The jurisdiction of municipal and state district courts is defined by statute. City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164, 168, 946 P.2d 1356 (1997). K.S.A. 12–4104 defines municipal court jurisdiction, and K.S.A. 22–2601 defines state district court jurisdiction in criminal cases.
K.S.A. 8-1567(f)-(g). Though municipal courts are permitted to prosecute those who drive under the influence of alcohol, they lose jurisdiction over the crime when prior convictions elevate it to a felony under state law. K.S.A. 22-2601; City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164, 174 (1997). "The state contends that all of Mr. Elliott's prior DUI convictions in municipal court remain valid, only the sentences are considered illegal. It has cited State v. Frazier, 30 Kan. App. 2d 398 (2002), in support of this assertion.
The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether Dodge City loses subject matter jurisdiction over Russell Wetzel when a second driving under the influence (DUI) charge and conviction is appealed to the district court, and before trial Wetzel commits and obtains a diversion from a new DUI offense. The trial court held that because of the timing of the convictions and our holding in City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164, 946 P.2d 1356 (1997), that municipalities have no jurisdiction over felony charges, the second DUI offense became a felony offense requiring the conviction to be vacated and the charges dismissed. We disagree with the trial court.
Since this court has jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses, and the penalties under K.S.A. 8-1567 fall within the definition of a misdemeanor under federal law, this court has jurisdiction. Defendant would contend that this court cannot ignore the fact that Kansas has classified a third time DUI conviction as a felony, and relies on the case of City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164, 946 P.2d 1356 (1997). In that case, the court held that since municipal courts lack jurisdiction over felony offenses, and the state had defined a third time DUI offense as a felony, city municipal courts lack jurisdiction to charge persons with a third time DUI offense.
Its answer, at a minimum, will depend on the nature of the defect alleged by the defendant and the timing of and circumstances surrounding the court's awareness of it. Although we cannot foresee every situation that may arise in a future case, a few general observations can be made today.As long as an error of the first type is merely a failure to recite or a mistake in recitation and not the actuality of a filing in the wrong court or wrong territory, which does implicate subject matter jurisdiction, see City of Junction City v. Cadoret , 263 Kan. 164, Syl. ¶ 5, 946 P.2d 1356 (1997) (municipalities do not have jurisdiction over crimes designated a felony by state statute), then it is most likely to be amenable to remedy or cure by amendment before verdict under K.S.A. 22–3201(e). An amendment to fill in the omission or to correct a fact obvious to both sides will neither charge a new crime nor impair defendant's “substantial rights,” including federal and state constitutional rights to due process and notice. Given the nonprejudicial nature of such an error, we also expect that it would not support a successful motion to arrest judgment after trial nor reversal on appeal.
Hanks also cited to City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164, 946 P.2d 1356 (1997), in support of his theory, but Cadoret has no effect on this issue. Our Supreme Court in Cadoret held only that municipalities are without jurisdiction to find a defendant guilty of a felony because the state statute only confers jurisdiction to try felony cases in the district courts.
Generally, municipal courts may not hear most felony prosecutions. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 12-4104(a); City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164, Syl. ¶ 5, 946 P.2d 1356 (1997). At the time of sentencing, Obiero had five prior DUI convictions.
281 Kan. 583 (2006). K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8-1567(f)(g); City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164 (1997). "Cities are permitted to enact ordinances which also proscribe operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
74 J.K.B.A. at 31 (citing David v. Board of Norton County Comm'rs , 277 Kan. 753, 760, 89 P.3d. 893 [2004] ; Hackett , 275 Kan. 848, 69 P.3d 621 ; City of Junction City v. Cadoret , 263 Kan. 164, 170, 946 P.2d 1356 [1997] ; McCarthy , 257 Kan. at 584, 894 P.2d 836 ; Johnson County Water Dist. No. 1 v. City of Kansas City , 255 Kan. 183, 193, 871 P.2d 1256 [1994] ; Dillon Stores v. Lovelady , 253 Kan. 274, 279, 855 P.2d 487 [1993] ; Executive Aircraft Consulting, Inc. v. City of Newton , 252 Kan. 421, 425, 845 P.2d 57 [1993] ; Blevins v. Board of Douglas County Comm'rs , 251 Kan. 374, 376, 834 P.2d 1344 [1992] ). Instead, we have recognized that the " ‘[b]road language in Blevins unsettled the principle’ " of requiring a clearly manifested legislative intent by statute to preempt the field.
See K.S.A. 25-4322(a). The parties attempt to utilize Attorney General Opinion No. 99-38, but it does not provide direct guidance and, as we said in City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164, 173, 946 P.2d 1356 (1997), it is not binding on us. If we limit our analysis to the language of K.S.A. 25-4325 and the plain meaning of "last general election" as Schmidt argues, we would of necessity reach the same conclusion that the trial court did.