Opinion
Rehearing Denied July 9, 1971.
Opinion on pages 338 to 354 omitted
HEARING GRANTED
For Opinion on Hearing, see 103 Cal.Rptr. 689, 500 P.2d 601.
[95 Cal.Rptr. 844] Donald E. Olson, City Atty. (City of Inglewood), for petitioners other than petitioner Swinerton & Walberg Co.
Stephens, Jones, La Fever & Smith, Los Angeles, Hassard, Bonnington, Rogers & Huber, San Francisco, and R. Wicks Stephens, II, Los Angeles, for petitioner Swinerton & Walberg Co.
Paul M. Hittelman, Everett W. Maguire and Shapiro & Maguire, Beverly Hills, for real parties in interest.
No appearance for respondent court.
KINGSLEY, Associate Justice.
This is a proceeding in prohibition and mandate to require respondent court to annul its judgment, and a peremptory writ of mandate issued thereon, restraining petitioner Authority from proceeding with certain phases of a Civic Center project. On February 23, 1971, this court issued an order, on application of petitioners for a stay order, limiting the effect of the judgment of the superior courts so that it would not prevent petitioners from consulting with, or securing advice from, Swinerton & Walberg Co. under certain conditions and issued an order to show cause on March 9, 1971, at 2:30 p. m. as to why a further stay order should not be granted. On March 10, 1971, the stay order was continued in effect pending our decision herein. The case has now been fully briefed and argued; we grant a peremptory writ of mandate for the reasons hereinafter set forth.
On December 31, 1970, real party in interest Argo Construction Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 'Argo' ) filed in respondent court a petition for a writ of mandate and for injunctive and declaratory relief. The purpose of that proceeding was to have annulled and set aside an award by the petitioner City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'Authority') of a public contract involving the construction of buildings to be occupied by the City of Inglewood, said award being made to petitioners Swinerton & Walberg Co., (hereinafter referred to as 'Swinerton'). The cause of action for declaratory relief was subsequently dismissed by respondent Argo.
George Gerard and William Morgan, taxpayers in the City of Inglewood joined in the petition in the trial court as parties petitioners. It is urged that, under Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1961) 57 Cal.2d 39, 40-41, 17 Cal.Rptr. 379, 366 P.2d 651, and Lagiss v. County of Contra Costa (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 77, 92, 35 Cal.Rptr. 450, they were not proper parties since they did not allege bad faith, corruption or fraud on the part of the Authority in awarding the bid to Swinerton. But the gist of the petition below was that the Authority had a positive duty to award the bid to Argo and that that duty had not been complied with; on that theory the taxpayers had standing to sue under the cases above cited.
The Authority was constituted pursuant to Government Code section 6507 as a separate and distinct public entity. It is made up of the City of Inglewood and the County of Los Angeles pursuant to a 'joint exercise of powers agreement' duly executed by both governmental bodies on February 24, 1970. The governing board of the Authority is the Civic Center Authority Commission. The Authority was established to construct the City of Inglewood-County of Los Angeles Civic Center, comprising city and county public buildings at a stated cost of $25,000,000, $12,000,000 of which were allocated to construction of City of Inglewood buildings.
The basic law under which the Authority is enabled to act is found in Government Code sections 6502-6507. The Joint Agreement hereinabove referred to under said law provides for the method by which the purpose of the Authority will be accomplished [95 Cal.Rptr. 845] or the manner in which the power of the Authority will be exercised. (Govt.Code, § 6503.)
Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations hereafter are to the Government Code.
The Government Code, providing for the government of counties, requires in sections 25450 and 25450.4 that construction projects such as contemplated in the within action exceeding $6,500 in costs must be let on contract. Any such contract not let pursuant to these sections is void. Section 25454 provides that 'The board shall award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, and the person to whom the contract is awarded shall perform the work in accordance with the plans, specifications, strain sheets, and working details, * * *.' Section 25452 requires the publication or posting of advertisement for bids. It is assumed by both parties that the award of such construction contracts by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors is governed by the foregoing statutes. The Government Code relating to cities has similar requirements in sections 37900-37902.
The governing laws for the City of Inglewood are found in its city charter. Pertinent to the within action is article XXXIII which, in speaking of construction improvements, provides in section 1 that 'every contract involving an expenditure of more than $2,500 for the construction of improvements (excluding maintenance and repair) of public buildings * * * shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder after notice by publication in the official newspaper. * * *'
The contract between the signators thereto, 'The Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement' provides that 'the Authority shall have the powers common to the city and county set forth in section 1 of this agreement, to wit: acquiring, constructing, maintaining, operating and leasing public buildings with land facilities and appurtenances necessary or convenient therefor. The Authority is hereby authorized in its own to do all acts necessary for the exercise of said common powers for said purpose including but not limited to any or all of the following: to make and enter into contracts, to employ agents and employees, to acquire, construct, manage, maintain and operate any buildings, works or improvements * * *. Such powers shall be exercised in the manner provided in the act and, except as especially set forth herein, subject only to such restrictions upon the manner of exercising such powers as are imposed upon the county in the exercise of similar powers.' (Joint Agreement section 4).
Section 10 of the Joint Agreement relates to the design and construction of city facilities only. It goes on to state that 'upon approval of the final plans and specifications for the city project by the city, the Authority shall call for competitive bids to let necessary construction contracts for the city project. Authority shall award such construction contracts to the lowest responsible bidders after approval of said bidders by the city. The city project shall then be constructed by the lowest responsible bidders in accordance with the plans and specifications approved by city.'
'Pursuant to section 4 hereof, all powers of Authority and city * * * related to construction shall be exercised in the manner provided in this agreement.'
Charles Luckman Associates were retained by the Authority as architects and prepared preliminary plans for the City of Inglewood civic buildings. They and the Department of Public Works of the City of Inglewood prepared also a 'Management Contracting Procedure' which was designed to assist the Authority in the selection of a management contractor to consult on, and to supervise, the construction of the City of Inglewood buildings.
The management contracting procedure was approved on November 3, 1970, by the City Council of Inglewood for use in the construction of the Inglewood civic buildings. The city council gave its approval on the basis of information provided to it concerning the favorable experience of the University of California in the construction [95 Cal.Rptr. 846] of buildings on its San Diego campus and the recommendations of the General Services Administration of the state. It was also made aware of the difficulties of the City of Inglewood itself with the traditional 'lump sum' bidding procedures which had been uniformly used in past years.
The advantages of using the management contracting method was set forth in the Luckman proposal as follows:
'Under the traditional lump sum method of bidding, contractors enter the project process upon the completion of working drawings. At this point in time they have little opportunity or incentive to contribute to cost reduction.
'The Management Contracting Method * * * differs from this traditional lump sum method in that the contractor is brought into the building project through competitive bidding, at or shortly after, the completion of preliminary plans, rather than working drawings. He is then called upon to contribute his practical expertise during the development of the working drawings, and subsequently apply this expertise during construction, in order to achieve maximum economies. He is expected to provide cost estimates from time to time during development of working drawings to determine that the project is within budget so that some of the early phases of construction can proceed prior to completion of all of the drawings. This makes it possible to save a significant amount of time in the total building process.'
In the 'Notice Inviting Bids' appears the following:
'Final evaluation and award will be made on the basis of the proposal submitted by the lowest responsible bidder, the Contractor's financial resources, his surety and insurance experience, construction experience, completion ability, personnel, equipment, work load, and other factors pertinent to a project of this scope.'
And at page 9, of exhibit F it is stated: 'final evaluation and award will be on the basis of the proposal most advantageous to the City of Inglewood.' There was a reservation of the right to reject any and all bids.
Notice inviting bids was published and a conference with all potential bidders was held. Argo attended said conference. The management contracting procedure was explained to all, including the procedure to be followed in evaluation of the bids toward selection of the lowest responsible bidder. Argo did not at any time prior to the opening of bids raise any objections to the method of evaluating or awarding the bid or even to the method of bid solicitation.
Twelve bids were received. They were reviewed, analyzed, and evaluated by the Authority architects and by the staff of the Director of Public Works of the City of Inglewood. The bids of nine were rejected and it was finally determined that the three lowest bidders were Argo, Swinerton, and Montgomery-Ross-Fisher. Argo was the lowest monetary bidder. The bid was some $70,000 lower than that of Swinerton pursuant to the formula applied.
In considering the qualifications of the three low bidders for management contractor, the selection panel placed emphasis on: experience and management contracting; proven capability in high rise construction; proven capability in architectural concrete placement; and depth of organization to insure adequate qualified staffing for the duration of the project. The panel also took note of the fact that the estimated completion time of Swinerton was 29 months while that of Argo was 42 months. Paul Johnson of Charles Luckman and Associates stated that, with escalating costs of approximately one percent per month, this difference would amount to well over $1,000,000. The panel noted as well that Argo was primarily a school contractor with no experience in high rise while Swinerton had completed numerous high rise structures all over the world. It was also noted that Argo had had no experience with management contracting whereas Swinerton had ample experience [95 Cal.Rptr. 847] with it. As to personnel, Swinerton was ready to supply numerous personnel with 20 to 30 years experience in high rise and with considerable background in architectural concrete. It might be observed that the bids hereinabove referred to were not for the construction of the project; rather they were for the fee to be charged the Authority as management contractor.
On the basis of these evaluations, the Authority's architect, the Department of Public Works of the City of Inglewood and the Inglewood City Council recommended that the contract be awarded to Swinerton as the lowest responsible bidder. These recommendations were predicated not only upon the bids submitted but also upon personal interviews with the bidders including respondent Argo and on hearings before the Inglewood City Council on December 15, 1970, and before the Authority on December 10 and on December 17, 1970. Respondent Argo was represented and was heard at each of the aforementioned meetings. The meetings before the Authority took very nearly four hours. At the conclusion of these hearings the Authority resolved that Swinerton was the lowest responsible bidder and awarded the contract to said company.
Argo then filed its petition for writ of mandate and injunctive relief in respondent court. No witnesses were placed on the stand nor was any testimony taken at the time of the hearing on Argo's petition, January 22, 1971. The minute order indicates that 'the verified pleadings and declarations filed together with attached exhibits are received in evidence by reference.'
On the basis of that record, and after extensive argument by counsel, the trial court issued its peremptory writ of mandate, commanding the Authority and the other public petitioners herein:
'1. To cease, desist and refrain from any and all action, including the execution of a written agreement, the commencing or permitting commencement of performance of any work, or the paying of any funds, pursuant to the purported award of a contract by respondent CITY OF INGLEWOOD-LOS ANGELES COUNTY CIVIC CENTER AUTHORITY to SWINERTON & WALBERG CO. related directly or indirectly to that particular public works project known as the Inglewood Civic Center, unless and until a hearing of the type described in the Administrative Procedures Act is held, to evaluate the responsibility or lack thereof of petitioner ARGO CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. to perform the work encompassed by the contract which was the subject of the 'Notice Inviting Bids for the Construction of Inglewood Civic Center', and a contract is awarded in accordance with the result of such hearing; or, in the alternative,
'2. To cease, desist and refrain from taking any further action, performing or permitting to be performed any work, or paying any funds relating to the public works project known as the Inglewood Civic Center unless and until said project is again made the subject of open, competitive bidding, lawfully submitted and lawfully awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.
'3. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as prohibiting the City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center Authority from acting as owner-builder in connection with the Inglewood Civic Center project and from letting all necessary construction contracts in connection with said project in accordance with the competitive bidding procedures applicable to construction activities of the City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center Authority.'
I
Argo contends that neither prohibition nor mandate is an appropriate remedy in the case at bench. It contends that, since there is a final judgment entered in the action, prohibition will not lie; that the remedy by appeal is adequate and speedy. In answer to this contention, the language [95 Cal.Rptr. 848] of the court in City Council of City of Beverly Hills v. Superior Court (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 876, 881, 77 Cal.Rptr. 850, 852, seems apropos:
"The writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to arrest the proceedings of the court where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and when the proceedings of the court are without or in excess of its jurisdiction as that term is used in relation to prohibition.' [Cases cited] The same principle applies to a writ of mandate. * * *
'We conclude that the case at bench is one in which we properly should exercise the power enunciated in City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 236, 243, 1 Cal.Rptr. 158, 347 P.2d 294, supra. It is uncontroverted that the action of the trial court * * * [granting a motion for writ of mandate and injunctive relief] will precipitously suspend work upon an important public contract, the performance of which is well along. That circumstance is, in our judgment, reason enough for us to inquire into the jurisdiction of the court to take the action. It is reason enough also for us to determine that the remedy by appeal is inadequate.'
In the case at bench the evidence before the court indicates that, pursuant to a contract not herein involved, an immense excavation some 25 feet deep has been made for the emergency operating center and substructures for the Inglewood City Hall and that there is inadequate supervision thereof; that the Authority (the city) does not have adequate staff or experience to supervise the work; that the Authority requires the expertise of the management contractor in preparing bid documents for the various phases of the work involved and that the architect requires the services of the management contractor. Further, because of the cost of delay in the work, bonding market considerations and increasing building costs, Authority is exposed to a loss of $3,600 per day 'for every day delayed in not having the management contractor at work on the project'. The remedy by appeal is therefore inadequate; the normal delays incident to an appeal will seriously jeopardize the entire project. As the Supreme Court said in Corona Unified Hospital District v. Superior Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 846, 848, 40 Cal.Rptr. 745, 746, 395 P.2d 817, 818: 'In these circumstances, relief by way of prohibition is necessary to prevent the frustration of a remedial statutory purpose and the defeat of a valid project * * *' (See also Housing Authority of City of Eureka v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 550, 556, 219 P.2d 457; Santa Clara County v. Superior Court (1949) 33 Cal.2d 552, 559, 203 P.2d 1.)
II
As the documents before the Authority, the trial court and this court make clear, the management contractor (as such) is not involved in the actual work of construction of the project. That work is done by construction contractors who bid on proposals submitted by the Authority, acting as an 'owner-builder'. The contract herein involved calls only for advice by the management contractor to the Authority and supervision by the management contractor of the work done by the successful bidders on the proposals made and accepted by the Authority.
It is argued that, under those conditions, a management contract is not one for 'the construction' of improvements, within the meaning and purpose of the statutory provisions above quoted, but that it is one for professional services, akin to those of an architect, to which the requirement of competitive bidding does not apply. (Cobb v. Pasadena City Board of Education (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 93, 285 P.2d 41.)
See, also: Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. Long Beach (1930) 210 Cal. 348, 354-355, 291 P. 839; San Francisco v. Boyd (1941) 17 Cal.2d 606, 620, 110 P.2d 1036.
[95 Cal.Rptr. 849] There are no California cases dealing directly with the employment by a governmental body of superintendents or consultants-supervisors on public works. However the problem was before the Commission of Appeals of Texas in the case of Gulf Bitulithic Co. v. Nueces County (Tex.Com.App.1928) 11 S.W.2d 305. In that case the County of Nueces decided to construct roadways as 'owner builder' and entered into a contract with the appellant paving contractor under which the paving company was required to manage and supervise construction of the road, procure, assemble and supply all labor and material, machinery and teams. It was also required to make records, and to 'give necessary advice for a consideration of six percent of cost less engineering expenses for commissions.' Nueces County was under statutory requirement to submit all public works contracts exceeding $2,000 to the competitive bidding process. There was no compliance with the competitive procedures in the letting of the contract. The court, in holding that the competitive bidding procedures did not apply to the contract of the paving company said (at page 309):
'The clear purpose of the enactment of this statute was to enable counties to obtain the performance of any public work at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer. If it be so construed as to bring contracts of the nature involved in this case within its provisions, the very object of the statute would be defeated, for the obvious reason that, when a county does a given piece of construction work, paying for the material and labor, the ultimate cost thereof is necessarily largely dependent upon the skill, experience, and business judgment exercised in the management and supervision of such work.
'* * *
'It cannot be said that the efficient performance in the most economical manner of the duties undertaken by plaintiff in error under the contract in question required technical knowledge, skill, experience, and business judgment of a high degree. The said experience of many commissioners' courts throughout the state in constructing public roads without intelligent and experienced supervision bears eloquent testimony to the truth of this proposition.'
The court further observed (at page 309) that:
'[t]o hold that contracts for the supervision of work done directly by the county must be let to the lowest bidder would result in the county obtaining the least competent supervision, as those possessing the necessary skill, experience, and business judgment to supervise a large construction program in the most efficient and economic manner could not hope to successfully compete with those of lesser skill, experience, or business judgment.'
(See also City of Houston v. Potter (1906) 41 Tex.Civ.App. 381, 91 S.W. 389 wherein the court, in a similar situation concerning a competitive bidding statute, stated 'this was not intended to refer to a contract for the supervision of work for public improvement.')
Although those authorities seem persuasive, we need not, and do not, in this case decide the issue thus raised, since, as appears below, we hold that, assuming that competitive bidding is required, the requirements of that procedure were met in the case before us.
For the same reason, we need not decide whether the Authority, having initiated a proposal for an award based on competitive bidding, is now estopped to assert that it was not obligated to use that procedure.
III
The trial court ordered that the Authority cease, desist, and refrain from any and all action 'related directly or indirectly to that particular public works project known as the Inglewood Civic Center unless and until a hearing of the type described in the administrative procedures [95 Cal.Rptr. 850] act is held to evaluate the responsibility or lack thereof of petitioner Argo * * *.' The trial court apparently assumed that the Authority was an administrative agency and that procedural due process required an adversary proceeding or hearing to permit Argo to urge its 'responsibility'. Neither of these assumptions is true. The Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to local agencies and certainly not to legislative bodies such as the Authority. That act applies only to state agencies and not to all of them. (Govt.Code §§ 11420 and 11371(a)(b).) Secondly, the quasi-judicial type of hearing customarily used by regulatory agencies is not necessary as a condition precedent to a legislative act.
There is neither statutory nor case law in California requiring a legislative body to hold an adversary hearing in reaching a determination as to which bidder for a contract is the lowest responsible bidder. Such a requirement would defeat the efficient legislative functioning of any public awarding authority. (Thoits v. Byxbee (1917) 34 Cal.App. 226, 235, 167 P. 166; Hudson v. Board of Education (1931) 41 Ohio App. 402, 179 N.E. 701.) Argo, in its claim to a 'hearing', relies on the case of Housing Authority of City of Opelousas, La. v. Pittman Construction Co. (C.A. 5th 1959) 264 F.2d 695. That case however is clearly distinguishable in that it involved charges of irresponsibility made against the lowest bidder at a meeting concerning which he had no notice and which he did not attend. The situation in the case at bench was different in that, while there was no formal hearing, in the sense of having pleadings, cross-examination of witnesses, a record of evidence, formal findings and the other similar procedures of a judicial trial, Argo was notified, was present, and was heard both by the Inglewood City Council and by the Authority. Testimony as to Argo's responsibility was received from Argo's president, its attorneys and others. On the record before us, it cannot successfully be contended that Argo did not have a full and complete opportunity to present its qualifications to the City Council and to the Authority; nor can Argo object if the Council and the Authority decided against it on matters as to which the data before them was in conflict.
IV
The record indicates that what Argo asserts, at most, is that the Authority, in interpreting its invitation to bid and in the evaluation procedures, acted honestly but differently from the way the court might have acted or Argo might have acted in letting the contract. In short, no evidence was offered to indicate that anything more serious than a good faith error in judgment on the part of the Authority may have taken place. The method of bid evaluation, well publicized by the Authority, the interpretation by the Authority of its own invitation to bid--these acts and procedures were not unreasonable and certainly were not so unreasonable as to warrant the action taken by the trial court. There was not a clear and convincing showing of an abuse of discretion by the Authority in its determination of the lowest responsible bidder whose bid was 'most advantageous to the City of Inglewood'. Competent and admissible evidence sustained the finding of the Authority. The argument of prejudice, of unfair or of no hearing cannot be sustained. The record in the case at bench demonstrates that there was no abuse of discretion by the Authority and that the findings of the respondent court to the contrary are unsupported by the evidence.
However Argo, in the lower court, pleaded the action of the Authority which it wished to have enjoined as an administrative or quasi-judicial act whereas in fact the Authority was acting at all times in a legislative capacity. It is well settled that the proceedings of a board, such as the Authority for a civic improvement of the kind involved herein--the resolution of intention, the order directing the improvement, the invitation for bids, the award of the contract are all legislative in character. Speaking to this point the Supreme Court [95 Cal.Rptr. 851] in Quinchard v. Board of Trustees declared:
'The act [of ordering a specific improvement] does not cease to be legislative because the members of the city council are required to exercise their judgment in determining whether the improvement shall be made. The judgment which they exercise in ordering the improvement is not a determination of the rights of an individual under existing laws, but is the conclusion or opinion which they form in the exercise of the discretionary power that has been entrusted to them, and upon a consideration of the public welfare and demands for which they are to provide. This discretion and opinion is a part of the legislative power that has been conferred upon the city, and is of the same character as that exercised by the legislature itself in providing for the general welfare of the state, and is equally independent of supervision by the judiciary.' (Quinchard v. Board of Trustees (1896) 113 Cal. 664, 669-670, 45 P. 856, 857; People ex rel. Cochran v. Board of Education of Oakland (1880) 54 Cal. 375, 376-377.)
In Lockard v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, at pages 461-462, 202 P.2d 38, at page 43, the Supreme Court had before it certain zoning ordinances and discussed the problem of judicial review of legislative acts stating:
'In considering the scope or nature of appellate review in a case of this type we must keep in mind the fact that the courts are examining the act of a coordinate branch of the government--the legislative--in a field in which it has paramount authority, and not reviewing the decision of a lower tribunal or of a fact-finding body. Courts have nothing to do with the wisdom of laws or regulations, and the legislative power must be upheld unless manifestly abused so as to infringe on constitutional guarantees. The duty to uphold the legislative power is as much the duty of appellate courts as it is of trial courts, and under the doctrine of separation of powers neither the trial nor appellate courts are authorized to 'review' legislative determinations. The only function of the courts is to determine whether the exercise of legislative power has exceeded constitutional limitations. As applied to the case at hand, the function of this court is to determine whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of the zoning authorities, and, if the reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed.'
V
Finally, Argo contends that the invitation to bid required the Authority to award the contract to Argo, as admittedly the 'lowest' bidder, unless the Authority properly found that Argo was 'irresponsible'. We know of no authority for that proposition.
The awarding authority has a right to consider factors other than the monetary value of the bid. In the leading case of West v. City of Oakland (1916) 30 Cal.App. 556, at pages 560-561, 159 P. 202, at page 204, the court said:
'The term 'lowest responsible bidder' has been held to mean the lowest bidder whose offer best responds in quality, fitness, and capacity to the particular requirements of the proposed work, and that where by the use of these terms, the council has been invested with discretionary power as to which is the lowest responsible bidder * * * such discretion will not be interfered with by the courts, in the absence of direct averments and proof of fraud.'
The federal court in Housing Authority of City of Opelousas, La. v. Pittman Construction Co. (C.A. 5th 1950) 264 F.2d 695, at page 698, followed the reasoning of the court in West in station:
'In determining the lowest responsible bidder on a public works contract, responsibility is not solely a question of financial ability to perform the work. Decisions * * * allow an awarding [95 Cal.Rptr. 852] body to consider skill, integrity, judgment, experience, reputation, previous conduct on contracts, and other factors bearing on a bidder's successful performance of his contract.' (See also Raymond v. Fresno City Unified School District (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 626, 267 P.2d 69.)
Further, it is the rule in California that where the awarding authority has the right to reject any and all bids, it may consider differences or variations in the character or quality of the work proposed to be furnished in determining who should be awarded the contract. A finding of the governing body that a person is not the lowest responsible bidder or that another is, is conclusive in the absence of fraud or collusion. (West v. City of Oakland, supra (1916) 30 Cal.App. 556, 159 P. 202; Cameron v. City of Escondido (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 311, 292 P.2d 60; Thoits v. Byxbee, supra (1917) 34 Cal.App. 226, 167 P. 166.)
The rule in California is that a governing body need not make specific findings as to their reasons for accepting or rejecting bids; they need not make specific findings that the lowest monetary bidder was not the lowest responsible bidder. (Rice v. Board of Trustees (1895) 107 Cal. 398, 401, 40 P. 551.) In Thoits v. Byxbee (1917) 34 Cal.App. 226, 167 P. 166, it was urged that the lowest bidder was given no notice that his responsibility was in issue nor was he accorded a hearing on that point. The court stated that the finding of the council in the absence of fraud and collusion was conclusive. (See also Raymond v. Fresno City Unified School District (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 626, 629-630, 267 P.2d 69.)
Since the record shows no more than that the Authority, acting in accordance with a lawful procedure, and properly interpreting the terms of its bid proposal, has exercised an honest discretion in awarding the contract herein involved to Swinerton rather than to Argo, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to substitute its own judgment for that of the legally constituted legislative body. Its attempt to intrude upon the legislative process was unwarranted and should be averted.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the trial court to vacate the judgment and writ heretofore issued by it, and to deny the relief prayed for in the case before it.
FILES, P. J., and DUNN, J., concur.