Opinion
Review Granted Feb. 27, 1992.
Previously published at 1 Cal.App.4th 562, 7 Cal.App.4th 1551
Gail Hutton, City Atty., and Arthur J. Folger, Deputy City Atty., for plaintiff and appellant.
Richard H. Koppes, General Counsel, Kayla J. Gillan, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Lemaire & Faunce, and Edward L. Faunce, for defendants and respondents.
DEVICH, Acting Presiding Justice.
City of Huntington Beach ("City") appeals from a judgment denying its petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5) in which it sought to overturn a decision of the Board of Administration of the Public Employees' Retirement System ("PERS") granting reclassification BACKGROUND
The parties have stipulated to all relevant facts and issues.
Jailers are employees of City's police department, hired between 1973 and 1988. City has contracted with PERS for retirement benefits for its employees. On July 29, 1987, jailers requested that City reclassify their PERS memberships from "local miscellaneous" (Gov.Code, § 20018 [all further statutory references are to the Gov.Code] ) to "local safety" (§ 20019). Safety membership generally provides more generous retirement benefits than miscellaneous membership. (Compare, e.g., § 21021 with § 21022.)
" 'Local safety member' includes all local policemen...." (§ 20019.) A " '[l]ocal policeman' means any officer or employee of a police department of a contracting agency which is a city, except one ... whose functions do not clearly fall within the scope of active law enforcement service even though the employee is subject to occasional call, or is occasionally called upon, to perform duties within the scope of active law enforcement service...." (§ 20020.)
Section 20020.9 provides that " '[l]ocal policeman' also includes any employee of a contracting agency which is a city, who is employed in a jail or a detention or correctional facility and having as their primary duty and responsibility the supervision and custody of persons committed to the jail or facility." However, section 20020.9 further provides that it does "not apply ... unless and until the contracting agency elects to be subject to [it]." Jailers in the case at bench come within the definition of employees specified in section 20020.9, but City has not elected to be subject to the statute.
In performing their duties for City, jailers "have daily contact with prisoners, and have an increased risk of physical assault from such prisoners." Jailers receive less pre- and post-employment training than is required of police officers.
On September 27, 1988, an administrative law judge submitted a proposed decision recommending that jailers be reclassified as "local safety" members of PERS. At the request of PERS staff, the proposed decision was not adopted by PERS, and the matter was heard de novo, with staff recommending that jailers' "local miscellaneous" status be retained. On March 15, 1989, PERS rejected its staff's recommendation and adopted the proposed decision of the administrative law judge.
On May 24, 1989, City filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court, which was denied on October 12, 1989. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Because there was no substantial conflict in the evidence regarding employees' duties, the proper interpretation of the statutory requirements for safety status is a question of law for this court. [Citation.]" (Tuolumne County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. Board of Administration (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1238, 257 Cal.Rptr. 824.)
ISSUES
City contends section 20020.9 is the exclusive manner by which jailers may be classified as "local policemen," and its refusal to elect to be subject to the statute bars such classification with its attendant "local safety" status. Jailers and PERS contend that section 20020.9 is merely an alternative to section 20020, and that jailers qualify as "local policemen" pursuant to section 20020.
DISCUSSION
In Ames v. Board of Retirement (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 906, 916, 195 Cal.Rptr. 453, the court held that, for purposes of the County Employees' Retirement Act, the test for determining whether one is engaged in "active law enforcement" is whether the employee has regular contact with prisoners and exposure to the risk of physical harm from prisoner contact. (See also Neeley v. Board of Retirement (1974) In Tuolumne County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. Board of Administration, supra, the court considered whether a county correctional officer was entitled to be reclassified from "miscellaneous" to "safety" membership pursuant to section 20021.5. The court noted that "[s]ection 20021.9 is one of several statutes which makes safety member status for certain classifications of employees optional with the contracting local agency. [Citations.]" (209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1239, 257 Cal.Rptr. 824.) Reasoning that " '[a] specific statute expressly dealing with a particular subject controls and takes precedence over a more general statute covering the same subject['] [citation]," the Tuolumne court determined that the employer's failure to elect to accord its jailers peace officer status pursuant to section 20021.9 rendered irrelevant whether they qualified for such status under section 20021.5. (Id. at pp. 1239-1240, 257 Cal.Rptr. 824.)
In language parallel to section 20020, section 20021.5 defines "county peace officer" to include an employee engaged in "active law enforcement." In language parallel to section 20020.9, section 20021.9 provides that county jailers may be considered "peace officers," and therefore eligible for "safety" membership in PERS, if the county elects to treat them as such.
We decline to follow Tuolumne. Prior to the enactment of section 20020.9 in 1983, the only method by which a city jailer could qualify for "local safety" status was to demonstrate the attributes of "local policeman." In enacting section 20020.9, the Legislature sought to provide "new authorization" for a city to treat its jailers as "local safety" employees. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 844 (1983 Reg. Sess.).)
We also decline to follow Schaeffer v. Public Employees' Retirement System (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 609, 614, 248 Cal.Rptr. 647, a case preceding Tuolumne which, in dicta, came to the same conclusion regarding exclusivity of section 20021.9, and Charles v. Board of Administration (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1410, 1413-1414, 284 Cal.Rptr. 106, a case involving section 20019.35 (paramedics), which cites Schaeffer.
"In construing a statute 'we begin with the fundamental rule that a court "should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." ' [Citations.] 'An equally basic rule of statutory construction is, however, that courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.' [Citations.] Although a court may properly rely on extrinsic aids, it should first turn to the words of the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. [Citations.] 'If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.' [Citations.]" (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.)
Moreover, "[t]he right to a pension is among those rights clearly 'favored' by the law. ' " '[T]he rule [is] firmly established in this state that pension legislation must be liberally construed and applied to the end that the beneficent results of such legislation may be achieved. Pension provisions in our law are founded upon sound public policy and with the objects of protecting, in a proper case, the pensioner and his dependents against economic insecurity....' " [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Assn. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 374, 390, 216 Cal.Rptr. 733, 703 P.2d 73.)
We find that the clear purpose of enacting section 20020.9 was to provide an alternative method of attaining "local safety" status. If this were not the case, the statute would surely have indicated that the "new authorization" it was creating was in DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
ORTEGA and VOGEL, JJ., concur.