Opinion
19-P-1599
07-01-2020
CITY OF NEWTON v. NEWTON POLICE ASSOCIATION.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The Newton Police Association (NPA) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the city of Newton (city), after a Superior Court judge vacated an arbitration award in NPA's favor. The arbitration award provided late cancellation fees to three officers for their detail work on May 23 or 24, 2017, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the NPA and the city. On appeal, the NPA claims that the judge erred in vacating the arbitration award. We reverse.
"[A]n arbitration award is subject to a narrow scope of review." Beacon Towers Condominium Trust v. Alex, 473 Mass. 472, 474 (2016), quoting Superadio Ltd. Partnership v. Winstar Radio Prods., LLC, 446 Mass. 330, 333 (2006). We review the judge's decision to vacate the arbitration award de novo. See Pittsfield v. Local 477 Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 480 Mass. 634, 637 (2018). Importantly, we note that Massachusetts has a strong public policy favoring arbitration, especially in the context of labor disputes. See id. at 636-637; Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Carmen's Union, Local 589, 454 Mass. 19, 25 (2009).
The city first claims that the arbitration award unlawfully imposed a double-payment fee in violation of G. L. c. 40, § 22F, which provides that the city may "fix reasonable charges to be paid for any services rendered or work performed by the city . . . or any department thereof." The city claims that the arbitration award compensated the officers for two details when they only performed work on one, and that this was an unreasonable fee prohibited by § 22F.
"The proper inquiry is whether the [relief] is prohibited by statute." Superadio Ltd. Partnership, 446 Mass. at 340. To vacate the arbitration award on the basis that it was prohibited by statute, the award must be in direct or material conflict with the statute. See, e.g., Somerville v. Somerville Mun. Employees Ass'n, 451 Mass. 493, 497 (2008) (inquiry is whether arbitration award "materially conflicts" with statute); Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. Safety, 430 Mass. 601, 604 (2000) (vacatur of arbitration award proper where "award directly conflicts with statutory provisions"). We keep in mind that it is the arbitrator's expertise that the parties bargained for, and so we start with the "presumption that the collective bargaining agreement compels the outcome directed by the award." See Somerville Mun. Employees Ass'n, supra at 497.
As a preliminary matter, the arbitrator here determined as a matter of contract interpretation that the reassignment of the officers' details constituted a cancellation, implicating § 6.10 of the collective bargaining agreement. This determination is beyond our scope of review. See Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 407 Mass. 1006, 1007 (1990) (contract interpretation within arbitrator's scope of authority; absent fraud, errors of law or fact are insufficient to set aside award). Section 22F does not reference late cancellation fees; it provides only that the city "may fix reasonable charges to be paid for any services or work performed by the city . . . or any department thereof." In that light, we cannot say awarding late cancellation fees is in direct or material conflict with § 22F. Rather, § 22F merely requires that charges to be paid for services or work performed must be "reasonable." However, § 22F is not a measuring stick for determining reasonableness in bargained-for contract provisions. If we made such a determination, then all similar provisions would be subject to judicial review for reasonableness, which risks judicializing the arbitration process. See, e.g., Bureau of Special Investigations, 430 Mass. at 604 (public policy exception is narrow because it has potential to "judicialize" arbitration process).
Section 6.10 provides that "each officer shall be guaranteed four (4) hours of pay at the applicable detail rate for every detail lasting four hours or fewer."
The collective bargaining agreement did not define "detail" for the purposes of § 6.10; thus, it was for the arbitrator to determine as a matter of contract interpretation.
Here, the agreement sent to vendors provided notice that a late cancellation fee would be imposed when a detail is cancelled within two hours of its scheduled time. As the arbitrator noted, the city had regularly charged such fees to contractors who cancel last minute. The city's recourse here is not vacatur, but renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement terms. There was no conflict with § 22F.
The city also claims that the arbitrator's award is in conflict with a well-defined Massachusetts public policy against windfall payments to municipal employees. The "public policy exception" is an exceedingly narrow exception to the "rule" that arbitration awards are final. See Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 477 Mass. 434, 442 (2017). Importantly, we do not reverse an arbitration award because we are unhappy with the result. See Beverly Sch. Dist. v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 248 (2001). The public policy "must be well defined and dominant." Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, supra at 442. As explained supra, there is no such policy against late cancellation fees applicable here. The officers here did not receive a windfall because § 6.10 was a bargained-for provision.
Judgment reversed.
By the Court (Vuono, Meade, & Wolohojian, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: July 1, 2020.