, 265 U.S. 472; United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472. Pp. 205-209. 31 Cal.3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, reversed and remanded. REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except MARSHALL, J., who took no part in the decision of the case.

(See Marks v. Whitney (1971) 6 Cal.3d 251, 257-261 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374].) City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties (1982) 31 Cal.3d 288 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 599, 644 P.2d 792], decided after briefing was completed in this case, is distinguishable. In that case, notwithstanding the rule that a federal patent conclusively determines the boundaries of a grant, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly took evidence as to whether a lagoon was an arm of the sea (and therefore tidelands) in 1850, as there was an ambiguity and inconsistency between the terms of the patent and the opinion of the Land Office Commissioner who had approved the underlying survey.

(3) All navigable waterways are held in trust by the state for the benefit of the public ( National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 434), and the public may use such waters for recreational purposes. ( City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties (1982) 31 Cal.3d 288, 291 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 599, 644 P.2d 792]; Marks v. Whitney (1971) 6 Cal.3d 251, 259 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374].) (4) Generally, sovereign ownership of navigable waterways extends to the underlying land.

Spanish law and subsequently Mexican law also recognized the public trust doctrine. (See City of Los Angeles v. VenicePeninsula Properties (1982) 31 Cal.3d 288, 297 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 599, 644 P.2d 792].) Commentators have suggested that the public trust rights under Hispanic law, guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, serve as an independent basis for the public trust doctrine in California.

(Id. at pp. 199–200, 104 S.Ct. 1751.) The California Supreme Court held that the lagoon was subject to the public trust easement claimed by the city and the State, which could thus construct improvements in the lagoon without compensating Summa. (City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties (1982) 31 Cal.3d 288, 297, 182 Cal.Rptr. 599, 644 P.2d 792, revd.,Summa, supra, 466 U.S. 198, 104 S.Ct. 1751.) Summa contended the lagoon had never been tideland to which a public trust easement attached, that even if it had been tideland Mexican law imposed no servitude on the fee interest by reason of that fact, and that in any event any such servitude was forfeited by the failure of the State to assert it in the federal land patent proceedings.

“Under that doctrine, the state holds a trust interest on behalf of the public in tidelands [citation] and in lands between high and low water in nontidal navigable lakes.” (City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties (1982) 31 Cal.3d 288, 291.) “‘By the law of nature these things are common to mankind--the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.’

HEARING GRANTED See 31 Cal.3d 288 for Supreme Court opinion.