Opinion
No. 95904.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 24, 2011.
Criminal Appeal from the Garfield Heights Municipal Court, Case No. TRD 1005194.
Affirmed.
Jerine L. Pease, pro se 6734, for Appellant.
Je'Nine Nickerson, Prosecutor, Attorney for Appellee.
Before: Rocco, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Cooney, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
{¶ 1} In this appeal assigned to the accelerated calendar, defendant-appellant Jerine L. Pease, proceeding pro se, appeals from the finding of the Garfield Heights Municipal Court that she violated the city's Codified Ordinance ("GHCO") Section 333.03(b)(3), Exceeding the Speed Limit.
{¶ 2} The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow this court to render a brief and conclusory opinion. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655; App. R. 11.1(E); Loc. App. R. 11.1.
{¶ 3} Pease presents three assignments of error. She claims the municipal court erred in: 1) taking "judicial notice" of the accuracy of the "Ultralight 20/20" laser unit the police officer used to measure her speed; 2) refusing to conduct a hearing on the propriety of the "judicial notice" before proceeding with her trial; and, 3) finding her guilty of the offense. Upon a review of the record, however, none of her claims has merit. Therefore, her assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 4} Pease was cited for speeding on the morning of August 10, 2010. At her trial, Garfield Heights police officer John Marks testified he had parked his patrol car in a vacant lot along Broadway Avenue near Chaincraft Avenue, when he observed Pease's car traveling toward his location at what appeared to be an excessive rate of speed.
{¶ 5} Marks aimed his laser unit at her car and the unit measured a speed of fifty miles per hour. Marks testified the speed limit at that location was thirty-five miles per hour. Marks stopped Pease and issued her a citation for violating GHCO 333.03. Marks also testified that, at the beginning of his shift, he ensured the laser unit was in proper working order. Marks further testified he was trained in the use of the unit and used it on a regular basis.
{¶ 6} Pease took the matter to a bench trial; she proceeded pro se. During her cross-examination of Marks, Pease indicated she could not understand the reason for the citation, because there were "no speed limit signs" on that section of the roadway. She asked the court if it had "ever heard expert testimony regarding th[e] laser," and the court responded affirmatively. The court stated it had taken "judicial notice" about the accuracy of the unit.
{¶ 7} Although Pease argues the municipal court erred in this respect, her argument is rejected based upon the municipal court's previous decision in Garfield Hts. v. Laba (July 5, 2001), Garfield Heights Mun. Ct. No. TRD 010345. Evid. R. 201(B)(2); Cleveland v. Tisdale, Cuyahoga App. No. 89877, 2008-Ohio-2807, citing, inter alia, E. Cleveland v. Ferell (1958), 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 and Cincinnati v. Levine, 158 Ohio App.3d 657, 2004-Ohio-5992, 821 N.E.2d 613; cf., State v. Miko, Medina App. No. 07CA0018-M, 2008-Ohio-1991, ¶ 13-14. See, also, Akron v. Kim, Summit App. No. 24178, 2008-Ohio-6928.
{¶ 8} Pease next argues the municipal court should have conducted a hearing on the accuracy of the laser unit Marks used. At trial, Pease sought a hearing "so that I can just verify for my own self the accuracy of that laser device." Her argument is rejected for two reasons.
{¶ 9} First, she never filed a motion for such a hearing. Second, even if she had brought a written motion with her to court, as the municipal court pointed out to her, it would properly have been deemed untimely.
{¶ 10} Garfield Heights Municipal Court's Loc. R. 16(A) provides that "All motions shall be made in conformity with Criminal Rule 12." Crim. R. 12(B) requires motions to be filed with the court, 12(C) requires defenses and objections that are "based upon defects in the institution of the prosecution" to be made before trial or they are waived, and 12(D) requires pretrial motions to be "made within thirty-five days of arraignment or seven days before trial, whichever is earlier."
{¶ 11} Lastly, Pease argues the municipal court's finding of guilt against her, which the court made at the conclusion of trial, is unsupported by the manifest weight of the evidence. This argument also is rejected, because Pease's assertion, i.e., she could not rightfully be cited when there was "no speed sign" at the location where Marks observed her car, is ludicrous in the context of this case.
{¶ 12} Pease conceded that, just before Marks stopped her, she observed a posted speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour. She contended that since the location where she was stopped had no posted limit, no one could say her speed was "unreasonable." Taken to its logical extension, her argument would require a sign to be posted on every foot of roadway. However, GHCO Section 333.03 states in pertinent part:
{¶ 13} "(b) It is prima facie lawful, in the absence of a lower limit declared pursuant to Ohio R.C. 4511.21 * * * for the operator of a motor vehicle to operate the same at a speed not exceeding the following:
{¶ 14} "(2) Twenty-five miles per hour * * * except on State routes outside business districts, through highways outside business districts and alleys;
{¶ 15} "(3) Thirty-five miles per hour on all State routes or through highways within the Municipality outside business districts * * *."
{¶ 16} Marks testified he observed Pease traveling on Broadway "50 miles an hour" in a "[t]hirty-five" zone; he stated this was a "business" area. Pease admitted to the court that she "honestly couldn't tell" how fast she was traveling; she merely "[felt] I wasn't going 50."
{¶ 17} The record, therefore, reflects the municipal court's finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Cleveland v. Binn, Cuyahoga App. No. 80674, 2002-Ohio-3796.
Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the municipal court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR.