Opinion
No. 30631.
May 15, 1933. Suggestion of Error Overruled June 12, 1933.
1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
Whether teacher agreed to reduction of salary and to teach ninth month of school term without compensation held for jury.
2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
School district trustees could close schools when district funds became insufficient for their operation (Code 1930, section 6634).
3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
That schools were kept open when closure meant probable loss of teacher's salary thereafter held sufficient consideration for teacher's promise to thereafter teach for reduced salary and ninth month of term without compensation (Code 1930, section 6634, and section 6665, subds. 9, 10).
APPEAL from Circuit Court of Winston County.
E.M. Livingston, of Louisville, for appellant.
After the appellee had been duly elected as a teacher the board of trustees and city officials determined that it would be impossible to maintain the city schools on the salaries as fixed and agreed upon at the time of the election of the teachers; the board of trustees realized that it would be necessary to make drastic reductions in the salaries or close the schools altogether. They reached the conclusion that the schools could be operated for eight months provided the teachers would accept a ten per cent reduction in salary, and donate or make no charge for any time taught after the eight months.
I know of no law and have been unable to find any which defines the length of a school term in a municipal separate school district, nor do I know of any law fixing and determining the length of a school day in such school district. If this position is correct then there was nothing to hinder or prevent the city from closing the schools on October 20th or any other day the officials deemed it best to close them.
It cannot be seriously contended that appellee did not accept the conditions and fully agree thereto. Her own testimony shows that she accepted the reduction of ten dollars per month and that she is not now trying to collect that. When she accepted part of the conditions she accepted all of them for all purposes and she is now estopped from claiming further benefits under the contract.
It would be untenable to permit the appellee to continue under the contract and accept such part of the changes and alterations as she elected to accept and not require her to accept all of them.
The circuit court granted a peremptory instruction for the appellee in the face of the testimony that the appellee had accepted the changes in the contract. There was certainly sufficient conflict in the testimony to make it the duty of the trial court to submit the matter to a jury for its determination.
Under the law she cannot be permitted to trifle with a contract and accept the benefits thereof until something happens that does not suit her and then come into court and say that she never agreed to any of it. She is bound by her acceptance of the beneficial part to her, and when she accepted the salary agreed on in the alteration she necessarily accepted all the changes.
Section 6665, Code of Mississippi, 1930, defines the duties of the trustees of a municipal separate school district, but it has no application in this case.
Rodgers Prisock, of Louisville, for appellee.
Mrs. Greer is entitled quantum meruit to recover this sixty-seven dollars and fifty cents for the work actually done, in fact, she is very liberal in not requiring the city to pay all the money due her under her contract at one hundred dollars per month; however, the fact that she accepted ninety dollars does not preclude her from recovering at the rate for the number of months taught, nor did it preclude her from collecting the entire amount.
Where the salary of the county superintendent of education is by statute definitely fixed at five per cent of the school funds of the county, the board of supervisors have no discretionary power to change the amount allowed by statute and the fact that the superintendent accepts a less amount does not estop him from claiming the full payment of the amount fixed by statute.
Hodnett v. Yalobusha County, 91 So. 454.
Where a licensed school teacher entered into a contract with a board of trustees for a fixed salary as superintendent and teacher of a separate municipal school district, such contract cannot be arbitrarily cancelled without the consent of the teacher, Such contract confers rights, which the teacher is entitled to have protected.
Campbell v. Walker, 107 So. 657.
There is no conflict in the testimony of this case whatsoever; the defendant does not produce testimony to prove Mrs. Greer agreed to work for nothing, on the other hand, its witnesses testified that she did hold it as an obligation against the city, and since there is no conflict in the testimony, it was the duty of the trial judge to direct a verdict where the testimony and reasonable inference would not be sufficient to support a different finding.
Mobile Ohio Railroad v. Clay, 125 So. 819; Elliot v. G.M. N.R.R., 111 So. 146, 145 Miss. 768; Board of Levy Commissioners v. Montgomery, 110 So. 845, 145 Miss. 578; Carrere v. Johnson, 115 So. 196; Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 114 So. 262; Mobile Ohio R.R. Co. v. Gulf States Lumber Company, 92 So. 235; Gulf S.I.R.R. Co. v. Prine, 79 So. 62, 118 Miss. 90.
The appellee recovered a judgment against the appellant for an alleged balance due her on her salary as a teacher in the appellant's separate school district. The judgment was pursuant to a directed verdict therefor.
The case disclosed by the evidence is, in substance, as follows: The appellee was elected as a teacher in the district schools by the trustees thereof for the 1931-32 term, and her salary fixed, along with the other teachers, at one hundred dollars per month. The length of the school term was not fixed by any order of the trustees. The appellee entered upon the discharge of her duties pursuant to this election without any formal contract having been executed relative thereto. After the schools had been in operation for a short time, it was ascertained by the trustees that the revenues of the district would be insufficient to run the schools for nine months — the term they seem to have had in mind when electing teachers — unless the expense of so doing was reduced, and a petition by the patrons of the school requested that this be done.
The following resolution was then adopted by the trustees: "That the teachers' salaries be reduced ten per cent providing the teachers will, at this time, give the town the ninth month free in case we do not get the money to pay for the ninth month." This resolution was submitted to the teachers at a conference called for that purpose by the superintendent of the schools, and, according to his evidence, they, including the appellee, agreed thereto. She admitted being present at this conference, but denied assenting to the resolution. She continued to teach, and thereafter accepted at the end of each month a warrant for ninety dollars as her salary for that month. The schools remained open for eight months and three weeks; the suit is for sixty-seven dollars and fifty cents, the amount claimed by the appellee as compensation for the three weeks of the ninth month at ninety dollars per month. The appellant has no school funds with which to pay this claim.
We will assume that the appellee's original contract covered the term for which the school should be kept open. The record, therefore, presents two questions: First, did the appellee agree to the reduction of her salary and to teach the ninth month without compensation? Second, if she did so agree, is the agreement binding on her?
The first question is one of fact on conflicting evidence, and is for the determination of the jury.
On the second question, the appellee's contention is that the agreement, if made, was without consideration, for the reason that the appellant surrendered or gave nothing therefor. Section 6634, Code 1930, provides that: "The schools shall be kept in session for at least eight months in each scholastic year, provided, funds are sufficient and the trustees and county superintendent approve that length of school term." Subdivision 9 of section 6665, Code 1930, provides for the election of teachers, the fixing of salaries, and terms by the board of trustees of a separate school district. Subdivision 10 thereof authorized the trustees, with the approval of the said board of education, to pay its teachers for time lost on account of the closing of its schools by boards of trustees in emergency cases. The first of these sections clearly contemplates that the schools should not be kept open unless the school revenues are sufficient to pay the expenses thereof — in other words, that they should be closed whenever the school revenues are insufficient for their further maintenance. The trustees here had the right, and it became their duty, to close the schools when the district funds became insufficient for their operation. The agreement here entered into with the teachers obviated the necessity of so doing. The teachers were confronted with the alternatives of submitting to the closure of the schools or to a reduction of salary; consequently, their acceptance of the reduction, in order to obviate the closing of the schools and probable loss of their salaries thereafter, was sufficient consideration for the promise to thereafter teach on other terms.
Reversed and remanded.