Appellant contends the rulings in this case must be reviewed under the de novo standard applicable to a nonsuit order. It relies upon City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465 (City of Livermore), in which the defendant acquiesced to the City's taking of his property but sought permanent and temporary severance damages. (Id. at p. 1464.)
Here, however, Kuzina argues the abuse of discretion standard should not apply here because the trial court's rulings on all 12 SBCTA motions disposed of Kuzina's "entire severance damages case" by excluding its expert's opinions. Citing to City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460 (Baca) and Garner v. BNSF Railway Co. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 660, Kuzina contends the court's rulings were the equivalent of a nonsuit and should be reviewed de novo. We disagree.
(Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1279–1280, 203 Cal. Rptr.3d 183; see also Legendary Investors Group No. 1, LLC v. Niemann (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1411, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 787 ["When a motion in limine ‘results in the entire elimination of a cause of action or a defense, we treat it as a demurrer to the evidence and review the motion de novo.…’"]; City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465, 141 Cal. Rptr.3d 271 (Baca) ["When, as in the present case, the court’s order excludes all evidence on a particular claim and, as a result, operates as a motion for nonsuit, we review the court’s order de novo .…"]; Dillingham-Ray Wilson v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 ["When all evidence on a particular claim is excluded based on a motion in limine, the ruling is subject to independent review as though the trial court had granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, if evidence was offered, a motion for nonsuit."]; Fergus v. Songer (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 552, 569– 570, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 (Fergus) ["Where, as here, the granting of a motion in limine disposes of one or more causes of action, it is the functional equivalent of the granting of a nonsuit as to those causes of action."].)
"[I]n determining a landowner's entitlement to severance damages, the fact finder . . . shall consider competent evidence relevant to any conditions caused by the project that affect the remainder property's fair market value, insofar as such evidence is neither conjectural nor speculative." (Id. at p. 718, fn. omitted; City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466 (Livermore) [Severance damages "may not be based on ' " 'speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible' " ' events."].) As noted, the trial court granted SANDAG's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the cost ($915,960) to construct a road to Vanta's remaining property in the after condition, which evidence SANDAG referred to as "cost to cure" evidence.
Under those circumstances, the appellate court “review[s] the court's order de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to the party offering the evidence.” ( City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 271.) That is, “all inferences and conflicts in the evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party.”
Next, the cases cited by plaintiffs in an attempt to establish that impairment of a view is itself a taking or damage do not support their claim. Plaintiffs cite a number of cases addressing compensation for a loss of view where there was a physical taking of the claimant's property, for example, Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State of California (1969) 70 Cal.2d 282, 74 Cal.Rptr. 521, 449 P.2d 737 [inverse condemnation action by inn owner after state built freeway on portion of inn's land], and City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 [eminent domain action by city that took portions of commercial property for improvement of intersection]. These cases did not involve a mere impairment of view, but an undeniable physical taking of the property in question by the public entity.
(§ 1263.410, subd. (b).) Evidence of the amount of such damages is usually presented by way of expert testimony. Norwalk relies on two cases to support its position that it is entitled to severance damages, Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 954 (Campus Crusade) and City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460 (Baca). Neither of these cases assists Norwalk.
In such cases, the in limine motion 'operate[s] as a general demurrer to [the] complaints or a motion for judgment on the pleadings.' [Citations.] 'Alternatively,' where such motions are granted 'at the outset of trial with reference to evidence already produced in discovery, they may be viewed as the functional equivalent of an order sustaining a demurrer to the evidence, or nonsuit.' " (City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465.) "When . . . the court's order excludes all [or the essential] evidence on a particular claim and, as a result, operates as a motion for nonsuit, we review the court's order de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to the party offering the evidence.
(See Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 937, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 669.) Additionally, as TWA alleges the pretrial ruling amounted to a nonsuit, we also independently review the trial court's evidentiary ruling. (See City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1473, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 271.) TWA's argument appears to relate to TWA's "breach of contract" claim which it asserted against both Kim and Truong.
He is not because a plaintiff whose case cannot survive a nonsuit has no right to a jury's consideration of his case. (Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 117-118 [noting that the appropriate grant of a nonsuit motion properly "serves to take a case from the jury's consideration"]; cf. City of Livermore v. Baca (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1473 [improper grant of a nonsuit "denies parties their right to a jury trial"]; Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 63.) Because the parties' initial briefs did not discuss the effect of a nonsuit motion, we invited supplemental briefing on this issue.