In another case involving the City of Minneapolis, this court held that Welsh "requires a narrow construction" of the City's powers to regulate a "statewide problem." City of Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights v. University of Minn., 356 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn.App. 1984). To support its claim that its resolutions do not conflict with Minn.Stat. ยง 471.61, the City relies on a test provided in American Electric Co. v. City of Waseca, 102 Minn. 329, 113 N.W. 899 (1907).
In Minnesota the Board of Regents is a constitutional body with powers akin to those of the Board of Higher Education. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held there was a distinction between a claim based upon a contract and one based upon a law establishing a state policy generally applicable to all employees and concluded the Minnesota Human Rights Act applied to the Board of Regents. City of Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights v. University of Minnesota 356 N.W.2d 841 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984). The Minnesota Supreme Court has not directly considered the question but in Winberg v. University of Minnesota, 499 N.W.2d 799 (Minn.
Respondents also point to the Open Meeting Law and the Minnesota Human Rights Act as laws of general applicability based on broad public policy which apply to the University. The cases cited by respondents, Minnesota Daily v. University of Minnesota, 432 N.W.2d 189 (Minn.App. 1988) and City of Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights v. University of Minnesota, 356 N.W.2d 841 (Minn.App. 1984), do proceed on the premise that these laws apply to the University. However, the language of the Open Meeting Law, making it applicable to "any state agency, board, commission or department, . . . governing body of any school district, . . . county, city, town, or other public body," Minn.Stat. ยง 471.705, subd. 1 (1992), is broader than the words "political subdivision" used in the Veterans Preference Act, and the Human Rights Act applies to any employer. Minn.Stat. ch. 363.03 (1992).
Because appellants satisfy the statutory requirements to establish a cartway, we must next consider whether the town board can establish a cartway over the University's property, which appellants concede, and we agree, constitutes state-owned land. See City of Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Univ. of Minn., 356 N.W.2d 841, 842 (Minn. App. 1984) ("[T]he university is, in the ordinary and functional sense, plainly an agency of the state.") (quotation omitted). Therefore, we must determine whether the town board could establish a cartway over state-owned land.
The University admits it is subject to this law. See City of Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights v. University of Minn., 356 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn.App. 1984). We find no reason to differentiate the general definition of applicability found in the Veterans Preference Act from those used in the Open Meeting Law and the Human Rights Act.
Hough Transit, Ltd. v. Harig, 373 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn.App. 1985). In City of Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights v. University of Minnesota, 356 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn.App. 1984) (quoting Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 1984)), the court stated: A municipality has no inherent powers, but only such powers as are expressly conferred by statute or are implied as necessary in aid of those powers which are expressly conferred.