Even where a personal injury action is timely initiated against a city, thereby providing actual notice meeting all the elements required by the statute except for service of notice on the mayor, city clerk or clerk of the board of aldermen, KRS 411.110 is not satisfied and such suits must be dismissed. City of Elsmere v. Brown, 297 Ky. 323, 324, 180 S.W.2d 86, 87 (1944); Cox, 296 Ky. at 686, 178 S.W.2d at 202; Ballinger v. City of Harlan, 294 Ky. 72, 170 S.W.2d 912, 913 (1943). Sturgill's reliance on Denton as signaling Kentucky courts are moving away from strict compliance to substantial compliance in regard to KRS 411.110 is misplaced.
Did the notice as to section 2 suffice within the meaning of the statute to put the city on notice as to the injury received on section 3? It has been uniformly held by the courts that the provision must be strictly complied with. The giving of notice is a condition precedent to bringing suit and is jurisdictional. City of Elsmere v. Brown, 297 Ky. 323, 180 S.W.2d 86; Treitz v. City of Louisville, 292 Ky. 654, 167 S.W.2d 860. It has been stated that the reason for the requirement of notice is to provide an opportunity for the city to investigate all the circumstances and prepare its defense.