As has been noted, the only alleged act of acceptance upon which the city relies is the recordation of the deed. The city cites the case of City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Academy, (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 S.W. 995, as its sole authority for this proposition. We do not consider this case to be persuasive.
The due registration of a deed is prima facie evidence of the delivery thereof. City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Academy (Tex.Civ.App.) 259 S.W. 995; Holmes v. Coryell, 58 Tex. 680; Emory v. Bailey, 111 Tex. 337, 234 S.W. 660, 18 A.L.R. 901; Newton v. Emerson, 66 Tex. 142, 18 S.W. 348; Luzenberg v. Bexar Building Loan Ass'n, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 261, 29 S.W. 237; Owens v. Jackson (Tex.Civ.App.) 35 S.W.2d 186; McAnally v. Texas Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 947. Is it a reasonable supposition that the parties contemplated that the grantors in the deed of trust should have the power to defeat the sale by their simple failure to record the acceptance? It is contrary to an elementary principle of law that one may by his own failure of duty defeat the contract rights of another in a contest between them.
And registration raises a presumption of delivery to and acceptance by the grantee. City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Academy (Tex.Civ.App.) 259 S.W. 995. To rebut these presumptions, disclosed by the record title, necessitated resort to parol evidence.
See, also, Bowers v. Machir (Tex.Civ.App.) 191 S.W. 758; Dallas Cotton Mills v. Industrial Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 296 S.W. 503; City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Academy (Tex.Civ.App.) 259 S.W. 995. In the last case cited it is held:
With the indicated construction of the ordinance we do not agree as hereinbefore stated, and the issue, in effect, submitted to the jury a question of law. This, we think, was error. City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Academy (Tex.Civ.App.) 259 S.W. 995; McCulloh v. Reynolds Mortgage Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 196 S.W. 565; Ryan v. Jackson, 11 Tex. 391. All other assignments have been considered and, being deemed without merit, are overruled.