Opinion
2 CA-CV 2023-0241
07-03-2024
City of Tucson, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Anna Do, Defendant/Appellant.
Michael G. Rankin, Tucson City Attorney By Rebecca F. Cassen, Principal Assistant City Attorney and Legal Advisor, Tucson Police Department, Tucson Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Anna M. Do, Tucson In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. C20231258 The Honorable Kellie Johnson, Judge
Michael G. Rankin, Tucson City Attorney By Rebecca F. Cassen, Principal Assistant City Attorney and Legal Advisor, Tucson Police Department, Tucson Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Anna M. Do, Tucson In Propria Persona
Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Staring and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, JUDGE
¶1 Anna Do appeals from the superior court's ruling releasing a vehicle from the City of Tucson's custody to A.M. We affirm.
¶2 "We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court's ruling." Tucson Ests. Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Jenkins, 247 Ariz. 475, ¶ 2 (App. 2019) (quoting Hammoudeh v. Jada, 222 Ariz. 570, ¶ 2 (App. 2009)). The City of Tucson filed an interpleader action to resolve ownership of a car in its possession. Do, L.B., and A.M. each claimed they owned the vehicle. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court issued a ruling that awarded the car to A.M.
¶3 That ruling did not contain finality language under Rule 54(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, but Do filed a notice of appeal. The superior court entered judgment thereafter. Although Do's notice of appeal was premature because she filed it before the court entered judgment, we nevertheless have jurisdiction. See Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n, 212 Ariz. 407, ¶ 37 (2006) (premature notice of appeal does not defeat appellate jurisdiction if court has made final decision that will not change, but has not completed ministerial task such as entering judgment); see also Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(c) ("A notice of appeal or cross-appeal filed after the superior court announces an order or other form of decision-but before entry of the resulting judgment that will be appealable-is treated as filed on the date of, and after the entry of, the judgment.").
¶4 Do's opening brief fails to comply with numerous provisions of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. It contains no cogent statement of the case, no statement of the issues, and no applicable standard of review. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(4), (6), (7)(B). It fails to provide citations to legal authority or reference any portion of the superior court record. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A). We could conclude that Do has waived her arguments on appeal, especially because we hold unrepresented litigants to the same standards as attorneys. See Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, ¶ 8 (App. 2022). But in our discretion, we address Do's arguments. See Varco, Inc. v. UNS Electric, Inc., 242 Ariz. 166, n.5 (App. 2017) ("waiver for failure to comply with Rule 13(a) discretionary"). We conclude that they lack merit.
¶5 Do argues that the evidence does not support the superior court's decision to release the car to A.M. But Do has failed to supply us with the transcripts necessary for us to consider the context for that evidence. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11(c)(1) (appellant's duty to order transcripts necessary for consideration of issues on appeal). We must presume that the evidence supports the court's findings and conclusions. See Blair v. Burgener, 226 Ariz. 213, ¶ 9 (App. 2010). We therefore reject this argument.
¶6 Do also argues that the superior court should have verified A.M.'s identity before the hearing because A.M.'s brother impersonated him at the evidentiary hearing. Without the transcripts, nothing in the record suggests anyone impersonated A.M., so we presume the evidence supports the ruling. See id. Even so, the court had no independent duty to verify A.M.'s identity because A.M. presumably stated his name under oath or affirmation before testifying. See State v. Navarro, 132 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1982) (judicial officers presumed to properly administer oath or affirmation); Ariz. R. Evid. 603 (witness must give oath or affirmation before testifying).
¶7 Finally, Do argues that the superior court erred in allowing L.B. to file his answer to the complaint a week after the deadline. She asserts that L.B.'s late submission denied her the right to cross-examine him. But Do had three months between L.B.'s answer and the hearing to gather evidence refuting his claims, and she has not argued that time was insufficient. Nor did she seek a continuance in the court. Moreover, the remedy for an untimely answer is a notice of default. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Do did not avail herself of this process.
¶8 We affirm the superior court's order.