(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 338 Conn. 310, 318–19, 258 A.3d 1 (2021).
Whether this was that injury, under the circumstances of this case, was a question for the referee. Notwithstanding our own view that this case certainly may have merited a more substantial award, pursuant to our standard of review, namely, to decide only whether, in light of the evidence, the referee has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of her discretion; see, e.g., Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 338 Conn. 310, 318, 258 A.3d 1 (2021) ; we cannot conclude that the referee committed reversible error. That brings us to the third point.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 338 Conn. 310, 322, 258 A.3d 1 (2021) ; see Fisette v. DiPietro , supra, 28 Conn. App. at 384–85, 611 A.2d 417 (relying on dictionary definitions to define "substantial circulation," noting that, "[b]ecause our courts have not determined what constitutes substantial circulation, we look to decisions of other courts as well as to dictionaries in order to determine commonly accepted usage"); see also General Statutes §§ 1-1 (a) and 1-2z. In Fisette , this court analyzed the ordinary dictionary meaning of "substantial circulation" in the context of a prior revision of § 8-3 (d).
Such an interpretation would, at a minimum, be counterintuitive for a remedial statute, and we will not find such an intention by implication. Cf. Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission, 338 Conn. 310, 328, 258 A.3d 1 (2021) ("we construe statutes to 242avoid … absurd result[s]"). The statute allows an employee to pursue both grievances alleging contractual violations that do not Implicate a whistleblower claim and whistleblower retaliation claims alleging retaliatory animus arising from the same underlying factual circumstances.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 352, 246 A.3d 429; see Meriden v. Freedom of Information85 Commission, 338 Conn. 310, 318–19, 258 A.3d 1 (2021) (plenary appellate review under Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.). I
Because the FOIA does not define that term, we look to its ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission, 338 Conn. 310, 322, 258 A.3d 1 (2021). Dictionaries in print in the 1970s, when the statute was amended to include the relevant language; see Public Acts 1975, No. 75-342, § 2 (P.A. 75-342); defined "prospective" in one or more of three ways.
is plenary. See, e.g., Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 338 Conn. 310, 319, 258 A.3d 1 (2021) ("[c]ases that present pure questions of law ... invoke a broader standard of review than is ... involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 338 Conn. 310, 322, 258 A.3d 1 (2021) ; see also General Statutes § 1-1 (a). Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "withhold" as "to hold back," "keep from action," "check" or "restrain ...."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 338 Conn. 310, 318, 258 A.3d 1 (2021). Although courts generally afford "deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission , 298 Conn. 703, 716, 6 A.3d 763 (2010) ; "[courts] do not defer to [an agency's] construction of a statute—a question of law—when ... the [provisions] at issue previously [have] not been subjected to judicial scrutiny or when the [agency's] interpretation has not been [time-tested]."
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission , 191 Conn. App. 648, 654, 216 A.3d 847 (2019), aff'd, 338 Conn. 310, 258 A.3d 1 (2021). "[T]he primary purpose of a sanction for [a] violation of a discovery order is to ensure that the defendant's rights are protected, not to exact punishment on the [complainant] for [her] allegedly improper conduct. ... The determinative question for [a reviewing] court is not whether it would have imposed a similar sanction but whether the [referee] could reasonably conclude as [she] did given the facts presented.