Opinion
B302478
08-20-2021
CITY OF LONG BEACH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAKSHA PATEL, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser and Frank A. Weiser for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the Long Beach City Attorney, Charles Parkin, City Attorney, Theodore B. Zinger, Sarah E. Green, Deputy City Attorneys; Best Best & Krieger, Christopher M. Pisano and Alexander Brand for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 18LBCV00013, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Dismissed.
Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser and Frank A. Weiser for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the Long Beach City Attorney, Charles Parkin, City Attorney, Theodore B. Zinger, Sarah E. Green, Deputy City Attorneys; Best Best & Krieger, Christopher M. Pisano and Alexander Brand for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CRANDALL, J. [*]
Daksha Patel (Patel) owns and operates the Princess Inn Motel, which the City of Long Beach (City) has been attempting to close for many years.
Additional defendants Dipak Patel, Pravin Patel, and Jayantibhai Patel were all dismissed in the course of litigation, leaving Daksha Patel as the only appellant.
On October 28, 2019, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction closing the motel. On November 7, 2019, Patel filed this appeal against the preliminary injunction. On December 7, 2020, the trial court issued a permanent injunction closing the motel.
Because the preliminary injunction has merged into the permanent injunction and is no longer operative, this appeal is moot. Moreover, there are no exceptional circumstances that might warrant exercising our jurisdiction over a moot appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Patel's in-laws purchased the Princess Inn motel in 2002. Patel and her husband moved into the property and, after obtaining local business licenses in 2003, began operating it as a motel.
Title to the motel was transferred to Patel and her husband in 2018.
In 2008, the City revoked the motel's business licenses after receiving numerous complaints of illegal drug activity and prostitution. Patel and her family continued to operate the motel without a business license in violation of local law.
Later that year, the City commenced criminal prosecution against the Patel family, which spawned a lengthy federal litigation regarding the City's seizure of the motel's logbook. As the federal litigation drew to a close, the City resumed its code enforcement prosecution.
On November 15, 2017, the City issued an administrative citation. Patel and her family continued to operate the motel without a business license.
On October 15, 2018, the City filed a civil complaint against Patel and others, alleging that their unlawful operation of the motel created a public nuisance.
On June 26, 2019, the City requested a preliminary injunction to close the motel. On October 28, 2019, after multiple hearings, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction.
On November 7, 2019, Patel timely appealed.
On December 7, 2020, the trial court granted the City's request for a permanent injunction ordering the closure of the motel.
DISCUSSION
Generally, appellate courts may only decide actual controversies. (Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of Conservation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1221.) We therefore dismiss appeals which originally presented a justiciable controversy but have since become moot. (General Petroleum Corp. v. Beilby (1931) 213 Cal. 601, 604 [“Authority is ample to the effect that where all differences respecting the subject matter of a controversy are adjusted during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal will be dismissed”].) An appeal becomes moot “ ‘when, through no fault of respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief. [Citation.]' [Citation.]” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 77-78.)
The grant of a permanent injunction causes any prior preliminary injunctions to merge with the permanent injunction. (Peoples Ditch Co. v. Foothill Irrigation Dist. (1930) 103 Cal.App. 321, 325 [“It is well settled that an injunction pendente lite remains in force only until rendition of the final judgment in the case. When granted it is a provisional remedy that is merged in a perpetual injunction and thereupon the injunction pendente lite ceases to have any force or effect”].) This merger effectively moots any pending appeals from the preliminary injunction. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Berkeley (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 123, 126, fn. 4 [“Since that [preliminary injunction] order was a provisional remedy which ceased to have any operational effect once the permanent injunction was granted, the appeal therefrom must be dismissed”]; see also City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1079 [“ ‘If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot' ”].) Accordingly, when the trial court granted a permanent injunction ordering the Princess Inn to shut down, this appeal became moot.
We acknowledge our discretion to decide a moot appeal in limited cases of exceptional circumstances, including: “ ‘ “(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court's determination [citation].”' [Citation.]” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495-496.)
Patel contends that exceptional circumstances are present because the pending appeal could affect her ability to seek relief from a separate order holding her in contempt of court for violating the preliminary injunction. We disagree.
Patel's contention fails for two reasons. First, she has not provided this court with the record necessary for us to understand the status of her contempt charge. (In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 [“Under well-established rules of appellate procedure, ... the appellant[ ] has the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal”].) Her briefing papers assert, without citations to the record, that “a specially appointed judge of the court held a hearing on the contempt charge and found... Patel to be in contempt” for violation of the order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [establishing, in relevant part, that all appellate briefs must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the... record”].)
Our own review of the record has not located any evidence of this contempt finding. In fact, the record's only references to the contempt order are in the docket sheet, which notes that the City requested an order to show cause why Patel should not be held in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction. The docket sheet also suggests that the contempt case is ongoing, with the most recent notation showing that a hearing was held to clarify procedures for the upcoming contempt proceeding.
It is possible that the contempt charges have been dismissed, withdrawn, or amended to incorporate any violations of the subsequent permanent injunction. With the record we have been provided, it is impossible to tell whether Patel has been or may yet be held in contempt for violations of the preliminary injunction. We decline to decide Patel's otherwise moot appeal on the basis of her unsupported assertions.
Patel also fails to support her argument with valid legal authority. (Kaufman v. Goldman (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 734, 743 [“Every argument presented by an appellant must be supported by both coherent argument and pertinent legal authority. [Citation.] If either is not provided, the appellate court may treat the issue as waived”].) She has therefore waived the argument that this appeal is her only recourse with respect to contempt.
In People v. Gonzalez (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816-819, the California Supreme Court held that an individual charged with contempt of an injunction may, under certain circumstances, collaterally challenge the validity of the injunction as a defense to the charge of contempt, rejecting the “ ‘collateral bar' rule” from other jurisdictions. (See People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 593-594, petn. for review pending, petn. filed July 19, 2021, S269909 [limiting application of Gonzalez to situations of entirely void orders].) However, Patel offers no authority for the converse proposition that she can collaterally attack her contempt prosecution through a direct appeal of a moot preliminary injunction.
We offer no opinion on whether Patel may have forfeited any opportunity for writ review of any contempt process. Neither this issue nor the validity of the permanent injunction is properly before us.
Patel also urges us to hear this appeal under the public interest exception, arguing that “[t]he issues raised in this appeal can guide future litigants and the courts regarding important issues that can recur with other municipalities and property owners.” This vague, barebones assertion of the appeal's importance does not persuade us that “an issue of broad public interest” is implicated by this appeal. (Sturgell v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 35, 46 [declining to exercise discretion under the public interest exception to mootness where the “appellants have not demonstrated that such exception pertains”].)
Accordingly, this appeal is moot and no exceptional circumstances apply. We do not reach (and thus, make no judgments regarding) the merits of Patel's claims regarding the preliminary injunction.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: CHANEY, J., BENDIX, Acting P. J.
[*] Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.