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City of South Beloit v. Casique

Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
Jul 18, 2023
2023 Ill. App. 4th 221068 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

Opinion

4-22-1068

07-18-2023

CITY OF SOUTH BELOIT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARICRUZ CASIQUE, Defendant-Appellant.


This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 20MR540 Honorable Ronald Anthony Barch, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

HARRIS JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: (1) Due to defendant's noncompliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), she forfeited her claim on appeal that municipal fines imposed against her were excessive; however, even absent forfeiture, defendant's claim lacks merit. (2) Defendant's claim that municipal fines were imposed against her without any evidentiary basis lacks merit, and the trial court's judgement as to those fines is affirmed as modified.

¶ 2 Defendant, Maricruz Casique, appeals the trial court's imposition of fines for her violation of various ordinances of plaintiff, the City of South Beloit (City). On appeal, she argues the fines were (1) excessive and in violation of the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and (2) improperly entered without a sufficient evidentiary basis. We affirm as modified.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On August 3, 2020, the City filed a two-count complaint against defendant, alleging she owned property within the City located at 532 Hemenway Place, and that defendant's property violated the City's code of ordinances (Code) in several respects. In particular, the City maintained that (1) defendant caused the construction or addition of a structure on the property and used or occupied the structure without making an application to the City's zoning officer and without the issuance of a zoning permit (South Beloit, IL, Code of Ordinances § 118-85 (adopted April 2, 2001)); (2) defendant's property was not in conformance with the City's building code (id. § 1461), (3) defendant's property was not in conformance with the City's electrical code (id. § 14-85), and (4) defendant used the property in a manner that was not permitted for her zoning district by using a structure on the property "as a banquet facility" (id. § 118-163(c)).

¶ 5 According to the City, the violations on defendant's property were found during property inspections on November 15, 2019, and March 19, 2020. It alleged that on November 15, 2019, it issued defendant "a Notice of Code Violation," but that, as of the date its complaint was filed, defendant had allowed the violations to continue to exist. In count I of its complaint, the City sought injunctive relief that prohibited continued violations and required defendant to bring her property into compliance with the Code. In count II, the City sought a judgment for municipal fines for continued violations. It alleged section 1-8 of the Code provided for the imposition of fines of not less than $100 and not more than $750 for each offense and that a separate offense was" 'deemed committed on each day that a violation occurs or continues.' "Id. § 1-8. The City asked the trial court to impose fines of $750 for each day the violations set forth in its complaint continued since November 15, 2019, the date it issued the "Notice of Code Violation" to defendant.

¶ 6 On August 6, 2020, defendant was served with summons and a copy of the complaint. However, she neither entered an appearance in the case nor responded to the complaint. On September 17, 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing in the matter, at which only counsel for the City appeared. At the City's request, the court entered a default judgment in the City's favor and continued the matter "for status on remediation as well as entry of an order for municipal fines, costs[,] and attorney[ ] fees."

¶ 7 At the next hearing on October 15, 2020, defendant appeared pro se. The City represented that the violations on the property had not been remediated. Again, the trial court continued the matter for status on remediation. Following hearings in November 2020 and January 2021, the court entered orders requiring defendant to continue cooperating with the City and to remediate all of the Code violations on her property. The matter was further continued following virtual hearings in March and May 2021.

¶ 8 In July 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing at which defendant, again, appeared pro se. The City represented to the court that defendant had received some of the required permits, but there had been "no inspections" and "no permits on [the] bigger easement for parties and other public events." On July 26, 2021, the court entered a written order, stating as follows:

"1) The Defendant continues to be enjoined and prohibited from using the property in violation of the Code ***, including, but not limited to, use of the structure located on the property for any events, gathering, parties, or occupancies other than cold storage, without first complying with all required buildings inspections and permitting approvals, and obtaining a certificate of occupancy from the Winnebago County Building Department.
2) The Defendant shall continue to proceed with the remediation of all [C]ode violations as previously ordered by the Court."

¶ 9 On October 7, 2021, the City filed a petition for rule to show cause for indirect civil contempt and for attorney fees. It noted the trial court's July 2021 order and alleged that (1) on August 26, 2021, and at times subsequent, the property at issue had been observed being used in a manner that was contrary to the Code, "including occupation of the structure located on the property for a use other than cold storage without obtaining inspections, permits, or a certification of occupancy"; (2) contrary to the court's order, "an uninspected and unpermitted building addition remain[ed] attached to the structure located on the property" and was used by defendant in violation of the Code; and (3) defendant "failed or refused to comply with the Court's Order as [to] the property." On October 15, 2021, the court entered an order, directing defendant to appear before it and show cause why she should not be held in indirect civil contempt.

¶ 10 On October 28, 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing on the rule to show cause. The record does not contain a transcript of the hearing, but a docket entry reflects defendant failed to appear, and the court found her in indirect civil contempt. On November 4, 2021, the court entered a written order, finding defendant in indirect civil contempt and ordering as follows:

"The Defendant *** is Ordered to comply with all previously entered orders of this Court, and shall remain in contempt of court until either 1) removing any non-conforming portions of the structure, or 2) obtaining such required permits, inspections, and certificates from the City, and causing such repairs to the property that it is brought into such condition that it is fit for its intended and permitted use."

¶ 11 On January 3, 2022, the City filed a petition for attorney fees and costs and a petition for municipal fines. With respect to the latter petition, the City alleged that the Code violations set forth in its August 2020 complaint had continued, and it requested the trial court order defendant to pay fines that totaled $2,122,500. The City cited the general penalty provision of its Code, which states as follows:

"Where an act or omission is prohibited or declared unlawful in this Code ***, the violation of any such provision of this Code or any ordinance shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100.00 and not more than $750.00 for each offense, such amount being in addition to any court costs and/or attorney[] fees applied by the court. A separate offense shall be deemed committed on each day that a violation occurs or continues." South Beloit, IL, Code of Ordinances § 1-8(a) (adopted April 2, 2001).

¶ 12 The City also attached an exhibit to its filing, which contained a breakdown of the fines requested for each of defendant's alleged continuing violations of the Code. The City asked the trial court to impose maximum fines of $750 per day with respect to each violation. It alleged defendant's violation of the electrical code (id. § 14-85) continued from November 15, 2019, until March 31, 2021-a period of 502 days-and it sought a fine of $376,500 for that violation. The City alleged the remaining three violations of its building and zoning codes (id. §§ 14-61, 118-85, 118-163(c)) continued from November 15, 2019, to December 30, 2021-a period of 776 days- and for each of the three violations, it sought fines totaling $582,000.

¶ 13 By March 2022, defendant had obtained counsel, who entered his appearance in the case on her behalf. In October 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the City's petition for municipal fines. Counsel for both parties appeared, but defendant was not personally present. At the hearing, the parties presented argument to the court. The City argued that defendant had been given "extensive opportunity to remediate" her violations of the Code, but there continued to be "major issues" on her property. Initially, the City also requested leave to file an amended petition for municipal fees, alleging continuing violations of its electrical code through July 2021, continuing violations of its building code through October 2022, and continuing violations of its zoning code through June 2022.

¶ 14 Defendant's counsel objected to the City's request to amend its petition, asserting there was not evidence to establish further noncompliance "[a]ttached to the complaint." The trial court characterized defense counsel as making an argument that there were no "additional fact findings of non-compliance after" the court's November 4, 2021, finding of indirect civil contempt. Ultimately, the court denied the City leave to amend its petition. As to the City's original petition, filed January 3, 2022, the court noted there had "never been a responsive pleading filed," and it stated it was "accepting the *** uncontested allegations in the original petition." The court further stated it found "no contest" as to the City's allegations in the initial petition and defendant's counsel responded in agreement, stating, "Yes, Your Honor."

¶ 15 After acknowledging both the default judgment and the November 2021 civil contempt finding against defendant, her counsel stated, "at that point, we're done with the fines." He went on to argue that the violations on defendant's property did not "endanger[ ] anyone else in the community" and that amount of the fine sought by the City was unreasonable. Counsel acknowledged that the goal was "to remediate," which had not been completed. He asked the court to "use [its] discretion to impose a fine that would be reasonable in relation to the values of the property and to the violations," suggesting a fine of $3000 per violation.

¶ 16 In setting forth its decision, the trial court noted the default judgment against defendant on September 17, 2020, and that more than a year later, on November 4, 2021, "the property remained out of compliance" and defendant was found in indirect civil contempt. It found that under the Code's penalty provision, it lacked discretion to impose a fine below the minimum of $100 per day, per violation. The court further stated as follows:

"[Defendant] could have avoided the per day fine by coming into compliance and
proving compliance. So it's not the City here that control[s] the magnitude of the fine ***. And the Court has uncontested evidence at the moment that, as of the end of 2021, she remained *** out of compliance. So the Court is-the Court does not believe it has discretion to excuse the fine or deviate from the statutory guideline. And the Court does not believe that the aggregate amount is necessarily dispositive of an unjust outcome because it is [defendant] that actually controlled this fine or at least the number of days that this property remained at risk of a per day fine."
The court then rejected the City's request for maximum fines of $750 per day and, instead, imposed minimum fines of $100 per day for each violation for the time periods alleged in the City's original petition. It ordered the City to recalculate the fines based upon its ruling.

¶ 17 In November 2022, the trial court entered an amended written order that was consistent with its oral ruling and imposed municipal fines against defendant totaling $283,000. The court also granted the City's request for attorney fees and costs and entered a judgment for the City and against defendant in the amount of $285,386.11.

¶ 18 This appeal followed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 A. Excessive Fine Claim

¶ 21 On appeal, defendant first argues that the fines imposed against her were excessive and in violation of the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). Initially, however, we find defendant has forfeited this claim due to her lack of compliance with the Illinois Supreme Court Rules for appellate briefs.

¶ 22 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff Oct. 1, 2020) provides that an appellant's brief must contain an "Argument" section, which sets forth "the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on." The rule states that "[p]oints not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing." Id.

¶ 23 Ultimately, appellate courts are entitled to have the issues in a case clearly defined with cohesive legal arguments, and they "are not depositories where litigants may dump the burden of argument and research." In re Marriage of Hundley, 2019 IL App (4th) 180380, ¶ 82, 125 N.E.3d 509. "The well-established rule is that mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit consideration on appeal." Bank of Illinois v. Thweatt, 258 Ill.App.3d 349, 362, 630 N.E.2d 121, 130 (1994). "An issue not clearly defined and sufficiently presented fails to satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7)." Express Valet, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill.App.3d 838, 855, 869 N.E.2d 964, 979 (2007).

¶ 24 Here, defendant's argument that the trial court imposed excessive fines is conclusory and not supported by any reasoned analysis. In connection with her claim, defendant cites law relating to the eighth amendment and its prohibition against excessive fines and briefly references the allegations against her in the City's August 2020 complaint. However, defendant offers essentially no discussion of how the cited legal authority applies to the particular facts of her case. At most, defendant's actual analysis of her claim consists of two conclusory sentences: "The City neither proved nor presented evidence that any of [defendant's] alleged violations of the [City's] municipal code relate to the imposition of a $285,386.11 fine [sic]. On its face this judgment violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution."

¶ 25 Notably, in Express Valet, one of the two cases defendant cites on appeal, the First District also found that the appellants in that case had forfeited their claim that municipal fines entered against them were excessive due to noncompliance with the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. Id. In so holding, the court stated as follows:

"In this case, petitioners have offered virtually no analysis as to why the fines imposed are excessive and unconstitutional. The record shows that petitioners committed 1,287 violations of the Code, yet petitioners have failed to address the propriety of any of the individual fines imposed on those violations or the conduct that each represents. Most significantly, petitioners have failed to address that they committed over 1,000 violations of the Code by operating without a valid valet parking license, that each day Express Valet operated in such a manner constituted a separate offense punishable by its own fine, and that the fines imposed for each violation are mandatory and provided by statute. Instead, petitioners have simply aggregated the fines imposed for those violations and claimed that this amount is 'excessive.' Moreover, petitioners have cited no Illinois case law applying the excessive fines clause to statutory fines such as those in this case, and they do not even argue that the clause should be applied to the type of fines involved here. The cases petitioners do cite as authority for such an application involve civil forfeiture provisions that are different from the penalty provisions in this case. [Citations.] In light of petitioners' failure to adequately present a challenge to the fines imposed, we conclude that this issue is waived." Id.

¶ 26 Defendant's argument in the present case suffers from the same deficiencies as the appellants' argument in Express Valet. Defendant even cites the same case authority relied upon by the appellants in that case and which the First District found distinguishable. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). Given defendant's lack of analysis and consequent noncompliance with Rule 341(h)(7), we find her excessive fine claim has been forfeited.

¶ 27 We note that in Express Valet, the First District concluded that even setting aside the appellants' "waiver" of their excessive fine claim, the claim lacked merit. Express Valet, 373 Ill.App.3d at 855. The court pointed out that the constitutionality of an ordinance is subject to de novo review. Id. at 854. It also noted the eighth amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and that "[a] fine is considered excessive 'if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense.' "Id. at 856 (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334). The court went on to find that the municipal code provisions at issue served legitimate interests and that the City of Chicago, the municipality in that case, also "ha[d] a legitimate interest in securing compliance with [its municipal code] through penalties." Id. The reviewing court determined the appellants in the case "misleadingly aggregate[d] the fines imposed" to claim that they were excessive. Id. at 857. The court stated the appellants' argument ignored "that almost all of the [the aggregate fine] amount [was] based on a per-offense penalty, and that it was [appellants] who controlled the extent of those fines." Id. It concluded the fines imposed were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses when considering the amount of each fine, the appellants' conduct, and the City of Chicago's legitimate interests that were served by its municipal code. Id.

¶ 28 Again, similar circumstances are presented by the case at bar. Defendant has made no argument either below or on appeal that the provisions of the City's Code that are at issue serve no legitimate interest or that the City had no legitimate interest in securing compliance with its Code through penalties. Moreover, on review, defendant references only the aggregate amount of the fines imposed when claiming that they are excessive. Although the aggregate amount is large, defendant ignores that the amount was based upon multiple violations of the Code, each of which continued unabated for a lengthy period of time. Like the appellants in Express Valet, defendant ultimately "controlled the extent of [the] fines." Accordingly, even if we were to excuse defendant's forfeiture in this case, we would find that her excessive fine claim lacks merit.

¶ 29 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

¶ 30 On appeal, defendant next argues that the trial court's judgment for municipal fines lacked evidentiary support. She contends "it was the City's burden to prove their fines," but it presented "no evidence or testimony" at the October 2022 hearing on its petition.

¶ 31 Again, we note defendant has provided very little in the way of analysis with respect to her claim of error. However, because we find her argument is at least minimally sufficient with respect to the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7), we address the merits of her claim.

¶ 32 A trial court may enter a default judgment when a party has failed to appear and file an answer to the complaint. City of Joliet v. Szayna, 2016 IL App (3d) 150092, ¶ 47, 66 N.E.3d 875. "Where a party has not answered, there are no factual issues raised, and a trial court has the discretion to enter default judgment without an evidentiary hearing." Id. However, default judgments are comprised of two judicial determinations: "(1) a finding of the issues for plaintiff; and (2) an assessment of damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 53. "[Fundamental fairness requires that [the] plaintiff be required to prove up its default damages and entitles [the] defendant the opportunity to be heard on said matter." Id. ¶ 57.

¶ 33 Here, the City filed a petition for municipal fines, alleging defendant's continuous violations of the Code. It specifically alleged that defendant's violation of its electrical code continued for 502 days, from November 15, 2019, to March 31, 2021, and that defendant's remaining three violations of its building and zoning codes continued for 776 days each, from November 15, 2019, to December 30, 2021.

¶ 34 In October 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition. As defendant points out on appeal, no evidence was presented at the hearing. However, instead, the court relied upon the default judgment against defendant and its previous orders in the case to find defendant's continuing violations of the Code. Notably, the City sought fines for each violation, beginning on November 15, 2019. In its original complaint, filed August 3, 2020, the City alleged four separate violations of the Code by defendant; that "A Notice of Code Violation" was issued to defendant on November 15, 2019; and that all of the violations continued through the date of the City's filing. On September 17, 2020, a default judgment was entered against defendant, meaning she never contested the allegations of the complaint.

¶ 35 Thereafter, the trial court entered several orders requiring defendant to remediate the violations and, on November 4, 2021, it entered an order finding her in indirect civil contempt for not complying with a previous order that prohibited her from using her property in violation of the Code and required her to "proceed with the remediation of all [C]ode violations." The record does not contain a transcript of the civil contempt proceedings; however, it does show the court entered the following order.

"The Defendant *** is Ordered to comply with all previously entered orders of this Court, and shall remain in contempt of court until either 1) removing any nonconforming portions of the structure, or 2) obtaining such required permits, inspections, and certificates from the City, and causing such repairs to the property that it is brought into such condition that it is fit for its intended and permitted use."

¶ 36 The trial court's default judgment and subsequent orders are indicative of defendant's continuing violations of the Code through the date of the court's contempt finding. At the October 2022 hearing on the City's fine petition, defendant did not present any evidence to contest the City's claims. Additionally, she did not challenge the City's reliance on, or the court's consideration of, the prior orders in the case, and she makes no such challenge on appeal. Significantly, the record in this case reflects defendant, in fact, acknowledged the court's prior orders, specifically the default judgment and the finding of indirect civil contempt, and suggested only that there was insufficient evidence of continuing violations beyond the date of the court's contempt finding.

¶ 37 Here, the default judgment and the trial court's subsequent orders through the date of the indirect civil contempt finding on November 4, 2021, provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for finding defendant's continuing violations of the Code. We note that for one of the four alleged Code violations, the City alleged a time period that ended well before the indirect civil contempt finding, i.e., March 31, 2021. Accordingly, we find no error with respect to the court's imposition of fines through that date. However, the City alleged the remaining three violations, which concerned violations of the City's building and zoning codes, continued beyond the date of the court's civil contempt finding on November 4, 2021, to December 30, 2021. The record reflects no evidentiary basis for finding any continuing violation of the Code after November 4, 2021, nor did defendant concede any continuing violation after that date. Accordingly, we find the court erred by imposing a $100-per-day fine against defendant for those three violations for the 56-day period between November 4 and December 30, 2021, and we modify the court's judgment by reducing the aggregate fine imposed by $16,800.

¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we reduce the aggregate fine imposed by $16,800 and affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.

¶ 40 Affirmed as modified.


Summaries of

City of South Beloit v. Casique

Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
Jul 18, 2023
2023 Ill. App. 4th 221068 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)
Case details for

City of South Beloit v. Casique

Case Details

Full title:CITY OF SOUTH BELOIT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARICRUZ CASIQUE…

Court:Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District

Date published: Jul 18, 2023

Citations

2023 Ill. App. 4th 221068 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)