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City of Monterey Park v. Rodriguez

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
Jan 29, 2009
No. B205632 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2009)

Opinion


CITY OF MONTEREY PARK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUSTAVO RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant. B205632 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Fourth Division January 29, 2009

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. KC047612, Dan T. Oki, Judge.

Law Offices of Mark R. Haddon and Mark R. Haddon for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of S. Henslee Smith and S. Henslee Smith for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SUZUKAWA, J.

Defendant Gustavo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) appeals the judgment entered against him on a breach of contract claim brought by the City of Monterey Park (city). We conclude that the issues Rodriguez raises on appeal were resolved against him in a prior workers’ compensation proceeding, and thus Rodriguez is collaterally estopped from raising them here. We therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Rodriguez’s Tort Action and the Global Settlement Agreement

On March 26, 2002, Rodriguez was injured while acting in the course and scope of his employment with the city. Rodriguez sued third party defendants G & A Fire Protection Corporation, Specialty Restaurants Corporation, and Casuda Canyon Restaurant Corporation (who are not parties to this appeal) for allegedly causing his injuries through their negligence. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. GC030631R.) The city filed a complaint in intervention against the third party defendants for damages under Labor Code section 3852 and for contractual indemnification. (City of Monterey Park v. Rodriguez, supra, B191938, 2007 WL 901755 at p. 1.)

Some of our discussion of the factual and procedural history of this case is taken from our unpublished opinion in Rodriguez’s prior appeal, City of Monterey Park v. Rodriguez (Mar. 27, 2007, B191938) 2007 WL 901755.

“The claim of an employee, including, but not limited to, any peace officer or firefighter, for compensation does not affect his or her claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from the injury or death against any person other than the employer. Any employer who pays, or becomes obligated to pay compensation, or who pays, or becomes obligated to pay salary in lieu of compensation, or who pays or becomes obligated to pay an amount to the Department of Industrial Relations pursuant to Section 4706.5, may likewise make a claim or bring an action against the third person. In the latter event the employer may recover in the same suit, in addition to the total amount of compensation, damages for which he or she was liable including all salary, wage, pension, or other emolument paid to the employee or to his or her dependents. The respective rights against the third person of the heirs of an employee claiming under Section 377.60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an employer claiming pursuant to this section, shall be determined by the court.” (Lab. Code, § 3852.)

In April 2004, the parties entered into a global settlement and release of all claims. The third party defendants agreed to pay Rodriguez and the city $2.25 million, to be allocated as follows: $1.25 million to Rodriguez, $215,000 to the city in reimbursement of workers’ compensation benefits paid to Rodriguez, and $785,000 to Rodriguez’s attorneys. The city agreed to pay all of Rodriguez’s injury-related medical bills through the date of the agreement, plus an additional $25,000 in future injury-related medical expenses, and to release all of its claims against the third party defendants.

Two paragraphs of the agreement are of particular significance to the present case. In paragraph 2(f), the parties agreed that the city would receive a credit in the amount of Rodriguez’s net settlement proceeds against any future injury-related claims by Rodriguez for workers’ compensation benefits. In paragraph 2(g), as between Rodriguez and the city only, it was agreed “that the City of Monterey Park was not at fault in causing or contributing to causing the incident and the issue of the negligence of the City of Monterey Park will not be raised or asserted in any subsequent proceedings between [the city] and Gustavo Rodriguez for any purpose.”

“Except as provided in 2(e) above [providing that the city would pay an additional $25,000 for Rodriguez’s future medical care], the City of Monterey Park shall have and receive credit against all further and/or future compensation pursuant to Labor Code, Section 3861 in any claim for workers compensation benefits by Gustavo Rodriguez arising out of or in any way related to the incident in the amounts to be received by Gustavo Rodriguez as set forth in Paragraph 3.”

II. The Workers’ Compensation Proceeding

At the city’s request, the trial court granted judicial notice of the pleadings filed in the workers’ compensation proceeding.

The city filed a petition for an order of credit pursuant to settlement agreement and mutual release before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (board) on July 8, 2004. It recited that Rodriguez had suffered an industrial injury on March 26, 2002, as a result of the negligence of third parties. Rodriguez, the third parties, and the city reached a settlement pursuant to which Rodriguez received $1,727,000 from the third parties, and Rodriguez stipulated that the city was not at fault in causing or contributing to his injury and was entitled to a credit in the amount of the third party recovery. Accordingly, the city sought a credit of $1,727,000, less $25,000 that the city had agreed to pay for Rodriguez’s future medical care, to be applied against all workers’ compensation benefits due or to become due to Rodriguez as a result of the March 26 injury.

Rodriguez objected to the city’s petition for credit. He asserted that the board had not reviewed or approved the settlement agreement, some portions of which “are contrary to State Law and or against public policy.” Further, he asserted that the city was not entitled to a credit until the board independently determined the extent of the city’s responsibility for his injuries. Rodriguez therefore sought an independent review of the settlement agreement, a determination of his general and special damages, a determination of the city’s negligence, a determination of the city’s liability, and a determination of the credit to which the city was entitled.

The matter was set for trial on two issues. The first issue was whether Rodriguez should be held to or released from paragraph 2(f) of the settlement agreement, which provided that the city would have a credit in the amount of Rodriguez’s settlement with the third party defendants. The second issue was whether Rodriguez had the right to an independent determination of the city’s liability or partial liability for his injuries.

The board issued its opinion on September 28, 2006, and its order allowing credit on October 4, 2006. It issued an amended order allowing credit on October 11, 2006. In its opinion, the board found as follows.

(1) Rodriguez and his attorneys all signed the settlement agreement, and his attorneys engaged in lengthy discussions regarding the potential liabilities of the civil defendants and potential recovery in the civil case. There is no indication that Rodriguez in any way was coerced into signing. Therefore, Rodriguez freely and knowingly entered into the agreement settling his civil case.

(2) There was no requirement that the civil settlement be reviewed and approved by the board because it was not dispositive of the workers’ compensation case.

(3) There was adequate consideration for the civil agreement, and Rodriguez failed to show any good cause why he should not be held to its terms. Therefore, Rodriguez does not have the right to an independent determination of the city’s liability or partial liability for his injuries. Rodriguez was free to settle this issue, and he chose to do so.

Rodriguez filed a petition for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a petition for writ of review with the Court of Appeal, and a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. Both petitions presented two questions for review: “(1) Does Paragraph 2(g) of the civil settlement agreement violate public policy[?] [¶] (2) Does an injured worker have the right to compel the Board to make an independent determination of the employer’s comparative culpability (for the worker’s injury), where the employer is seeking a credit at the Board[?]” Both petitions were denied.

III. The City’s Breach of Contract Action Against Rodriguez

On January 5, 2006, the city sued Rodriguez for breach of contract. Allegedly, in his workers’ compensation action, Rodriguez had breached the settlement agreement by objecting to the city’s petition for a credit in the amount of Rodriguez’s net settlement proceeds and by seeking to adjudicate the city’s comparative liability after having agreed not to do so. The city alleged that as a result of Rodriguez’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement, the city “‘has been forced to pay workers compensation benefits it is not obligated to pay and has incurred costs and attorney fees.’” (City of Monterey Park v. Rodriguez, supra, B191938, 2007 WL 901755 at p. 1.)

Rodriguez filed a motion for summary judgment on July 20, 2007. The motion asserted: (1) the global settlement agreement was void as between the city and Rodriguez because it had not been approved by the board and it required Rodriguez to waive future workers’ compensation benefits; and (2) the issue of the city’s negligence had to be determined before the city could assert a claim against Rodriguez’s settlement proceeds. The trial court denied the motion.

The case was tried to a jury on November 7-8, 2007. The jury returned a special verdict for the city, awarding it damages of $140,625. Judgment was entered on December 3, 2007, and notice of entry of judgment was served on December 6, 2007. A timely notice of appeal from the judgment was filed on January 31, 2008.

DISCUSSION

Rodriguez raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that paragraphs 2(f) and (g) of the settlement agreement are void and unenforceable because they required him to waive benefits guaranteed by the workers’ compensation laws, in violation of Labor Code section 2804, and to compromise rights under the workers’ compensation laws without approval by the board, in violation of Labor Code section 5001. Second, he contends that the city is not entitled to be reimbursed for benefits paid after the global settlement agreement was entered until the board determines the extent to which the city’s negligence contributed to his injuries.

The city responds that (1) collateral estoppel precludes litigation of these issues because they were decided against Rodriguez by the board, and (2) Rodriguez’s claims fail on the merits. Because we agree with the city that Rodriguez’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel, we do not reach the merits.

The city also contends that because Rodriguez raised these issues in the trial court by way of a motion for summary judgment, they are not appealable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (m). This contention is in error. While the city is correct that orders denying motions for summary judgment are not appealable, Rodriguez has appealed from the judgment, not the order denying summary judgment. The judgment is appealable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). Further, Rodriguez may properly raise denial of his summary judgment motion on appeal from the final judgment. (E.g., Lackner v. LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747, 753 [“An order denying partial summary judgment is a nonappealable order although reviewable on appeal from the final judgment”]; Gackstetter v. Frawley (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1269-1270 [issue raised in motion for summary judgment, which was denied, “may be a basis for this appeal of the judgment”].)

“A final decision by an administrative agency may be given collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent judicial action if the agency acted in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed factual issues that the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate.” (County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1120.) Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue if “‘(1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)’ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) The application of collateral estoppel is a question of law to which we apply an independent standard of review. (Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870, 878.)

There is no dispute that the decision of the board is final and on the merits and that Rodriguez was a party to the workers’ compensation proceeding. The parties disagree, however, whether the issues raised here are identical to those decided in the workers’ compensation proceeding. The city contends that the issues Rodriguez asserted in his motion for summary judgment and asserts again on appeal “have already been rejected by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and decided against him.” Rodriguez has a different view; he asserts that “[t]he issue in Appellant’s summary judgment motion is the fact that the agreement entered into is void as it was not approved by the [board]. The subject of the hearing at the [board] was a petition for credit; not whether the agreement was void.”

We agree with the city that the issues Rodriguez raises on appeal are identical to those resolved against him in the workers’ compensation proceeding. The board’s opinion states that the matter was set for trial on two issues: “The first issue was whether [Rodriguez] should be held to or released from paragraph 2(f) of his civil settlement agreement executed on or about 4-26-04. The second issue was whether [Rodriguez] has a right to an independent determination of the City’s liability or partial liability for his injuries.” The board noted, moreover, that while the first issue referred only to paragraph 2(f) of the settlement agreement (giving the city a credit in the amount of Rodriguez’s third party settlement), “[Rodriguez]’s trial brief makes it clear that he is also objecting to the language in Paragraph 2(g) [stipulating that the city was not at fault in the accident that caused Rodriguez’s injuries].”

The board found against Rodriguez on both issues. As to the first issue, the board found that Rodriguez “has failed to show any good cause why he should not be held to Paragraph[s] 2(f) and 2(g) of his civil settlement agreement.” Among other things, it specifically noted that while it was true that the agreement was not reviewed and approved by a judicial officer, “the agreement in this matter is not dispositive of the workers’ compensation case; and, therefore, it is found that there was no requirement to have the civil settlement reviewed and approved by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.” As to the second issue, the board found that Rodriguez “does not have a right to an independent determination of the City of Monterey Park’s liability or partial liability for his injuries. [Rodriguez] was free to settle this issue and chose to do so.” Thus, we conclude that the issues decided by the board are identical to those Rodriguez raises on appeal.

Rodriguez re-raised the issues of the enforceability of paragraphs 2(f) and (g) of the settlement agreement and the necessity for an administrative determination of the city’s negligence in a petition for reconsideration filed with the board, in a petition for writ of review filed with the Court of Appeal, and in a petition for review filed with the California Supreme Court. All three petitions were denied.

We reject Rodriguez’s contention that the issues are not the same because the present case concerns the validity of the global settlement agreement, while the workers’ compensation proceeding concerned the city’s right to a credit. It is well established that “‘[t]he “identical issue” requirement addresses whether “identical factual allegations” are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same. [Citation.]’” (Bostick v. Flex Equipment Co., Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 80, 96-97.) Here, the identical factual allegations are at stake in both proceedings, i.e., Rodriguez urges in both that (1) the settlement agreement is void and unenforceable because, among other things, it required him to compromise rights under the workers’ compensation laws without approval by the board, and (2) he has the right to an administrative determination of the city’s negligence. It therefore is irrelevant that the relief sought in the two proceedings is not precisely the same.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the issues raised in the present appeal are identical to the issues decided by the board. Further, the administrative record reflects that these issues were actually litigated and “necessarily decided” in the administrative proceeding. Thus, these issues are barred by collateral estoppel.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The city shall recover its costs on appeal.

We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., MANELLA, J.


Summaries of

City of Monterey Park v. Rodriguez

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
Jan 29, 2009
No. B205632 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2009)
Case details for

City of Monterey Park v. Rodriguez

Case Details

Full title:CITY OF MONTEREY PARK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUSTAVO RODRIGUEZ…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division

Date published: Jan 29, 2009

Citations

No. B205632 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2009)