the "'kitchen sink' approach to appellate advocacy" that our supreme court has discouraged. State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, n.1 (2003) (quoting State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 299 (1995)). Miramar's opening brief raises a variety of disconnected arguments, sometimes without identifying any specific issue that was raised and ruled on by the trial court, or without addressing the grounds actually cited by the court. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(B) (appellant must identify where a contention "was raised and ruled on"). Other issues are mentioned without development or citation to authority. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A) (requiring arguments be supported with "citations of legal authorities and appropriate references" to the record).
¶12 Many of Miramar's arguments are scatter-shot, unsupported by authority or reasoning. Raising but failing to properly address issues prejudices the responding party and does a disservice to the court. To the extent that Miramar's briefing fairly presents an issue in a fashion that has afforded the City a meaningful opportunity to respond, and this court to address it in light of the record, we will do so. See Adams v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1984) (appellate court prefers to resolve issues on merits). Otherwise, Miramar's deficient arguments are deemed waived. See Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (noncompliance with Rule 13 results in waiver).
A. Motion to supplement answer
¶13 The first of Miramar's waived arguments is its claim that the trial court erred by denying its pretrial motion to supplement its answer. We review a court's ruling on a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Valley Farms, Ltd. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 206 Ariz. 349, ¶ 6 (App. 2003).
¶14 In its opening brief, Miramar argues that the sole basis for the trial court's denial was delay and that delay alone is insufficient to deny a motion to amend. As explained above, in addition to determining that Miramar had been dilatory, the court determined that the events surrounding the grease trap were essentially irrelevant to a just compensation valuation. Miramar does not address this ground. Even as to its assertion that it was not dilatory, Miramar's only argument is that "[t]he City was fully aware of the issue; it was the City's demand for payment that compelled the amendment." Miramar fails to adequately address the court's exercise of discretion. Further, Miramar's arguments go to public use, necessity, and the widening project's location, not whether Miramar received just compensation.
¶15 Although, in its reply brief, Miramar contends without elaboration that "[t]he annual license payment alone is 20 times higher per square foot than the value the City's own appraiser placed on the area condemned," and had asserted below that the grease trap license would cost $500 a year, it does not develop why or how this figure would factor into a claim for greater compensation. Accordingly, any argument on Miramar's motion to supplement its answer is waived. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A); Ritchie, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62.
B. Palo Verde easement
¶16 Miramar also asserts that the trial court "improperly left a legal question of the Palo Verde easement and its location without instructions." Miramar itself explains that its arguments on this matter go to public use and necessity. Because this is not a claim for increased compensation, this argument is waived. See § 12-1127(B).
C. Motion to quash
¶17 Next, Miramar contends that the City improperly withheld certain documents in discovery and that the trial court erred by granting the City's motion to quash Miramar's subpoena to a third party, PICOR Commercial Real Estate. Miramar asserts that this denial "kept Miramar from laying additional foundation for the Trial Court to consider" before precluding certain evidence.
¶18 According to the City's motion to quash below, Miramar's first request for production from the City included several requests related to PICOR, such as "[a]ny and all documents constituting, or relating, directly or indirectly, to any City agreement with PICOR . . . to lease City surplus property within the Tucson City limits including, but not limited to, along Broadway Boulevard and Grant Road." The City objected to the request. No agreement was reached on this request, and Miramar did not seek court intervention, it simply subpoenaed PICOR for essentially the same information it had sought from the City. Miramar then apparently refused to meet and confer about the subpoena with the City, and the City moved to quash it pursuant to Rule 45(c)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P. The City argued, in part, that Miramar had abused the discovery process when it failed to seek resolution of the discovery dispute pursuant to Rule 26(d), Ariz. R. Civ. P. The trial court agreed that the dispute over the discovery request should have been handled pursuant to Rule 26(d) and quashed the subpoena.
¶19 On appeal, Miramar makes much of why the evidence it sought would have been relevant and how the City should be sanctioned for its withholding. Trial courts have "broad discretion" in matters of discovery and disclosure, and their rulings will not be disturbed "absent an abuse of discretion." Marquez v. Ortega, 231 Ariz. 437, ¶ 14 (App. 2013). Miramar does not address the court's conclusion that Miramar abused the discovery process by side-stepping Rule 26(d). Because Miramar fails to address the basis of the court's ruling, or point to where its appellate arguments were otherwise raised and ruled on, these arguments related to the subpoena are waived. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A); Ritchie, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62.
D. Exclusion of evidence of placement of power poles
¶20 Miramar also argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the City's placement of certain power poles on the Property. Evidently, at some point before the first day of trial, the parties conferred and agreed that evidence of placement of power poles on Miramar's property would be excluded. On the third day of trial, however, Miramar argued anew that it should be permitted to introduce evidence regarding the power poles. The court explained that they "had already discussed this," and the court's understanding was that, "at the end of the day," these power poles were "not going to change the valuation at all, and we agreed that it wouldn't be mentioned or talked about because it didn't change the ultimate appraisal number." Although Miramar questioned which poles were subject to the agreement, it conceded that, while the poles were part of its expert's "analysis of all things," they "[do not] increase his number."
¶21 Now, on appeal, Miramar asserts among other things that the pole placement bore on the market value of the retained parcel, citing State ex rel. Miller v. J.R. Norton Co., 158 Ariz. 50, 52 (App. 1988) ("[A]ny factor bearing on the market value of the retained parcel, such as increased noise, proximity to the highway, fumes, etc., is admissible."). However, because Miramar conceded below that the power pole evidence would not affect the valuation of the Property, we deem this argument waived as well. See Harris v. Cochise Health Sys., 215 Ariz. 344, ¶ 18 (App. 2007) (party's concession below, on which trial court relies, belies contrary argument on appeal); Ritchie, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62.
E. Duration of the temporary construction easement
¶22 Miramar argues that the trial court erred in refusing to limit the TCE to two years in duration. Miramar fails on appeal, however, to demonstrate with relevant authority why the court was bound to expressly limit the duration of the TCE, and how it erred in failing to. It also fails to identify in the record where the court was properly asked to limit the duration of the TCE and where the court refused to.
¶23 Miramar cites to day three of the trial, where Miramar asked an expert witness, "how much more the City is obligated to pay as a result of the temporary construction"; the City objected that any such expert opinion was undisclosed. During the bench conference that followed, Miramar requested that the TCE be capped at two years. The trial court refused as the matter had not been properly raised. Ultimately, Miramar withdrew the question and moved on from its request.
¶24 Miramar also points to the end of trial, during the settling of final instructions. At one point, Miramar sought inclusion of an instruction referred to as jury instruction "19." In discussing the instruction's inclusion, Miramar argued about the expected duration of the TCE and how it should be valued but made no formal request to cap its duration. At another point, Miramar sought to include a jury instruction on the "maximum use" of the TCE, but the court ruled the concept was covered by other instructions.
Despite the reference to the instruction number, it is unclear from the record which of the proposed jury instructions this is.
¶25 Miramar has not, on appeal, identified any ruling by the trial court on the issue of the TCE's duration properly preserved for our review. This court therefore has no basis to find any error, and the matter is waived. Ritchie, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62.
F. Jury instructions and interrogatories
¶26 Finally, Miramar contends the trial court erred by refusing to give certain instructions and interrogatories to the jury. But Miramar does no more than assert that its offered instructions and interrogatories should have been given and that, because they were not given, the court erred. Miramar fails to present any cogent legal reasoning or references to the record demonstrating what the court ruling on any given instruction or interrogatory was and specifically why the court ruling was in error. Such solely conclusory assertions are insufficient. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A); Ritchie, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62. Miramar has waived these arguments on appeal.
II. Just Compensation
¶27 As stated above, the jury awarded Miramar $332,000 in damages including compensation for the partial taking of the Property. Under the Arizona Constitution, "[n]o private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made ...." Ariz. Const. art. II, § 17. "Just compensation" is a monetary amount that will "place the property owner in the position he or she would have occupied had no taking occurred." State ex rel. Miller v. Filler, 168 Ariz. 147, 149 (1991). In a partial-takings case like this one, the formula for determining just compensation is codified by § 12-1122(A). In awarding just compensation, a fact finder must determine: (1) the fair market value of the condemned property; (2) any "severance damages" incurred; and (3) any "special benefits" gained. Id.
¶28 Valuation of the property taken "is determined by the market value of the property-by what a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept." City of Tucson v. Allen, 20 Ariz.App. 134, 135 (1973). "'Fair market value' is the highest price the property will bring if offered for sale on the open market, allowing for reasonable time to find a purchaser knowing all uses and purposes to which the property is adapted and for which it is capable." Filler, 168 Ariz. at 150. Fair market value is established as of the service of the summons in the condemnation action. A.R.S. § 12-1123(A); see also § 12-1122(A)(1) (fact finder shall determine "value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements on the property pertaining to the realty").
¶29 "Severance damages" are damages suffered by the owner as to his property retained after condemnation "by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." § 12-1122(A)(2). To calculate severance damages, the proper formula is to consider the difference in fair market value of the owner's retained property before and after the taking. Filler, 168 Ariz. at 149-50. A condemnee-here, Miramar- has the burden of proving severance damages. State ex rel. Ordway v. Buchanan, 154 Ariz. 159, 297 (1987).
¶30 "Special benefits" are gains to the condemnee by virtue of the project, which are particular to the condemnee's remaining property, as opposed to those experienced in the area generally. § 12-1122(A)(3); see Taylor v. State ex rel. Herman, 12 Ariz.App. 27, 30 (1970) (distinguishing unique and special benefits from general and community benefits). Special benefits, if found, offset any severance damages found. § 12-1122(A)(3). The condemning authority, the City here, has the burden to prove special damages. Taylor, 12 Ariz.App. at 32.
A. Motion in limine rulings
¶31 To ensure that an owner receives just compensation, Arizona courts apply the project influence rule, whereby evidence of "diminution in market value prior to the actual taking, and due to either the anticipation of the taking or preliminary steps toward it, may not be used to reduce the landowner's compensation." Maricopa County v. Barkley, 168 Ariz. 234, 246 (App. 1990). That is, "the property cannot be charged with a lesser value at the time of taking when the decrease in such value is occasioned by reason of the taking itself." State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200, 206 (1963); City of Phoenix v. Clauss, 177 Ariz. 566, 569 (App. 1994); see also Robles v. City of Tucson, 16 Ariz.App. 100, 101 (1971) ("[P]roperty owners are not entitled to enhancement in their property value occasioned by the construction or in anticipation of the construction of the proposed project, and . . . consideration should not be given to the effect of the taking in depressing the value." (citation omitted)). Decrease in a property's value "directly attributable to the taking itself" is "condemnation blight." Filler, 168 Ariz. at 152 n.2.
¶32 Before trial, the City moved in limine to "preclud[e] [Miramar], their attorneys or witnesses, from referring to or introducing evidence of, directly or indirectly, in the presence of the jury or the jury panel, 'condemnation blight.'" The City asserted that condemnation blight is an alternative term for project influence and that, under the project influence rule, evidence of the effect of the widening project is inadmissible when determining the fair market value of a condemned property. The City posited that a pretrial order excluding such evidence was actually in Miramar's best interest because the jury would be ultimately instructed to "disregard project influence in determining the 'before' value of the Property."
¶33 In its motion in limine, the City argued that only comparable sales outside the scope of the Project-that is, away from the Grant Road widening work-should be considered "so that the resulting values will not reflect project influence either as 'blight' or enhancement." The City asserted that Miramar witnesses would offer project influence evidence, including by using properties located within the project zone, as comparable sales properties. While it agreed that "[t]he blight of this Project must be disregarded," Miramar argued that "[k]nowledge of the project, when it started, the harm to the neighborhood, the subject property, and the amount of that harm, i.e. the influence (or blight) must be ascertained and then disregarded from the 'before' value." Miramar also asserted that "[t]he same influence is then used to determine the 'after' value."
¶34 Miramar maintained that "[b]light erodes the claim for just compensation; it is not merely a matter of evidence." Miramar also argued, based on non-binding out-of-state authority, that "[b]oth Federal and State Courts see Blight as a right to recover damages upon a 'taking' of property-not evidence, and not something to be disposed of by in limine practice." Miramar's argument below was detailed in its "organized path at trial" near the end of its opposition to the motion in limine:
• The project must be regarded by the jury to determine what the project is (and when?- projects often change), when and how the project was announced: when the blight was made known in the market. Stated otherwise, it is impossible to know how to "disregard" negative project influence without knowing when the project began.
• To then determine causation. Again, the landowner must show what the blight is and that the project Blight caused the damage. Thus, project causation must be regarded.
• To determine the amount of damage caused by the blight must be regarded by the jury because then it must be added back into the present market value by an adjustment upward for the loss caused by the blight. Arizona statute requires that each source and the amount of damage be assessed "separately."(Footnote omitted; underlining and italicizing in original; bolding added.)
¶35 As discussed above, the trial court's initial ruling on the City's motion in limine was equivocal. The court stated:
I am going to essentially grant the [City's] motion in limine . . . with the notion of blight, and admonish counsel and their witnesses not to use that term, or that notion, or that concept.
But I'm going to have to wait until somebody feels that it's been referenced improperly, objects, and look at the context, and rule on an objection as it comes. I don't know- I'm unable to articulate any more clearly how I intend to handle it. So that's the best I can do.
¶36 In citing error on appeal, Miramar first contends the trial court improperly "grant[ed] summary disposition" on its "claims" of condemnation blight in a motion in limine without complying with Rule 56, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Whether the court employed the proper legal standard in evaluating the City's motion in limine is reviewed de novo. City of Tucson v. Tanno, 245 Ariz. 488, ¶ 23 (App. 2018).
¶37 We reject Miramar's argument that the trial court improperly addressed condemnation blight in the context of a motion in limine. This question is, indeed, a matter of evidence-specifically, what kind of valuation methodology will be admitted to determine fair market value and just compensation. See id. ¶ 25. Miramar sought to use evidence of condemnation blight to prove its overall claim for just compensation. And the admissibility of evidence of the project's effect on the value of Property is therefore fundamentally an evidentiary dispute, addressable by a motion in limine. See id. ¶¶ 24-25.
¶38 Miramar next argues that the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine was a "blanket prohibition" on condemnation blight evidence. It was not. The court did rule that it would "essentially grant [the City's] motion in limine . . . with the notion of blight, and admonish counsel and their witnesses not to use that term, or that notion, or that concept." But, crucially, the court reserved any actual admissibility ruling for when "somebody feels that it's been referenced improperly" and "objects," at which point the court would "look at the context, and rule on an objection as it comes." Thus, the court's order plainly deferred ruling until such time as evidence was offered and an objection was made. Consequently, there was no pretrial "blanket prohibition."
In the unsigned minute entry of the clerk following the hearing, the trial court's ruling was described as: "The Court grants the Plaintiff's motion as to the term blight. Counsel are admonished that that term or concept shall not be referred to or used by either counsel or the witnesses." This minute entry of the clerk does not accurately reflect the court's ruling in the record transcript, which, if there is conflict, will control. See, e.g., State v. Ruiz, 239 Ariz. 379, n.4 (App. 2016) ("A discrepancy between a transcript and a minute entry may be resolved by reference to the transcript.").
B. Exclusion of offered project influence evidence
¶39 Given the absence of a pretrial blanket prohibition of project influence evidence, we will examine those discrete rulings by the trial court during trial on any such offered evidence. Miramar identifies only a few points at trial where it sought to admit evidence of condemnation blight but was precluded. But we see no error.
¶40 In its opening brief, Miramar asserts that its manager and majority owner, Paul Kahn, "attempted to testify to the effect of the project on tenants and value. The City objected and the objection was sustained." That exchange is as follows:
[Miramar's Counsel] Now that we are three years from the order for possession that allows the contractor to enter the property, are you speculating about the ultimate effect this project is having on your tenants and on the value of your property?
[Kahn] It's already having an affect.
[City's Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Miramar's Counsel]: I have no further questions.
¶41 It is not clear from either the objection or the trial court's ruling why this testimony was objected to or why the objection was sustained. It could have been objected to on another basis, including foundation and speculation. See State v. Herrera, 232 Ariz. 536, ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (affirming evidentiary ruling if it is correct for any reason). Nonetheless, the question was asked and the answer was given, and it was not "stricken" and the jury was not advised to disregard the answer. Consequently, we see no basis for a finding of error, or, if error, prejudice.
¶42 Miramar also complains that "[t]he City argued successfully that the 'Project cannot be used to show damage to after value,'" and that "[t]he Court agreed and suggested a mistrial if anyone suggested blight caused a loss in tenants." Despite its argument, Miramar fails to identify any particular erroneous ruling made by the trial court excluding any offered, or proffered, evidence or incorrect ruling made on any evidentiary objection. Although the court certainly warned counsel to avoid project blight evidence, Miramar does not identify the evidence in the record it would have offered but for the court's admonition. See Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) (where evidence is excluded, party may preserve claim of error by "inform[ing] the court of its substance by an offer of proof"). Consequently, we see no basis for error.
¶43 Miramar also argues that "[d]espite the City opening the door, the [trial court] refused to admit Miramar's appraiser Sanders' Blight land sales." For this argument, Miramar cites the court barring it from introducing both its expert's testimony about his valuation conclusions and the report memorializing those conclusions. It appears, however, the court did not bar admission of the evidence itself, but merely barred introduction of cumulative, or duplicative, evidence. See Lewis v. S. Pac. Co., 102 Ariz. 108, 110 (1967) ("Whether cumulative evidence will be allowed on a particular point is a proper area for the trial court's discretion."); Herrera, 232 Ariz. 536, ¶ 14 (affirming evidentiary ruling if correct for any reason). Miramar fails to argue why any exclusion of cumulative evidence would have been error.
¶44 Finally, throughout its opening brief, Miramar points to its efforts to admit evidence of purported comparable properties on Broadway Boulevard. It argues it was precluded from offering this evidence by the trial court's rulings on the motion in limine and at trial. The effect, Miramar argues, is that it was "barred from adducing the best evidence of lost income, lost tenancies, and no sales for commercial properties with lost access and parking."
¶45 However, Miramar itself argues that "the City's Broadway project including its early announcement and delayed commencement [of construction] greatly reduced new permits, solar, water meters, and maintenance of properties in the Project's path." Miramar is contending, therefore, that the Broadway properties should be considered, specifically, because of the effect of condemnation blight on those properties. Given that evidence of condemnation blight is inadmissible for the purpose of determining fair market value of the condemned Property, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Robles, 16 Ariz.App. at 101 ("[C]omparable sales that have been substantially enhanced or depressed in value because of the contemplated improvements are generally not admissible in evidence."); City of Tucson v. Ruelas, 19 Ariz.App. 530, 532 (1973) ("[T]he preliminary question of whether the evidence of the sale is admissible, initially a question left to the sound discretion of the trial court.").
¶46 Additionally, but for the fact that the Broadway properties and the condemned Property are both on streets experiencing widening projects, there was no expert testimony that the Broadway properties were comparable to Miramar's. Indeed, the evidence was to the contrary. The Broadway properties were not "partial takings" as here; the City took them in whole and then abandoned them. And, despite its chief claim of comparability, Miramar did not lose all of its parking or street access, while the Broadway properties did. The trial court rightly precluded this evidence.
III. Attorney Fees
¶47 Miramar requests its attorney fees pursuant to Rule 37, Ariz. R. Civ. P., and Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. Because Miramar has not demonstrated any basis for an award of sanctions against the City, we deny its request. The City only requests its costs. As the prevailing party, we grant the City's request upon its compliance with Rule 21.
Disposition
¶48 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.