City of Eugene v. Lincoln

13 Citing cases

  1. State v. Babson

    249 Or. App. 278 (Or. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding that guideline does not fall into second category because it does not “expressly” provide that expression is a way to cause a regulated harm

    Huffman and Wright Logging Co., [317 Or. at 452, 857 P.2d 101] (emphasis in original) [ (trespassing protesters not immune despite expressive conduct while trespassing) ]; see also City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or. 174, 182, 759 P.2d 242 (1988) (‘A grocery store gains no privilege against a zoning regulation by selling The National Enquirer and Globe at its check-out counter.’).”City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or.App. 36, 43, 50 P.3d 1253 (2002). Rather, to determine whether the enforcement of a speech-neutral statute violates an individual's rights under Article I, section 8, we apply the analysis that we described and explained in Lincoln.

  2. City of Lowell v. Wilson

    197 Or. App. 291 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 11 times
    Applying ORS 221.360 to an appeal where the defendant pled no contest to a municipal violation in a municipal court, and then filed a motion in the circuit court to "reverse and vacate" the municipal court's judgment, rather than seeking a new trial in the circuit court

    The city, invoking City of Salem v. Polanski, 202 Or 504, 276 P2d 407 (1954), asserts that we lack jurisdiction under ORS 221.360 because "[d]efendant's opening brief reveals no constitutional arguments as to [the city's] ordinance under which she pled no contest." The city acknowledges, however, that language in City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or App 36, 50 P3d 1253 (2002), "appears to aid an argument for jurisdiction over non-constitutional issues." Nevertheless, the city contends that the pertinent language in Lincoln was dicta that is irreconcilable with Polanski and other Supreme Court authority and should, consequently, be disavowed.

  3. State v. Carr

    215 Or. App. 306 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 7 times

    Both challenges equally attack the constitutionality of the [statute]." City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or App 36, 41, 50 P3d 1253 (2002). In reviewing defendant's conviction, we apply the analysis for deciding issues under Article I, section 8, that the Supreme Court established in State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d 569 (1982).

  4. State v. Rich

    218 Or. App. 642 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that ORS 166.025(b) is “a classic time, place, or manner law,” and that, “[i]f the regulated noise happens to be speech, then enforcement is unconstitutional only if the enforcement is directed toward the speech's content and not its noncommunicative elements”

    An example of the third type of law is a trespass statute that, although it does not mention expressive activity, could be enforced against political protesters engaging in political expression. See City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or App 36, 50 P3d 1253 (2002). Such laws are facially constitutional; whether applying them violates Article I, section 8, depends necessarily on the facts of a particular case.

  5. State v. Sanchez-Cacatzun

    304 Or. App. 650 (Or. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    See Mullane , 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652 ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."). We do not understand defendant to argue that the affirmative defense statute, as applied to the facts of this case or on its face, violates the Due Process Clause.See, e.g. , City of Eugene v. Lincoln , 183 Or. App. 36, 41, 50 P.3d 1253 (2002) (explaining that "[a] facial challenge asserts that lawmakers violated the constitution when they enacted the ordinance; an as-applied challenge asserts that executive officials, including police and prosecutors, violated the constitution when they enforced the ordinance"). Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the meaning of "received notice" under ORS 811.180(1)(b).

  6. City of Corvallis v. State

    304 Or. App. 171 (Or. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 6 times
    Rejecting various constitutional challenges to ORS 222.127

    That is, as relevant here, the law must have been enforced against the complainant. City of Eugene v. Lincoln , 183 Or. App. 36, 41, 50 P.3d 1253 (2002) ("A facial challenge asserts that lawmakers violated the constitution when they enacted the ordinance; an as-applied challenge asserts that executive officials, including police and prosecutors, violated the constitution when they enforced the ordinance."). The state defendants successfully argued to the trial court that that prerequisite was not met in this case.

  7. Wilson v. Dep't of Corr.

    259 Or. App. 554 (Or. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 6 times
    Declining to address a constitutional argument that was asserted but not developed

    Id. at 417–18, 649 P.2d 569. An example of the third type of law is a trespass statute that, although it does not mention expressive activity, could be enforced against political protesters engaging in political expression. See City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or.App. 36, 50 P.3d 1253 (2002). Such laws are facially constitutional; whether applying them violates Article I, section 8, depends necessarily on the facts of a particular case.

  8. Thunderbird Mob. Club v. City of Wilsonville

    234 Or. App. 457 (Or. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 16 times
    In Thunderbird Mobile Club, LLC v. City of Wilsonville, 234 Or. App. 457, 228 P.3d 650 rev. den., 348 Or. 524, 236 P.3d 152 (2010) (Thunderbird), we addressed a similar argument that the ORLTA preempted local ordinances that added obligations for landlords.

    In this case, where there has been no executive action against plaintiff and where the only government action to have occurred was enactment of the ordinances by the city council, we construe plaintiff's claim as a facial challenge. See City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or App 36, 41, 50 P3d 1253 (2002) ("A facial challenge asserts that lawmakers violated the constitution when they enacted the ordinance; an as-applied challenge asserts that executive officials * * * violated the constitution when they enforced the ordinance."). By so construing plaintiff's claim as a facial challenge, we do not intend to offer any opinion as to the merit of pursuing an "as-applied" substantive due process challenge to economic regulation.

  9. State v. Borowski

    231 Or. App. 511 (Or. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 7 times
    Concluding that the legislature would have preferred a statute to fail as a whole

    Defendants' only challenge to ORS 164.887 is facial. Thus, facts involving the circumstances of defendants' arrests are immaterial; the only relevant "fact" in this case is that defendants were convicted of violating that statute, and the only issue is whether the legislature transgressed one of the specified state or federal constitutional provisions by enacting it. City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or App 36, 41, 50 P3d 1253 (2002). That is a purely legal question that we review for legal error.

  10. State v. Johnson

    213 Or. App. 83 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 2 times

    Further, the harm must be intentionally inflicted. The element of intention distinguishes this case from City of Eugene v. Lincoln, 183 Or App 36, 50 P3d 1253 (2002). In that case, we held that an animal-rights protester could not constitutionally be stifled even though her expressive activity could have provoked a violent response.