Opinion
No. 2380 C.D. 2013
September 26, 2014, Submitted. November 12, 2014, Decided. November 12, 2014, Filed
BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Steve A. Frempong appeals, pro se, from the November 13, 2013, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) that denied Frempong's petition to redeem property at 5701 North 17th Street, Philadelphia (Property). The trial court determined that Frempong failed to meet his burden of proving readiness to redeem the Property and found in favor of Corestates Group, LLC, the third-party purchaser (Corestates). We affirm.
On September 20, 2010, the City of Philadelphia (City) filed a petition for permission to sell the Property free and clear of all encumbrances (Petition) due to unpaid property taxes for the Property, which was owned by Frempong. On September 1, 2011, the trial court issued a rule to show cause (Rule) why a decree should not be entered permitting the sale of the Property.
On April 5, 2012, Frempong filed a motion to strike the City's Petition due to fatal defects and irregularities. The trial court denied the motion on May 16, 2012. On May 23, 2012, Frempong filed an answer to the Petition. The trial court scheduled a hearing for the Petition and Rule on June 28, 2012.
Frempong became ill at the hearing, so the trial court rescheduled the hearing for July 3, 2012. Frempong filed a motion for continuance on July 2, 2012. The trial court granted Frempong's continuance and rescheduled the hearing for July 12, 2012.
The trial court entered its final decree on July 12, 2012, permitting the sale of the Property and setting a sheriff's sale date on July 18, 2012. On Monday, July 16, 2012, Frempong filed a motion to vacate the decree and an emergency petition to postpone the sheriff's sale of the Property. The trial court denied the motion to vacate; however, after a hearing, the trial court granted the emergency petition. On July 18, 2012, the trial court issued an order postponing the sheriff's sale until August 23, 2012.
On August 16, 2012, Frempong went to the sheriff's office to check the sheriff's sale schedule for August 23, 2012. Staff at the sheriff's office informed Frempong that the sheriff's sale of the Property had been postponed to November 21, 2012.
A sheriff's sale of the Property was held on September 19, 2012, at which Corestates purchased the Property for $51,000. On the evening of September 19, 2012, Frempong's wife received a telephone call informing her that the Property had been sold at a sheriff's sale. On September 20, 2012, Frempong went to the sheriff's office and was informed that the City had listed the Property for sale the morning of September 19, 2012.
On October 3, 2012, Frempong filed a motion to set aside the sheriff's sale. On October 26, 2012, Frempong filed a motion to stay consideration of the motion to set aside, which the trial court denied on November 5, 2012. On November 15, 2012, Frempong withdrew his motion to set aside the sheriff's sale and filed a second motion to set aside the sheriff's sale. The sheriff acknowledged the deed to Corestates on November 27, 2012. On January 16, 2013, the trial court denied Frempong's second motion to set aside the sheriff's sale.
On August 26, 2013, Frempong filed the instant petition to redeem the Property. Frempong alleged irregularities in the sheriff's sale and illegal eviction of tenants. On September 16, 2013, the City and Corestates filed answers in opposition to the petition to redeem. The City and Corestates opposed redemption, alleging that Frempong could not show that he was ready, willing, and able to redeem the Property. On October 9, 2013, the trial court issued a rule to show cause why Frempong's petition should not be granted and scheduled a hearing on Frempong's petition to redeem.
At the November 13, 2013, hearing, Frempong asked the trial court to determine the cost of redemption. Frempong claimed that the Property was a five-unit rental with no known housing or fire code violations and no structural defects. Frempong stated that he was ready and willing to pay the redemption money and any incidental costs up to $60,000. Corestates presented testimony and evidence, showing pictures of the Property prior to its renovations and invoices that supported its claim of $297,581.13, in the event of redemption. On that same date, the trial court determined the cost of redemption was $291,581.13 and denied Frempong's petition to redeem, finding that Frempong failed to meet his burden of proving readiness to redeem. On December 12, 2013, Frempong appealed to this court.
The trial court found that Corestates was seeking $297,581.13, and "that the cost of redemption would be $291,581.13. (Trial court op. at 3, 6.)
Our review in a tax sale case is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, or whether an error of law was committed. City of Philadelphia v. F.A. Realty Investors Corporation, 95 A.3d 377, 380 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Initially, we must determine whether the trial court erred in finding that Frempong did not demonstrate a readiness to redeem. Section 32 of the Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207 (Act), as amended, 53 P.S. §7293, provides:
(a) The owner of any property sold under a tax or municipal claim . . . may, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, redeem the same at any time within nine months from the date of the acknowledgment of the sheriff's deed therefor, upon payment of the amount bid at such sale; the cost of drawing, acknowledging, and recording the sheriff's deed; the amount of all taxes and municipal claims, whether not entered as liens, if actually paid; the principal and interest of estates and encumbrances, not discharged by the sale and actually paid; the insurance upon the property, and other charges and necessary expenses of the property, actually paid, less rents or other income therefrom, and a sum equal to interest at the rate of ten per centum per annum thereon, from the time of each of such payments . . . .
(b) Any person entitled to redeem may present his petition to the proper court, setting forth the facts, and his readiness to pay the redemption money; whereupon the court shall grant a rule to show cause why the purchaser should not reconvey to him the premises sold; and if, upon hearing, the court shall be satisfied of the facts, it shall make the rule absolute, and upon payment being made or tendered, shall enforce it by attachment.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in any city . . . there shall be no redemption of vacant property by any person after the date of the acknowledgment of the sheriff's deed therefor. For the purposes of this subsection, property shall be deemed to be "vacant property" unless it was continuously occupied by the same individual or basic family unit as a residence for at least ninety days prior to the date of the sale and continues to be so occupied on the date of the acknowledgment of the sheriff's deed therefor.
The trial court found that Frempong filed the petition for redemption within nine months of the sheriff acknowledging the deed and that the Property was not vacant at the time Corestates took possession. However, the trial court determined that Frempong did not have the right to redeem the Property because he failed to set forth facts demonstrating a readiness to pay the redemption money. Specifically, the trial court determined that Frempong did not "deposit any money with the Prothonotary, not even the undisputed purchase price at the Sheriff's Sale, which is stated on the deed." (Trial court op. at 6.)
Pursuant to section 32(b) of the Act, Frempong could redeem the Property if, after a hearing, the trial court was satisfied that he set forth facts showing his readiness to pay the redemption money. 53 P.S. §7293(b); see also City of Philadelphia v. F.A. Realty Investors Corporation, 95 A.3d 377, 380 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (stating that section 32(c) of the Act requires the property owner to 'set forth facts warranting redemption and his readiness to pay the redemption money' (quoting trial court)).
At the hearing before the trial court, Frempong asked the court to make a determination of whether Corestates' expenses for improvements and changes to the Property would be part of the redemption costs, i.e. whether Frempong would pay $51,000 or $297,581.13 to redeem the Property. The trial court advised Frempong that "procedurally, we have to establish, first, whether or not you are situated timewise and otherwise to redeem the [P]roperty." (N.T., 11/13/13, at 6.) Frempong established that he timely filed the redemption petition and that the Property was occupied by a family prior to and at the time Corestates took possession. ( Id. at 14, 18-19.) The trial court asked Frempong, "[W]hat proof or what do you have to show that if it was $51,000, that you would be able to [pay] that?" ( Id. at 14.) Frempong presented testimony that Corestates began rehabilitating the Property after it took possession and spent about $300,000 to make the Property livable. ( Id. at 21, 30.)
Corestates testified that "[t]he renovation is done the most economical way in order for the [P]roperty to be in a rentable condition." (N.T., 11/13/13, at 36-37.) Corestates further acknowledged that the renovations were necessary to make the Property habitable. ( Id. at 43, 46.)
In moving forward, the trial court stated: "The key question as I see it now is [Frempong's] ability to redeem, that's where we are now, so let's hear something about that." ( Id. at 55.) Frempong asked the trial court, "[B]ased on what amount?" ( Id.) The trial court responded that Frempong should present evidence on his ability to redeem "based on any amount, based on [$]51,000 or the [$]291,000." ( Id. at 55-56.)
Upon Frempong's request, the trial court found that the amounts Corestates spent to make the Property habitable were reasonable and necessary and, therefore, that the amount of redemption was $291,581.13. ( Id. at 56.) The trial court further prodded Frempong: "You are in the middle of your case. Do you have any additional witnesses or testimony or evidence?" ( Id. at 57.) The trial court added:
[Y]ou asked me from the beginning of the court to make a determination whether it was [$]51,000 or [$]291,000. I did that based on your request, not on my own volition. I did that based on what you asked me to do. So now that I have done that, do you have any additional testimony or evidence in your case-in-chief.
( Id. at 58.)
Frempong responded: "[I]f the [c]ourt has made that determination, then we will end—if that is the [c]ourt's position, my position is that in itself undercut our defense because we are not going to pursue the redemption if that is the determination . . . ." ( Id. at 59.)
Finally, the following conversation took place between the court and Frempong:
THE COURT: Let me put it to you this way, do you have anymore witnesses?
MR. FREMPONG: No.
THE COURT: Do you have anymore evidence?
MR. FREMPONG: No.
THE COURT: Okay. The Court will find that the petitioner has not met its burden and will dismiss the petition.
( Id. at 59.) Because Frempong failed to present any testimony or evidence regarding his financial ability to redeem the Property, regardless of the redemption amount, Frempong failed to meet his burden.
Frempong argues that, in determining the cost of redemption, the trial court erred in finding that Corestates is not entitled to recover the costs allegedly incurred for extensive improvements and additions to convert a five-unit apartment building into a six-unit apartment building, where the City had not declared the Property uninhabitable or in imminent danger of collapse. However, we do not address this issue because Frempong failed to present any testimony or evidence showing a readiness to redeem the Property regardless of the amount owed to redeem.
Accordingly, we affirm.
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of November, 2014, we hereby affirm the November 13, 2013, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge