Opinion
October 10, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County, E. Clay Lewis, J.
Thomas Sale, Panama City, for appellants.
H.P. Sapp, Panama City, for appellees.
Chapter 25015, Laws of Florida 1949, provides, in part:
"Section 1. That from and after the effective date of this Act the Board of County Commissioners of Bay County, Florida, is hereby authorized, empowered and directed to pay over and distribute to the * * * municipalities of Panama City and Lynn Haven in said County certain portions of the money hereafter allocated and distributed to said County by the State of Florida and derived from excise taxes now levied and collected or hereafter levied and collected by said State from the operation of pari-mutuel pools, including all moneys resulting from Chapter 14832, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1931, and all Acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, said certain portions being as follows: * * *
"Twenty-five per cent (25%) of the total amount so received by said County to the City of Panama City, Florida, and which twenty-five per cent (25%) is to be used by said City in carrying on its governmental functions.
"Five per cent (5%) of the total amount so received by said county to the City of Lynn Haven, Florida, and which five per cent (5%) is to be used by said City in carrying on its governmental functions. * * *"
By an appropriate suit instituted in the Circuit Court of Bay County the Board of County Commissioners of Bay County sought to obtain a declaration of its rights under the quoted statute, particularly as to whether the portion of the statute requiring the payment to the City of Lynn Haven of a portion of the funds allocated to the County was constitutional and valid. At final hearing the trial court held that the funds allocated to the County could not be lawfully diverted to defray the governmental expenses of the municipality involved, and entered the decree appealed from.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court. It is the general rule that state taxes may be expended only for state purposes; that county taxes may be expended only for county purposes. If the rule were otherwise it would lie within the power of the law-making body to divert by means of special or local legislation all state or county excise tax funds to other than state or county purposes — a situation, it need hardly be said, that might well prove intolerable or disastrous to the state and to many of the counties which are dependent upon the receipt of excise tax funds to aid them in carrying on the basic functions of government.
The only exception to the general rule which prevails in this State is that created by Section 15, Article IX of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., which provides: "The Legislature shall have the power to allocate and distribute to the several counties of the State, in equal amounts, and at such times as the Legislature shall determine, any portion of or all excise taxes now levied and collected, or hereafter levied or collected by the State of Florida from the operation of parimutual pools."
By force of this constitutional provision excise tax funds which otherwise would constitute state funds are authorized to be allocated and distributed to the various counties of the state in equal amounts and when so allocated and distributed become county funds in the hands of the counties to be expended for county purposes. Compare Prescott v. Board of Public Instruction, 159 Fla. 663, 32 So.2d 731.
It is not pretended that the funds required to be paid by Bay County to the City of Lynn Haven are to be used for county purposes. Indeed, the provisions of the challenged statute are explicit that the funds are to be used by the City to carry on its municipal governmental functions. It follows that the challenged act, insofar as it attempts to require Bay County to turn over funds coming to it as County funds to the City of Lynn Haven to be used by the latter for municipal governmental functions is unconstitutional and void.
The decree appealed from should be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADAMS, C.J., and TERRELL, CHAPMAN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., not participating.