Opinion
No. 12–P–1122.
2013-03-27
CITY OF LYNN & another v. LYNN POLICE ASSOCIATION.
By the Court (GREEN, HANLON & AGNES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
We agree with the defendant that the judgment entered in Essex Superior Court civil action no. 99–1277 (first action) is preclusive of the issues raised in the present action. The issue is identical, as are the plaintiff (who has not appealed from the judgment in the present action) and the defendant. The intervener, Lynn Residency Compliance Commission (commission), is likewise bound, as it is a subordinate body within the plaintiff city, and is simply the administrative entity charged by the city, through its city council, with enforcement of the charter provisions that the plaintiff and the defendant litigated to final judgment more than a decade ago. The commission accordingly is in privity with the city as to the matter in controversy. See generally Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23 (1988).
The complaint accordingly must be dismissed.
The commission advances no argument challenging the defendant's assertion of issue preclusion, other than its contention that it is not in privity with the city.
The judgment is vacated. A new judgment shall enter dismissing the complaint.
The commission would fare no better were we to consider its argument on the merits. As the judge in the first action correctly recognized in his April 21, 2000, memorandum of decision, G.L. c. 41, § 99A, establishes residency requirements generally applicable to municipal employees, providing that more stringent requirements may be imposed pursuant to mechanisms not applicable in the present circumstances. Accordingly, as the first judge recognized, insofar as the Lynn city charter purported to impose residency requirements inconsistent with § 99A, it violates the authority delegated under art. 89, § 96, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution (the Home Rule Amendment) and G.L. c. 43B, § 13, and is invalid. See Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 35 (1999).
Our view of the case obviates any need for us to consider the defendant's contention that the motion judge erred in allowing the commission to intervene in the action.
So ordered.