Accordingly, because we find that neither the Illinois Condominium Act nor the Illinois General Not For Profit Corporation Act specifically prohibits a home rule unit from governing the process by which a unit owner may gain access to a condominium association's financial records, the Ordinance's provisions regarding this subject are valid. Defendants' reliance on City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank Trust Co., 364 Ill. App. 3d 506 (2006), does not convince us otherwise. In Oakbrook Terrace, the court concluded that a city ordinance that provided for a two-year amortization period for existing nonconforming advertising signs was an invalid exercise of home rule authority because it precluded the remedy of just compensation under the Illinois Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 5/7-101 (West 1998)).
When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that no material factual issues exist and that only questions of law are presented. City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank & Trust Co., 364 Ill.App.3d 506, 510, 301 Ill.Dec. 135, 845 N.E.2d 1000 (2006). (Of course, neither the trial court nor the reviewing court is required to accept the parties' beliefs as to the existence of factual issues, and both courts remain free to determine the existence of a genuine factual issue sufficient to preclude the entry of summary judgment.
[Citation.] Home rule powers should be construed liberally. " City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank & Trust Co. , 364 Ill. App. 3d 506, 514, 301 Ill.Dec. 135, 845 N.E.2d 1000 (2006). ¶ 20 The circuit court here found that Calumet City had the power under article VII, section 6(f) to place a referendum on the ballot, asking the voters whether to limit the mayoral office to persons who had served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as alderman.
The court found that Ordinance 221 provided amortization as the only remedy available to an owner of an existing, but nonconforming, sign which existed at the time North Pekin enacted Ordinance 221 in 1972. The court also found that Adams' leases to own and operate the sign structures were valid and had not expired as of midnight of April 30, 2004, while recognizing Adam's license permits pertaining to each sign, issued annually by North Pekin, did expire on that date. ¶ 22 Further, the court found the facts in the instant case were consistent with those in the case of City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank and Trust Co., 364 Ill. App. 3d 506 (2006). After applying the case law, the court determined Ordinance 221 violated the mandates of the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 30/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2002)) by allowing the Village to take ownership of the billboards without providing just compensation to the sign owner.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of attorney fees. As he did at trial, defendant argues that the attorney fees provision contained in paragraph 15(e) of the lease is unenforceable under section 5-12-140(f) of the RLTO. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank Trust Co., 364 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510 (2006). We review de novo the propriety of an order granting summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank Trust Co., 364 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510 (2006). We review de novo the propriety of an order granting summary judgment.
Opinions by those courts required municipalities to show that (1) the exercise of power pertained to its government and affairs, (2) whether the legislature had specifically limited the local exercise of power on an issue or whether the State's exercise was exclusive, preempting the exercise of power by home rule units and (3) that if no specific action had been taken, a court must "determine the proper relationship between the local ordinance and state law." Id. (citing City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank and Trust Co., 364 Ill. App. 3d 506, 514 (2006). The Howard opinion also analogized the City's enactment of Municipal Code § 9-92-080(f) to several Illinois Supreme Court cases wherein the Illinois Supreme Court held that some functions of home rule units do not pertain to a unit's government and affairs, and are thus not appropriate for municipal legislation.
Id. (citing City of Wheaton v. Loerop, 399 Ill. App. 3d 433, 434 (2010)). Those courts required municipalities to show (1) that the exercise of power pertained to its government and affairs, (2) that whether the legislature had specifically limited the local exercise of power on an issue or whether the State's exercise was exclusive, preempting the exercise of power by home rule units and (3) that if no specific action had been taken, a court must "determine the proper relationship between the local ordinance and state law." Id. (citing City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank and Trust Co., 364 Ill. App. 3d 506, 514 (2006). The Howard opinion also analogized the City's enactment of Municipal Code § 9-92-080(f) to several Illinois Supreme Court cases wherein the Illinois Supreme Court held that some functions of home rule units do not pertain to a unit's government and affairs, and are thus not appropriate for municipal legislation.
Opinions by those courts required municipalities to show that (1) the exercise of power pertained to its government and affairs, (2) whether the legislature had specifically limited the local exercise of power on an issue or whether the State's exercise was exclusive, preempting the exercise of power by home rule units and (3) that if no specific action had been taken, a court must "determine the proper relationship between the local ordinance and state law." Id. (citing City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank and Trust Co., 364 Ill. App. 3d 506, 514 (2006). The Howard opinion also analogized the City's enactment of Municipal Code § 9-92-080(f) to several Illinois Supreme Court cases wherein the Illinois Supreme Court held that some functions of home rule units do not pertain to a unit's government and affairs, and are thus not appropriate for municipal legislation.
Id. (citing City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban Bank and Trust Co. , 364 Ill. App. 3d 506, 514, 301 Ill.Dec. 135, 845 N.E.2d 1000 (2006).