Defendants contend that the trial court does not have jurisdiction to "enjoin a person from engaging in activities which are constitutionally or statutorily authorized," citing People v. Kelley (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 418 (Kelley). Defendants argue that Silva and Gobert were licensed and authorized to work with each other, and thus the injunction impairs their " 'constitutional right to engage in lawful work activity' " and "interfere[s] with their constitutional rights to free association and noninterference with their family relationship as sisters," citing City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193 (City of Los Altos), among other authorities. Defendants also argue that the requirements that they maintain and make certain documents available for inspection are improper.

This principle is particularly applicable to rulings granting or denying preliminary injunctions. As this court explained in City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, a hearing on a preliminary injunction is not “ ‘ “a trial of a question of fact” ’ ” within the meaning of section 632, so no statement of decision is required, even on request. (Id. at p. 1198, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 77; cf. People v. Landlords Professional Services, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 68, 72, 223 Cal.Rptr. 483.)

Rasmussen is correct that the statutory “requirement of a written statement of decision generally does not apply to an order on a motion, even if the motion involves an evidentiary hearing and even if the order is appealable.” (Lien v. Lucky United Properties Inv., Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620, 623-624 [order striking cross-complaint under § 425.16]; see also, e.g., City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198 [order granting preliminary injunction]; cf. § 1291 [requiring a statement of decision for certain arbitration orders].) Rasmussen is mistaken about the effect of the foregoing general principle, however.

” The Supreme Court has further held, “Discretion is abused in the legal sense ‘whenever it may be fairly said that in its exercise the court in a given case exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 527; accord, IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69; City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1199.) The burden is on the party challenging the injunction to establish the trial court clearly abused its discretion.

This home office was sufficiently connected to the private lives of the Mosses as stated above. City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 77], cited by both parties on this issue, is irrelevant because that case concerned zoning ordinances restricting home offices in residential neighborhoods. The ordinance in Barnes only allowed business to be carried on in a home if no assistants were employed, the business was conducted in the dwelling by the occupants of the property, and the business was clearly incidental to the residential use of the building.

The hearing on a preliminary injunction is not the equivalent of a trial, and the court is not obligated to set forth its reasoning. ( City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 77].) The trial court's minute order is entitled to a presumption that it is correct, and any error must be affirmatively shown.

" However, "the absence of an official definition does not necessarily mean the phrase is vague." City of Los Altos v. Barnes, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1193, 1203 (1992) (rejecting vagueness challenge to home occupation zoning ordinance that did not define "occupation carried on at home" and contained phrase "provided no assistants are employed" because "reference to commonly accepted usage" established what terms meant and persons of reasonable intelligence would not have difficulty understanding terms). Moreover, "a substantial amount of vagueness is permitted in California zoning ordinances."

On its summary judgment motion defendant does not rely on dictionary definitions; instead, it makes a different argument. It contends that the terms "meetings," "conferences" and "social events" as used in the Ordinance are sufficiently clear when viewed in the context of the entire regulatory scheme, including the legislative purpose behind the Ordinance. See Gospel Missions of America, 419 F.3d at 1048 (holding that other provisions of an ordinance may provide guidance on terms that appear vague); City of Los Altos v. Barnes, 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202 (1992) (holding that in interpreting zoning ordinances, courts should refer to, among other things, legislative history or purpose). In Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 9 Cal.4th 1069 (1995), for example, the plaintiffs challenged an ordinance which prohibited camping and storage of personal property in public places.

However, to the extent the court's conclusion could be construed as such, numerous courts have held a zoning ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague because it contains an undefined term. See Ogden v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Columbia , 157 Conn.App. 656, 117 A.3d 986, 995-96 (Conn.Ct.App.2015) ; Benton Cty. Stone Co., Inc. v. Benton Cty. Planning Bd. , 374 Ark. 519, 288 S.W.3d 653, 657 (2008) ; Bushey v. Town of China , 645 A.2d 615, 617-18 (Me. 1994) (ordinance's failure to define "commercial use" did not render ordinance unconstitutionally vague); City of Los Altos v. Barnes , 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 83-86 (1992).In opposition to the Sorensons' motion and in support of its own cross-motion for summary judgment, the County included the affidavit of Williams County Code Enforcement Officer Kameron Hymer.

Thus, Reyes is not left to guess how his actions are restricted in a way that would "chill" his legally protected activities. (See City of Los Altos v. Barnes (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202 [" 'a vague law may have a chilling effect, causing people to steer a wider course than necessary in order to avoid the strictures of the law' "].)