A quo warranto proceeding is a challenge to a defendant's right to exercise jurisdiction over territory or to hold public office. City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1079, 605 N.E.2d 1079, 1087 (1992). A quo warranto proceeding is generally regarded as an appropriate and adequate remedy to determine the right or title to public office and to oust an incumbent who has unlawfully usurped or intruded into such office.

Feb. 19, 1998) (unpublished decision) ("Quo warranto is not the proper proceeding to test the Constitutional legality of the official acts of public officers." (emphasis supplied). (citing People ex rel. Chillicothe Township v. Bd. of Review of Peoria County, 19 Ill.2d 424, 167 N.E.2d 553, 553 (1960); City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill.App.3d 1066, 179 Ill.Dec. 65, 605 N.E.2d 1079, 1087 (1992), appeal denied, 183 Ill.Dec. 859, 612 N.E.2d 511 (1993))). The United States Supreme Court has similarly observed that a quo warranto action "must be brought against the person who is charged with exercising an office or authority without lawful right," and that "[t]he possession of power is one thing; the propriety of its exercise in particular circumstances is quite a different thing."

Feb. 19, 1998) (unpublished decision) ("Quo warranto is not the proper proceeding to test the Constitutional legality of the official acts of public officers." (emphasis supplied) (citing People ex rel. Chillicothe Township v. Bd. of Review of Peoria County, 19 Ill.2d 424, 167 N.E.2d 553, 553 (1960); City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill.App.3d 1066, 179 Ill.Dec. 65, 605 N.E.2d 1079, 1087 (1992), appeal denied, 183 Ill.Dec. 859, 612 N.E.2d 511 (1993))). The United States Supreme Court has similarly observed that a quo warranto action "must be brought against the person who is charged with exercising an office or authority without lawful right," and that "[t]he possession of power is one thing; the propriety of its exercise in particular circumstances is quite a different thing."

Indeed, an objection which relates to a person's eligibility, such as a residency requirement, may be presented for judicial review under appropriate circumstances. Greenwood v. Murphy, 131 Ill. 604 (1890) ( quo warranto); Dilcher v. Schorik, 207 Ill. 528 (1904); Edgcomb v. Wylie, 248 Ill. 602 (1911); Swiney v. Peden, 306 Ill. 131 (1922); Wagler v. Stoecker, 393 Ill. 560 (1946); see also People ex rel. Henderson v. Redfern, 48 Ill. App.2d 100 (1964); Breslin v. Warren, 45 Ill. App.3d 450 (1977); City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill. App.3d 1066 (1992). Today's decision leaves undisturbed that body of law which permits such post-election challenges to a person's right to hold office.

For private individuals, quo warranto is not a writ of right. Burson, 307 Ill. at 536. These principles regarding quo warranto were codified and remain substantially the same ( City of Highwood v. Obenberger (1992), 238 Ill. App.3d 1066, 1079), although the statute allows private parties to bring the action under special circumstances (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 18-102). Currently, individuals may bring an action in quo warranto only by leave of court. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 18-102.

Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill.App.3d 677, 682, 624 N.E.2d 928, 931 (1993) (citing City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill.App.3d 1066, 1073-74, 605 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 (1992)). We will not search the record for citations or possible errors.

Arguments that do not satisfy this rule do not merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected for that reason alone. Prairie Rivers Network v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 335 Ill.App.3d 391, 408-09 (2002); see also City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill.App.3d 1066, 1083 (1992) ("any statement unsupported by argument or citation to relevant authority will not merit our consideration on review."). Thus, we will disregard Turan's arguments that fail to comply with Rule 341. Rottman, 2018 IL App (1st) 180234, ¶ 23; In re S.F., 2020 IL App (2d) 190248, ¶ 16.

"As a general rule, certiorari will not lie to review acts which are ministerial, executive or legislative in nature." City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1075 (1992). ¶ 19 In sum, the trial court properly determined that the action of the City Council was legislative because it was effectuated through the enactment of an ordinance. Attempting to challenge the decision by administrative review "is a nullity."

Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶¶ 9, 15. Although Kofoed's request that we rewrite plaintiff's statement of facts for him using his preferred substitute sentences and paragraphs violates Rule 341, we have the benefit of the record before us as well as plaintiff's proper statement of facts. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (i) (eff. May 25, 2018); see Carter v. Carter, 2012 IL App (1st) 110855, ¶ 12. Our review of the issues therefore is not hindered, and we will consider Kofoed's brief while disregarding the inappropriate content. See City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1073 (1992). ¶ 13 Second, plaintiff failed to present any standard of review, authority, or argument in support of its assertion that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to reconsider the motion for sanctions, in violation of Rules 341(h)(3) (see Hall, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 10) and 341(h)(7) (see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. East-West Logistics, L.L.C., 2014 IL App (1st) 121111, ¶ 58).

However, a court will vacate a consent decree in limited circumstances. See City of Highwood v. Obenberger, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1072 (1992). It is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, stipulation, or waiver.