In Hanen, the supreme court overruled Pacific Motor and adopted the position of the Pacific Motor dissent. 102 Ariz. at 9-10, 423 P.2d at 98-99. The court cited a number of federal and state decisions in support of liberal construction of notices of appeal. Among these cases, the court quoted from City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Co., 386 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1965), a case essentially identical to ours. In City of Joplin, the appellant had appealed from an order overruling its motion for new trial a non-appealable order in Missouri without referring to the underlying judgment.
The Missouri courts have not yet construed this section. However, in construing statutes generally, the Missouri courts act on the presumption that the Legislature never intends to enact an absurd law (City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Company, Mo., 386 S.W.2d 369, 373; State ex rel. American Mfg. Co. v. Koeln, 278 Mo. 28, 211 S.W. 31, 33) or to intend to require the performance of a needless and useless act. Gross v. Merchants-Produce Bank, Mo. App., 390 S.W.2d 591, 597.
State ex rel. St. Louis Public Service Co. v. Public Service Commission, 326 Mo. 1169, 34 S.W.2d 486, 489. Cf. City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Co., Mo., 386 S.W.2d 369, 373-374. That the coins were delivered to and are in the physical possession of the Bank is not in dispute.
This Court presumes that Congress did not intend to enact an absurd law, incapable of being enforced. City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Co., 386 S.W.2d 369, 373-74 (Mo. 1965). For its final claim, Financial Solutions argues that a JNOV would have been inappropriate because Mr. Grimes' testimony regarding Activecore's joint membership in certain trade organizations with plaintiffs raised a factual issue as to whether plaintiffs had consented to receive the advertisements in question.
Moreover, the true intention of the framers must be followed and where necessary the strict letter of the act must yield to the manifest intent of the Legislature. State ex rel. Webster Groves Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 365, 115 S.W.2d 816 (1938); City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Company, 386 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1965); State ex rel. Kirks v. Allen, 255 S.W.2d 144 (Mo.App. 1953); Taylor v. McNeal, 523 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App. 1975); Carson v. Oxenhandler, 334 S.W.2d 394 (Mo.App. 1960); State ex rel. Blackwell v. Travers, 600 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. App. 1980). Also to be considered, the mechanic lien statute is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed in favor of the lien claimant.
Our view is that in placing the limitation reference to Section 53.071 in Section 137.330 the legislature simply overlooked the fact that first-class charter counties were excepted from that section. See, City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Company, 386 S.W.2d 369[6, 7] (Mo. 1965) and cases cited therein. It would have been unreasonable for the legislature to have intentionally excepted first-class charter counties from the salary limitation when it had no control over the amount of the salaries paid in such counties while placing the limitation on all other counties in regard to which it had the duty to fix and thus control the salaries.
Certainly City construed and enforced the ordinance on such a discriminatory basis. It is an "established rule that the interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional or statutory provision by legislative bodies and by administrative, executive, and other public officials will be given serious consideration in determining the meaning thereof." State ex inf. Anderson v. St. Louis County, Mo.Sup. en Banc, 421 S.W.2d 249, 254; Three River Junior College Dist. v. Statler, Mo.Sup. en Banc, 421 S.W.2d 235, 243; City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Co., Mo.Sup., 386 S.W.2d 369, 375. The Court found: "[S]aid ordinance inequitably and unreasonably discriminated against the owners of apartments and apartment family units, and in favor of owners of single family residences, in that the ordinance levies a charge only upon single family residences which are used and occupied, whereas it levies a charge upon apartment family units regardless of whether or not the units are occupied, and whether or not water and other materials are placed in the sewer therefrom; * * *."
We, therefore, hold the statute applies to both classes of jurors. In so construing the statute we disregard as doubtful and improvidently inserted the words "or its" appearing in the second clause, for as this court, en banc, stated in State ex rel. Harvey v. Sheehan, 269 Mo. 421, 190 S.W. 864, 865: "* * * We have frequently said that doubtful words of a statute will be enlarged, restricted, supplied, or even stricken out in order to make them conform to the true intent of the lawmakers * * *" In Bingham v. Birmingham, 103 Mo. 345, 15 S.W. 533, 534-535, this court struck out the words "* * * 'executed substantially as provided for in the next preceding section' * * *", as "having been improvidently inserted", saying that "* * * In pursuing this course we do but follow well-approved precedents, and allow the reason of the law to prevail over its letter * * *" In City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Company (Mo.Sup.) 386 S.W.2d 369, 373-374, we said: "* * Acting on the presumption that the legislature never intends to enact an absurd law * * * and on the principle that the reason of the law should prevail over the letter of the law, courts * * * confronted with ambiguous or contradictory language * * * have stricken out words or clauses regarded as improvidently inserted, in order to make all sections of a law harmonize with the plain intent * * of the legislature * * *." Judgment affirmed.
Many state jurisdictions have applied the same construction to the sufficiency of the notice of appeal where it is clear the appellee has been informed of the appeal and was neither prejudiced or misled. Greyhound Corporation v. Carswell, 181 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1966), affirmed 185 So.2d 171 (Fla.App. 1966), cert. denied 189 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1966); City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Company, 386 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1965); Baker v. Sojka, 74 N.M. 587, 396 P.2d 195 (1964); Collins v. City and County of San Francisco, 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 247 P.2d 362 (1952). As was said in the City of Joplin case, supra:
(citation omitted)). In particular, we should avoid interpretations of statutes which leave a criminal statute "incapable of being enforced," Leiser v. City of Wildwood , 59 S.W.3d 597, 604 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) (quoting City of Joplin v. Joplin Water Works Co. , 386 S.W.2d 369, 373–74 (Mo. 1965) ), or that "render some phrases mere surplusage." Middleton v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. , 278 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Mo. 2009).