Summary
In City of Hollywood v. Broward County, Fla., 54 So.2d 205, we held a suit prematurely brought where the county's application for a funding program had not been acted upon by the Improvement Commission and the Board of Administration had not passed on the legal and fiscal sufficiency of the proposed program.
Summary of this case from Brautigam v. MacVicarOpinion
September 11, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Broward County, George W. Tedder, J.
Patterson, Freeman, Richardson Watson, Giles J. Patterson, all of Jacksonville, and Ellis Spencer, Hollywood, for appellants.
John U. Lloyd, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.
As authorized by Chapter 420, F.S.A., Chapter 23758, Acts of 1947, the Board of County Commissioners of Broward County made application to the Florida State Improvement Commission to construct certain roads, bridges and tunnels at different places in the County at a cost of $15,000,000 the said projects to be financed from funds of the State Road Department, including Federal Aid allocations in an estimated amount $2,000,000, including the proceeds of revenue bonds in the amount of $13,000,000.
Appellants as complainants have filed a bill for declaratory decree in which they pray for a determination of whether or not the action of the Board of County Commissioners was a valid exercise of its power. There was an answer to and a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint and on final hearing the chancellor found that the Board of County Commissioners was authorized to adopt the resolution and make the application. The complainants have appealed from that decree.
Four questions are urged for our determination. (1) Whether or not the action of the County Commissioners was authorized by Chapter 420, particularly Section 420.12, F.S.A. and if it was, whether or not the total of surplus gas taxes and tolls from the projects will be sufficient to pay the principal and interest on the bonds? (2) Can the County and City apply its annual road and bridge fund other than as specified by Section 343.17, F.S.A.? (3) Is the pledge of all surplus gasoline taxes for 30 years to finance the proposed projects an abuse of discretion in view of the needs of the City of Hollywood and the County at large as exemplified by Exhibit "C" attached to the County's request? (4) Has the State Improvement Commission any power to construct tunnels with the proceeds of certificates payable from surplus gas taxes?
It appears that a great deal of the argument of counsel addressed to these questions arises from a disagreement or misunderstanding as to what the status of the transaction between the Board of County Commissioners and the State Improvement Commission is. As we see it, nothing more than an application to the Florida State Improvement Commission has been made, nothing is yet binding on it, it may consider the application but when it does, it will make no response to the County before it makes a thorough examination of the cost, feasibility and advisability of the projects and when it does that, it may reach the conclusion that it is so fantastic and impractical that it will decline to undertake it. At any rate in making its investigation the Florida State Improvement Commission may reject the application or it may decide to undertake a portion or all of it. It will then be time for appellants to move if they desire.
This reasoning unquestionably applies to the first question raised. The State Board of Administration is required to approve the legal and fiscal sufficiency of the bonds or certificates of indebtedness and in doing this, will give a full and complete answer to question one. As to question two appellees admit that it should be answered in the negative if squarely presented, but they say it was not presented to nor ruled on by the Circuit Court. The County and City both concede that taxes levied pursuant to Section 343.17, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., can be used only for the purposes therein stated, so this question would seem to be out of the picture.
In answer to question three it is sufficient to say that Section 16, Article IX of the Constitution, F.S.A., makes the State Road Department the sole judge as to the manner in which the 80 per cent surplus gas tax funds shall be applied to state roads in Broward County. State v. State Board of Administration, 157 Fla. 360, 25 So.2d 880. We will not now assume that its discretion will be improperly exercised.
The last question challenges the power of the Florida State Improvement Commission to construct tunnels with the proceeds of certificates payable from surplus gas taxes. We are cited no law that would authorize it to do this, so it may present a justiciable question, but neither the Florida State Improvement Commission nor the State Road Department is a party to this suit, and for reasons already expressed we refrain from expressing any opinion on the point at this time.
In fine it is our view that the questions presented are in the main premature so the judgment appealed from is affirmed without prejudice to appellants to raise such of them as they may be advised at the appropriate time.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN, THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
ADAMS and ROBERTS, JJ., not participating.