Opinion
04-20-00409-CV
08-04-2021
CITY OF DEL RIO, Appellant v. Henry Arredondo, Appellee
From the 83rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-0073-CIV Honorable Robert E. Cadena, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Irene Rios, Justice
The City of Del Rio appeals an order denying its plea to the jurisdiction. The City contends the trial court erred in determining it had subject matter jurisdiction because there was no valid waiver of governmental immunity for Henry Arredondo's breach of contract suit. Because the City's plea challenged the existence of only non-jurisdictional facts, we affirm the trial court's order.
Background
In January 2015, the City hired Arredondo as its City Manager. The parties entered into an Employment Agreement, which provided Arredondo served "at the pleasure of the City Council." At a June 2018 special meeting of the City Council, the City Council voted to terminate the Employment Agreement. Arredondo then sued the City, alleging the City Council did not obtain a majority vote to terminate his employment, which constituted a breach of contract claim. He also pled an alternative breach of employment contract claim.
The City answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The City argued Arredondo did not plead a waiver of governmental immunity. It also argued that Arredondo was an at-will employee and a majority of the City Council voted to terminate the Employment Agreement. Arredondo filed a First Amendment Petition alleging a waiver of governmental immunity under section 271.152 of the Texas Local Government Code and, in a response, argued the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because his pleadings established all requisites of the statutory waiver. The trial court denied the plea, and the City timely filed a notice of interlocutory appeal.
Standard of Review
"Immunity from suit implicates a court's subject-matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction." City of Pearsall v. Tobias, 533 S.W.3d 516, 521 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2017, pet. denied). "As subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo." Id. "If the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we liberally construe the pleadings to determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause." Id. (quotation marks omitted). "If the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, which also implicate the merits of the case, we consider evidence submitted by the parties to determine if a fact issue exists." Id. (quotation marks omitted). "We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Id. "If the evidence creates a fact question regarding jurisdiction, the plea must be denied pending resolution of the fact issue by the fact finder." Id. "If the evidence fails to raise a question of fact, however, the plea to the jurisdiction must be granted as a matter of law." Id. at 521-22.
Waiver of Governmental Immunity
"Absent waiver, governmental entities retain immunity from suit." Id. at 522. "If the Legislature has not expressly waived immunity from suit, the State retains such immunity even if its liability is not disputed." Id. Arredondo alleged the Legislature waived immunity for his suit under section 271.152 of the Texas Local Government Code. Section 271.152 provides as follows:
A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter.TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.152. "'Contract subject to this subchapter" includes "a written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity." Id. § 271.151(2)(A). Section 271.152 waives governmental immunity for the adjudication of certain breach of contract claims. City of Pearsall, 533 S.W.3d at 521-22.
When, as here, the defendant is a local governmental entity that is authorized to enter a written contract as per section 271.152, governmental immunity is waived for a breach of contract claim if the plaintiff alleges and, if challenged, shows the contract is subject to section 271.152's waiver of immunity. Id. As we stated in City of Pearsall, "[f]or a contract to be subject to section 271.152's waiver of immunity, it (1) must be in writing, (2) state the essential terms of the agreement, (3) provide for goods or services, (4) to the local governmental entity, and (5) be executed on behalf of the local governmental entity." Id. at 522.
In its plea to the jurisdiction and on appeal, the City contends its immunity is not waived under section 271.152 for two reasons: (1) "the employment contract, City Charter and Personnel Policies did not alter Arredondo's at-will employment status"; and (2) "the City Council fulfilled the requirements of the employment contract and City Charter." In his response and appellee's brief, Arredondo has briefed and argued that all the jurisdictional facts we outlined in City of Pearsall and the City's arguments relate exclusively to the merits. In its reply, the City asserts that the issues of Arredondo's at-will employment and the City's compliance with its contractual obligations are jurisdictional prerequisites to suit.
In sum, the parties dispute whether the facts the City sought to establish to defeat the trial court's jurisdiction are, in fact, jurisdictional facts. The parties' dispute implicates the scope of section 271.152's waiver of immunity, and determining the scope of a statute presents an issue of statutory construction. See Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 177 (Tex. 2012); County of Galveston v. Triple B Servs., LLP, 498 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). We "must enforce the statute as written and refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose." Triple B Servs., 498 S.W.3d at 184. "We must give a statute's words their ordinary, everyday meanings unless we are given some reason to believe that the text of the statute indicates that the legislature intends the words to be interpreted in a technical sense." Id.
Beginning with the plain language of section 271.152, we now reaffirm the jurisdictional facts are those we identified in City of Pearsall. The plain language confirms that if these statutory requirements are met, governmental immunity is waived "for the purpose of adjudicating" a breach of contract claim. "Adjudication" of such claims refers to "the bringing of a civil suit and prosecution to final judgment" of those claims. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.151(1). Adjudicating such claims requires considering whether the plaintiff has established all elements of a breach of contract claim. Lenk v. Guar. Bank, 360 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008) (stating breach-of-contract elements include: "(1) a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach"), aff'd, 361 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2012). Some elements of a breach of contract claim can be intertwined with jurisdictional facts under section 271.152. For example, under the plain language of section 271.152, the existence of a contract is a jurisdictional fact that can implicate the merits of the breach of contract claim (e.g., the existence of a valid contract). See City of Pearsall, 533 S.W.3d at 521-22; Lenk, 360 S.W.3d at 514.
However, applying the plain language of section 271.152, we hold that not all facts relating to the merits are necessarily jurisdictional facts. The City's arguments seek to establish its compliance with the Employment Agreement. The City contends that because Arredondo is an at-will employee, the only requirement to terminate his employment was a majority vote of the City Council and the City Council-by a majority vote-terminated the Employment Agreement. Considering Arredondo's live pleading, the sole basis for the alleged breach of contract was that the City Council terminated Arredondo's employment without a majority vote. Whether the City terminated Arredondo's employment without a majority vote relates to the merits of the breach of contract claim (i.e. the "breach" element). See Lenk, 360 S.W.3d at 514. But considering the plain language of section 271.152, we hold that showing a breach of the contract is not a jurisdictional requirement under the statute's plain language.
Arredondo's live pleading also does not assert he is not an at-will employee or base his claims on such an allegation.
Although the City asserts its "satisfaction and compliance with the contract provisions is applicable to the jurisdictional matter," the City cites no authority and makes no arguments showing how the merits-specifically its satisfaction and compliance with the Employment Agreement-is a jurisdictional requirement considering section 271.152's plain language. Put simply, the challenges raised by the City's plea and on appeal relate solely to the merits, are not jurisdictional, and are not properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Because the City's plea improperly challenged non-jurisdictional facts relating to the merits of Arredondo's breach of contract claims, the trial court properly denied the City's plea.
Conclusion
Because the trial court did not err by denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction, we affirm the trial court's order.
AFFIRMED