Rickett asserts that the District Court was required to hold a trial de novo upon the filing of her appeal pursuant to § 46-17-311, MCA. On that basis, she contends that court was precluded from ordering the execution of a previously-imposed sentence. She also argues that the District Court exceeded its authority by exercising appellate jurisdiction, relying on City of Hardin v. Myers (1981), 194 Mont. 248, 633 P.2d 677. The City of Billings (the City) concedes that Rickett perfected her appeal under § 46-17-311, MCA. It contends, however, that the District Court had the jurisdiction to remand the case under its authority to control litigants and dismiss cases sua sponte, citing §§ 3-1-111, 3-1-113, 25-33-304, and 46-13-401, MCA.

"(1) All cases on appeal from justices' or city courts must be tried anew in the district court and may be tried before a jury of six selected in the same manner as a trial jury in a civil action, except that the total number of jurors drawn shall be at least six plus the total number of peremptory challenges." See, Adair v. Lake County Justice Court (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 466,] 692 P.2d 13, 41 St.Rep. 2241, and City of Hardin v. Myers (Mont. 1981), [___ Mont. ___,] 633 P.2d 677, 38 St.Rep. 1512. The judgment of the District Court finding defendant guilty is vacated and this cause is remanded to the District Court for a trial anew before a jury.

The second issue is whether the District Court erred when it dismissed defendants case and remanded it back to Justice Court for sentencing without allowing defendant the opportunity to respond to the State's motion to dismiss as provided by Rule 2 of the Uniform District Court Rules and Rule 6, M.R.Civ.P. Defendant argues that the District Court lacked authority to remand the case to Justice Court pursuant to our holding in City of Hardin v. Myers (1981), 194 Mont. 248, 249, 633 P.2d 677, 678, and that defense counsel did not have an opportunity to file an opposition brief to the States motion to dismiss. We stress the point that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to even hear this case because the Justice Court had not rendered sentencing and final judgment upon the defendant.

An appeal to the District Court for a trial de novo is appellants' exclusive remedy for review of justice court's proceedings. Forsythe v. Wenholz (1976), 170 Mont. 496, 554 P.2d 1333; Hardin v. Meyers (Mont. 1981), 633 P.2d 677, 38 St.Rep. 1512. Accordingly, the appellants may appeal the judgment of the justice court to the District Court pursuant to the statutory notice of appeal as provided in section 46-17-311(2), MCA, within ten days after the remittitur of this Court.