" Nevertheless in Black v. Sutton, 301 Ky. 247, 191 S.W.2d 407 (1945), this court held that a statute which literally abolished all non-elective offices in cities of the second and third class having a commission form of government did not have the effect of abolishing the office of city attorney and in City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328 (1963), we held that a statute with identical provisions did not abolish the office of clerk of the police court upon the ground that such a result was not intended by the legislature. In Triplett this court said:
Board of Educ. v. Logan Aluminum, Inc., Ky., 764 S.W.2d 75, 80 (1989). As stated in City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1963), "[m]yopic exactitude in the construction of statutes would produce many an unfortunate and unintended result." "When all else is said and done, common sense must not be a stranger in the house of the law.
This is merely a corollary of the rule that the courts will not give a strict literal construction to a statute if it would lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion." City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1963). (Citations omitted.)
See Wells v. Board of Education of Mercer County, Ky., 289 S.W.2d 492 (1956). Ramsey asserts that City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328 (1963), compels a different result. We disagree.
It is well established that a governmental administrative body may not deal in a purely arbitrary manner with the compensation or work assignment of its employes. See Saylor v. Metcalf, 310 Ky. 137, 220 S.W.2d 99; City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328; Freeman v. Barnes, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 729. In upholding the transfer of a teacher in Board of Education of Bath County v. Hogge, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 459, this court noted that there was no contention that the transfer was "unfair or unreasonable."
Nevertheless, we conclude that it is absolutely essential to the conduct of government that public officials receive adequate compensation for services but that they should not be paid in excess of that which is reasonable. In City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328 (1963), we held that reduction in salary "was arbitrary and unreasonable and the ordinance was subject to judicial attack as an abuse of discretion. Const. ยง 2.
George denied having sold any alcoholic beverage, and there was no direct evidence that he did sell any. The appellant calls attention to City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328, and Hamilton v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 695, in support of the proposition that a statute must not be interpreted so as to bring about an absurd or unreasonable result. We agree that the proposition is a sound one.
We hold that KRS 86.225 is applicable to candidates for city offices in fourth-class cities operating under the councilmanic form of government whether they file in party primaries or as independent candidates, because we are persuaded that the legislative intent impels that conclusion. Asher v. Stacy, 299 Ky. 476, 185 S.W.2d 958; City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328. Appellee points to the re-enactment of KRS 118.070, 118.080, and 118.130 as superseding KRS 86.225.
See Boggs v. Reep, Ky., 404 S.W.2d 24. We think the literal interpretation is unacceptable because, first, if the legislature had intended simply to forbid any future voted tax levies it would not have used such obtuse language; and, second, the literal interpretation would not be compatible with the obvious object and purpose of the 1965 legislation. It is an established rule of statute construction that the courts will consider the purpose which the statute is intended to accomplish and will not give a strict, literal construction to the statute if it would lead to an unreasonable or absurd conclusion. City of Frankfort v. Triplett, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 328; Kentucky Mountain Coal Co. v. Witt, Ky., 358 S.W.2d 517. The obvious purpose of the 1965 legislation was to prevent the taxpaying public from being subjected by governmental bodies to taxes far in excess of those paid in the past, through the application of old tax rates to greatly increased assessments.