The court below correctly determined that appellant had failed to comply with RPAPL 1341 (2) and therefore was not entitled to a stay of the foreclosure sale. ( NYCTL 1996-1 Trust v LFJ Realty Corp., 307 AD2d 957; Bankers Fed. Sav. Loan Assn. v House, 182 AD2d 602; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Bobb, 296 AD2d 476; Green Point Sav. Bank v Oppenheim, 237 AD2d 409; Abley Props., Inc. v Reid, 9 Misc 3d 1107[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51438[U]; City of New York v Nelson, 309 NY 94; City of New York v Jackson-140 Realty Corp., 279 App Div 668; City of Peekskill v Perry, 272 App Div 940; Village of Ossining v Lakin, 5 Misc 2d 1024; Finance Inv. Co. [Bermuda] v Gossweiler, 145 AD2d 463.) III.
That being so, the case is similar to Matter of Kantor ( supra), which is at least inferentially approved by Cameron Estates v. Deering ( supra), and the rationale of the latter case has no bearing here. There is no doubt that the above principles apply to article VII-A of the Tax Law ( Town of Somers v. Covey, 283 App. Div. 883, affd. 308 N.Y. 798, revd. on other grounds 351 U.S. 141; City of Peekskill v. Perry, 272 App. Div. 940; see, also, City of New York v. Lynch, 281 App. Div. 1038, affd. 306 N.Y. 809; City of New York v. Jackson-140 Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 668). Therefore, both irregularities and jurisdictional defects are beyond attack by reason of the running of the Statute of Limitations. If the default were opened and appellant permitted to answer, no defense could be asserted which could not be immediately refuted by the conclusive presumption of regularity.
In any event, there is no claim that any other address was "known". Accordingly, there is no judicial power to disrupt the statutory proceeding and relieve from default ( City of New York v. Nelson, 309 N.Y. 94; Town of Somers v. Covey, 283 App. Div. 883, affd. 308 N.Y. 798; City of New York v. Jackson-140 Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 668; City of Peekskill v. Perry, 272 App. Div. 940). The owner of tax-delinquent real property is chargeable with knowledge thereof and of the statutory summary foreclosure procedure ( City of New Rochelle v. Echo Bay Waterfront Corp., 268 App. Div. 182, 186, 191, supra).
Upon the expiration of the time prescribed by the statute (Tax Law, ยง 165 et seq.) for redemption and answer, the rights of the parties, in view of the provisions of section 165-a of the Tax Law, became fixed and unalterable. The latter section is in the nature of a Statute of Limitations and precludes the court from extending the time to answer or redeem therein prescribed. (City of Peekskill v. Perry, 272 A.D. 940; City of New York v. Jackson-140 Realty Corp., 279 A.D. 668; City of New York v. Lynch, 281 A.D. 1038, affd. 306 N.Y. 809; Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 445-446; Levy v. Newman, 130 N.Y. 11, 13; People ex rel. Quaranto v. Moynahan, 148 A.D. 744, 746, affd. on opinion below, 205 N.Y. 590; City of New Rochelle v. Echo Bay Waterfront Corp., 268 A.D. 182, 191, affd. 294 N.Y. 678, certiorari denied 326 U.S. 720.) Nolan, P.J., Wenzel, MacCrate and Beldock, JJ., concur. Adel, J., dissents and votes to reverse the order and to grant the motion, with the following memorandum: It appears without dispute that the taxpayer was incompetent for many years, to the knowledge of the town officials.
The rule is fundamental that once the prescribed time for redemption has expired the rights of the parties become fixed and unalterable and the court is powerless to extend the time to answer or redeem or to open the default. (See City of New York v. Nelson, 309 N.Y. 94; City of New York v. Jackson-140 Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 668; City of Peekskill v. Perry, 272 App. Div. 940.) There is no question that the right to redeem pursuant to the in rem foreclosure has long since expired and the court is without power to extend this right of redemption. The question remains whether by maintaining the present action and purporting to afford a new right to redeem plaintiff bestowed rights upon this defendant sufficient to justify court intervention.