Opinion
C089762
09-14-2023
CITY OF DAVIS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HOWARD ZOCHLINSKI, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. PT171327
HORST, J. [*]
Defendant Gity Haj-Moin owned a house in Davis, and defendant Howard Zochlinski (Zochlinski) lived in the house for decades as a tenant. Beginning in or about 2014, the plaintiff City of Davis (the City) issued numerous notices of violation and administrative citations to the property based on complaints about its condition. In 2017, the trial court appointed as receiver the California Receivership Group (the Receiver). During the course of the receivership, Zochlinski claimed various items of his personal property were lost, destroyed, and stolen, his rent and relocation expenses were not paid by the receivership as required, and he sustained psychological and emotional harm as a result of the conduct of the Receiver among others. In 2018, the trial court granted the Receiver's motion to discharge the Receiver and denied Zochlinski's motion for reimbursement for expenses and losses.
Haj-Moin was a respondent to the petition in the trial court and is a defendant and respondent here on Zochlinski's appeal. However, she did not file a respondent's brief on this appeal.
Zochlinski appeals. Although his briefing covers a great deal more ground, based on the argument headings in his opening brief, Zochlinski contends (1) "this case should be reviewed de novo due to repeated civil rights violations, with Zochlinski entitled to recoup losses and file suit accordingly," and (2) the "trial court was so negligent and biased in their functioning that, even under the more restrictive differential review of abuse of discretion, the appellate court should decide in [Zochlinski's] favor." (Capitalization and bold typeface omitted.)
Zochlinski filed his notice of appeal on June 24, 2019. After granting several extensions of time, in July 2020, we dismissed the appeal based on Zochlinski's failure to timely file his Appellant's Civil Appeal Mediation Statement pursuant to the Third District Court of Appeal, Local Rules, rule 1(d)(4) and his Civil Case Information Statement as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(g). After we vacated the dismissal and reinstated the appeal in August 2020, we granted numerous additional extensions of time, including at least six such requests by Zochlinski for his opening brief and two for his reply briefs. The case was not fully briefed until April 5, 2023, and was assigned to this panel on April 28, 2023.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Factual Background
Haj-Moin owned the subject property and Zochlinski was the resident and tenant. According to Zochlinski, he was the tenant at the property for 33 years.
According to the City, over several years, beginning in 2014, the Davis Police Department had received numerous complaints about the property concerning "overgrown vegetation and substantial accumulations of trash, junk and debris that have been stored on the driveway, front, side, and rear yards, at times piled above fences, discernable from the public right of way and neighboring properties, many of which have issued complaints with the City regarding their observations of the Subject Property." The City had issued numerous notices of violation and administrative citations. However, the property remained in its nuisance state and neither Haj-Moin nor Zochlinski adequately abated the violations of Davis Municipal Code and state health and safety laws. Following additional notices and citations, the City obtained inspection and abatement warrants, and, upon inspection in 2016, the City discovered additional violations of the Health and Safety Code. The City served a notice and order to abate based on numerous violations. Upon another inspection in May 2017, the City discovered abatement efforts had been inadequate to address the numerous nuisance conditions. Eventually, the City served Haj-Moin with a notice of intent to file a petition for the appointment of a receiver, and, on August 17, 2017, the City petitioned for the appointment of a receiver pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980.7.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.
The Receivership
In an order filed November 28, 2017, the trial court appointed the Receiver, through its president Mark Adams, as receiver of the subject property. The trial court issued the order upon its findings that the property was substandard and a public nuisance; the condition of the property violated state housing laws and provisions of the Davis Municipal Code; the violations were so extensive and of such a nature as to endanger the health and safety of neighboring residents; the property owners had failed to comply with notices to repair and abate the nuisance conditions despite being afforded a reasonable opportunity to do so; and the conditions were likely to persist if the court did not appoint a receiver.
We will provide more detail concerning the receivership's initial inspection in our discussion, post. For the moment, it is sufficient to say the property contained "massive amounts of debris," including decaying matter; piles of junk so substantial as to render much of the house impassable without climbing over the piles; signs of severe rodent infestation in the kitchen including "evidence of droppings among the empty coffee containers, food storage boxes, and used paper products"; rooms that were "completely unreachable"; a kitchen and bathrooms that were unusable; and an equally cluttered exterior. Cleanup and repair of the property under the receivership commenced in December 2017.
In an ex parte application for an order authorizing a receiver's certificate, the Receiver estimated it would make a payment, among others, of $3,000 to Zochlinski for moving expenses. In an order filed January 5, 2018, the trial court approved the Receiver's first report. The court also authorized the Receiver to issue a receiver's certificate in the total amount of $49,500. Of that amount, the court authorized the Receiver to pay, presumably in relation to Zochlinski, up to $2,200 in storage costs and up to $5,000 in supplemental rent.
Early in the process, Zochlinski was on site to ensure the preservation of his personal property. However, according to the Receiver, throughout the receivership, Zochlinski's behavior was "uncooperative, unpredictable and aggressive. His behavior and operation of the Property was responsible for the nuisance conditions, and attempts to work with him on the abatement were quickly shown to be counterproductive. He was removed from the site, and banned during the later stages of the clean-out." On the latter point, a January 5, 2018, minute order stated Zochlinski was not to sleep at the property but could be present with the Receiver's consent, which could be withdrawn at any time. In a written order filed January 17, 2018, the trial court barred Zochlinski from the property unless he obtained prior consent from the Receiver, and authorized the Receiver to withdraw consent.
On January 16, 2018, Zochlinski filed a motion in which he sought, among other things, "a halt to the clean-up, [and] permission to search the current dumpster ...." In his motion, Zochlinski claimed to have witnessed an attempted theft of his property onsite, asserted his efforts to oversee the cleanup were thwarted, and claimed to have found evidence of destruction of his property. The trial court denied Zochlinski's motion. The court's minute order noted the "issues have been previously addressed." The order also stated that "[a]ny weapons located should be turned over to the Davis PD. Mr. Zochlinski may make a claim with Davis PD."
Zochlinski filed objections to several of the Receiver's reports based on claims of theft, loss, and destruction of property and on having been barred from the site. In each instance, the trial court approved the Receiver's reports and effectively overruled Zochlinski's objections.
In an undated minute order, the trial court stated it had reviewed Zochlinski's objections to the Receiver's third report and found "no action necessary at this time." In the same order, the court stated: "Receiver notes when Mr. Zochlinski files invoice for $5,000-prev agreed to they will pay at that time."
Following cleanup and repair, the Receiver listed the property for sale in August 2018. Thereafter the trial court confirmed the sale of the property and the sale closed on October 30, 2018.
Zochlinski's Motion for Compensation and Receiver's Motion for Discharge
On November 13, 2018, Zochlinski filed a motion for, among other things, payment of moving and rental expenses, payment for personal possessions destroyed or missing as a result of his forced expulsion from the property, and payment for psychological and emotional harm. Zochlinski claimed a number of specified items of personal property went missing during the receivership, including cameras, a shotgun, and a revolver, and he asserted the items had been stolen and destroyed. Zochlinski further stated the Receiver had not paid for his rent, moving, or damages.
In February 2019, the Receiver moved for discharge of the Receiver, exoneration of surety, and distribution of the receivership proceeds. The Receiver noted Zochlinski had filed numerous claims of theft and emotional damages, all of which were denied. The Receiver anticipated Zochlinski would submit additional filings given the "discharge hearing is the final venue for such challenges ...." The Receiver also noted that, while "the receivership has been ready to provide the moving assistance this Court authorized as part of the remediation budget, these funds were to be allocated under two conditions that Mr. Zochlinski has failed to meet: 1) the amount was to be provided to a third-party landlord or property manager, as disclosed by Mr. Zochlinski, and 2) the amount was to be provided contingent on Mr. Zochlinski's cooperation during the receivership process, as he was disqualified under . . . [section] 17980.7[, subdivision ](d)(4)(B)(ii) to receive such assistance otherwise."
There is no subdivision (d)(4)(B)(ii) in section 17980.7. Presumably, the Receiver intended to refer to subdivision (d)(3)(B)(ii), which we discuss in part III. A., post.
In additional briefing, Zochlinski offered further points and authorities on his motion for payment of expenses.
Oral Argument Before the Trial Court
In oral argument before the trial court, Zochlinski asserted he was entitled to payment for relocation and compensation for lost and stolen property under section 17980.7. He further asserted that, under section 17975.1, subdivision (a), the Receiver was required to pay those expenses "within ten days after the date the order to vacate is first mailed to the owner and posted on the premises or at least 20 days prior." According to Zochlinski, under section 17975.3, where such payments are not timely made, the receiver shall be liable to the tenant for one and one-half times the relocation benefits.
Zochlinski also stated he had a video which would show a representative of the Receiver preventing him from recovering his camera from a large trash receptacle and acting in a threatening manner. Zochlinski suggested the Receiver's representation that an item recovered from the property was a toy gun rather than his missing revolver was not credible. Zochlinski requested payment for moving and rental expenses and for items lost, and suggested he could also seek compensation for emotional harm.
Regarding rent, the Receiver responded it had been authorized to pay $5,000 to Zochlinski's new landlord upon receiving an invoice from the landlord. According to the Receiver, Zochlinski never provided an invoice. The Receiver relied on section 17980.7 as establishing that, if the court concludes the party requesting relocation benefits substantially contributed to the conditions that led to the appointment of the receiver, the party is not entitled to those benefits. (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(B)(ii).) The Receiver argued: "[I]f the tenant's occupation of that property makes it a nuisance, the tenant is not going to be entitled to recover the cost of relocating. That's a discretionary call up to the Judge."
Zochlinski replied he had provided checks to prove he had paid his rent, and asserted there was "nothing that says I cannot be reimbursed by the receiver." He stated his "prior landlords being noncitizens didn't want to get involved in writing up a document that was a legal document."
The Trial Court's Ruling and Order
In a ruling dated April 25, 2019, the trial court granted the Receiver's motion for discharge, for exoneration of surety, and for distribution of receivership proceeds, and denied Zochlinski's motion for reimbursement for expenses and losses.
In a subsequent order filed May 29, 2019, the trial court granted the motion for discharge and terminated the receivership. The order also denied Zochlinski's motion for reimbursement and specified: "No further payments are to be made from the receivership account to . . . Zochlinski."
The trial court denied Zochlinski's motion for reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
I
The Appellant's Burden and Self-represented Litigants
At the outset of our discussion, we must reiterate certain aspects of the appellate process." 'A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.'" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) "It is the appellant's burden to demonstrate the existence of reversible error." (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 766 (Del Real).)
As a self-represented litigant, Zochlinski "is entitled to the same but no greater consideration than other litigants." (County of Sacramento v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861 (County of Sacramento).) "Accordingly, he must follow the rules of appellate procedure. [Citations.] Those rules require an appellate brief to support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation to authority and to provide a citation to the record for a factual assertion. [Citations.] '[W]e may disregard factual contentions that are not supported by citations to the record [citation] or are based on information that is outside the record [citation]. We may disregard legal arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority [citation] or are conclusory [citation].' [Citations.] Further, we may treat a point that is not supported by cogent legal argument as forfeited." (Ibid.; accord, In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C).)
At the beginning of the argument section of Zochlinski's brief, he states that his "most cogent arguments, with citations," appear at specified ranges of pages in the record, and further states, "he will reassemble those arguments herein and respectfully refers the Justices of the Appellate Court to the pages presented." (Bold typeface omitted.) The latter point does not comport with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) which requires the brief "[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority."
In the first sentence under the second argument heading, Zochlinski states he had "provided numerous examples of bias and negligence by Trial Court &case citations, supra, and need not rehash them." On the contrary, if an appellant wishes to advance an argument, and have that argument considered by the reviewing court, the appellant must set forth the argument with citations to the record, cogent argument, and, if possible, citations to authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); County of Sacramento, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 861; In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) "When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, 'it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.'" (In re S.C., at p. 408.)
Zochlinski's briefing often fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), which requires that briefs must "[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears." "We are not required to scour the record in search of support for a party's factual statements and may disregard such unsupported statements." (Harshad & Nasir Corp. v. Global Sign Systems, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 523, 527, fn. 3; accord, Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1074.)
We must remark on two additional matters before proceeding.
First, each of Zochlinski's briefs contains a section entitled, "Apologies to the Court." (Bold typeface and some capitalization omitted.) In these sections, Zochlinski explains reasons for delays in preparing his briefs, including descriptions of the circumstances of his health; apologizes for what he characterizes as his briefs' "questionable qualities"; offers his assurances that, under different circumstances, he would have produced better briefs; and apologizes in his reply briefs in the event his opening brief "seemed an angry rant rather than a brief." These sections are unnecessary, counterproductive in that they add to the volume of the briefing, and could be read as efforts to garner sympathy. We suggest the omission of such material in future filings.
Second, we are compelled to comment on Zochlinski's frequent ad hominem attacks on opposing parties and others. We caution Zochlinski that ad hominem attacks have no place in an appellate brief. (See generally In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 80; Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 295; Martinez v. Department of Transportation (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 559, 566.)
II
Standard of Review
Under his first argument heading, Zochlinski asserts this case should be reviewed under the de novo standard "due to repeated civil rights violations ...." (Capitalization and bold typeface omitted.) Under his second argument heading, Zochlinski asserts that even under the abuse of discretion standard, he should prevail based on the trial court's negligence and bias.
Appellate courts "independently review questions of statutory interpretation." (Gerlach v. K. Hovnanian's Four Seasons at Beaumont, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 303, 311; see National Asian American Coalition v. Newsom (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 993, 1007 [appellate courts "review questions of law de novo"].)
An order discharging a receiver is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Boyd v. Benneyan (1928) 204 Cal. 23, 27; Sly v. Superior Court of California (1925) 71 Cal.App. 290, 294.) " 'A ruling amounts to an abuse of discretion when it exceeds the bounds of reason ....'" (City of Rocklin v. Legacy Family Adventures-Rocklin, LLC (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 713, 727, quoting Alfaro v. Waterhouse Management Corp. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 26, 37.)" 'The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power.'" (Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566.)
"When the trial court has resolved a disputed factual issue, the appellate courts review the ruling according to the substantial evidence rule. If the trial court's resolution of the factual issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed." (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) As it is often defined," '[s]ubstantial evidence' is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.)
III
Zochlinski's Motion for Reimbursement and Receiver's Motion for Discharge
Zochlinski seeks amounts to compensate for his losses and rental costs. Specifically, he asserts he is entitled to compensation for rental payments and stolen and destroyed property, as well as for emotional pain and distress, civil rights violations, and violations of statutory and fiduciary duties.
A. Zochlinski's Motion for Reimbursement
As a general matter, section 17980.7 provides authority for the payment of relocation benefits under circumstances such as those at issue here. Such relocation benefits can include moving and storage costs and relocation compensation (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)), including the "reasonable replacement value of property lost, stolen, or damaged (not through the fault or negligence of the displaced person, their agent, or their employee) in the process of moving" (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)(iv); see also § 17980.7, subd. (c)(6) ["If the conditions of the premises or the repair or rehabilitation thereof significantly affect the safe and sanitary use of the substandard building by any tenant, to the extent that the tenant cannot safely reside in their unit, then the receiver shall provide relocation benefits in accordance with" § 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)]).
Elsewhere, however, section 17980.7 specifies: "If the court finds that a tenant has been substantially responsible for causing or substantially contributing to the substandard conditions, then the relocation benefits of this section shall not be paid to this tenant." (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(B)(ii).)
According to the Receiver's first report, submitted by Mark Adams and declared true and correct under penalty of perjury, at the receivership's initial inspection, "the receivership team observed a severe amount of debris both on the inside and outside the home. The Property is an example of extreme hoarding, with massive amounts of debris including garbage bags of trash, stacks of cardboard and bins full of debris and papers, worn clothing items, milk crates of garbage, bags of trash, old weight sets, thousands of books and magazines, stacks of old newspapers, empty boxes and used containers with decaying matter inside, personal [e]ffects covering a majority of the surface area and various other objects no longer of worth. The piles of items and junk are so high that almost every square foot of the home cannot be walked through and must be climbed over or is no longer accessible. This includes the kitchen, which houses signs of a severe rodent infestation by evidence of droppings among the empty coffee containers, food storage boxes, and used paper products. It also includes several other rooms of the home which are completely unreachable because the stacks of debris are several feet high blocking the doorways and the whole of the room. In short, the bathrooms and kitchen are unusable and the living areas inaccessible without a climb. The outside of the home was equally cluttered; the sides of the home were littered with trash, old bicycles, motorcycles, computers and other electronic equipment left in the elements, empty suitcases and non-operable machinery, trash bags, and other debris."
While Haj-Moin owned the subject property, by Zochlinski's own representations, he was the tenant at the property for 33 years. Based on our review of the record, at all relevant times, Zochlinski was the only resident.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court could conclude Zochlinski occupied the property at all relevant times and caused it to be in the hazardous condition that resulted in the code violations and, ultimately, the receivership. (See Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582, 596 (Regalado) [in reviewing for substantial evidence, we" 'must accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court's findings and decision, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment' "].) The foregoing constitutes substantial evidence Zochlinski was "substantially responsible for causing or substantially contributing to the substandard conditions . . ." at the property. (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(B)(ii).) As such, the Receiver was not required to pay the relocation benefits of section 17980.7, including reasonable moving and storage costs and relocation compensation (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(B)(i)), to Zochlinski. (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(B)(ii).)
For his part, Zochlinski denies being responsible for the condition of the property, asserting Haj-Moin was the responsible party. However, this merely gives rise to a conflict in the evidence before the court. "Under the well-established standard of review applicable to a claim that a judgment or finding is not supported by the evidence in the record, 'we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citations.] [¶] It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment. Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence this court is without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the absence of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn. We must accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court's findings and decision, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.'" (Regalado, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595-596, quoting Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.) As stated, the trial court's determination is supported by substantial evidence.
With regard to reimbursement for lost, stolen, and destroyed property, these, too, are "relocation benefits." (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)(iv).) As stated, "the relocation benefits of [section 17980.7] shall not be paid" to a tenant who "has been substantially responsible for causing or substantially contributing to the substandard conditions . . ." at the subject property. (§ 17980.7, subd. (d)(3)(B)(ii).)
We also note on this point that Mark Adams stated in the first report that he had investigated Zochlinski's claims that a contractor had engaged in theft or attempted theft. He found the accusations to be "entirely untrue." Adams continued: "During the cleanout, Mr. Zochlinski suspected movement of a box of ipods in his garage, but there is no evidence supporting the credibility of his claim whatsoever. The [Receiver] was also onsite with the cleaning crew as was Mr. Zochlinski and witnessed no theft of any kind."
Zochlinski insists items of his property has been lost, stolen, and destroyed. However, again, at most, this would give rise to a conflict in the evidence before the trial court which we would resolve in favor of the judgment. (Regalado, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 596.)
Zochlinski relies on section 17975.1, subdivision (a), which requires a receiver to pay certain expenses "within 10 days after the date that the order to vacate is first mailed to the owner and posted on the premises, or at least 20 days prior to the vacation date set forth in the order to vacate, whichever occurs later." Regardless of the applicability of that section, however, Zochlinski fails to demonstrate the inapplicability of section 17980.7, subdivision (d)(3)(B)(ii), which establishes he is not entitled to reimbursement for relocation benefits.
On an evidentiary matter, Zochlinski faults the trial court for refusing to view a video recording during oral argument. Zochlinski proffered a video recording which he claimed would show the Receiver's employee preventing him from recovering a camera that had been thrown into a trash receptacle and acting in a threatening manner. Zochlinski had previously raised his contentions concerning this conduct by the Receiver's employee, and claimed he had a video recording, in objecting to the Receiver's second report. The court necessarily considered Zochlinski's contention and nonetheless approved the second report. Zochlinski repeated this claim in his motion for reimbursement and in a subsequent reply to the Receiver's opposition to his motion for reimbursement. He then raised the trial court's decision not to view the video in a supplemental post-argument brief, with which he included still images from the video. In that filing, Zochlinski stated he was submitting the still images "as evidence as the video I located were not viewed in Court and I feel I have an obligation to insure the evidence is provided to the Court as evidence of Receiver's destruction of personal property and threats."
Given that he provided the trial court with still images "to insure the evidence is provided to the Court as evidence of Receiver's destruction of personal property and threats," it would appear the issue of the trial court's refusal to view the video recording during oral argument was rendered moot. In any event, Zochlinski has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit and view the video. (See McDermott Ranch, LLC v. Connolly Ranch, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 549, 559 ["We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion"].) Nor has Zochlinski shown that the trial court declined to view the video based only on impediments to the admissibility of that evidence that Zochlinski should have been afforded the opportunity to cure as he suggests. (See generally Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 949; Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145-1149.) Zochlinski has not established the trial court committed reversible error in declining to view the video. (See Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.)
We conclude substantial evidence supported the trial court's denial of Zochlinski's motion for reimbursement and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion.
B. Discharge of Receiver
Under section 17980.7: "The receiver shall be discharged when the conditions cited in the notice of violation have been remedied in accordance with the court order or judgment and a complete accounting of all costs and repairs has been delivered to the court. Upon removal of the condition, the owner, the mortgagee, or any lienor of record may apply for the discharge of all moneys not used by the receiver for removal of the condition and all other costs authorized by this section." (§ 17980.7, subd. (c)(9).)
In its motion, the Receiver indicated the receivership was complete, the property had been sold, and the Receiver had filed the final account and report. Zochlinski does not raise any arguments of substance specifically addressed to the granting of the motion to discharge. Under these circumstances, and in light of our conclusion that the trial court's denial of Zochlinski's motion for reimbursement was supported by substantial evidence and was not an abuse of discretion, we further conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to discharge the Receiver. (See generally City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 931 ["court rulings on receivership matters are afforded considerable deference on review"].)
C. Denial of Requests for Continuances
Zochlinski asserts, for the first time in his reply brief responding to the Receiver, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his requests for continuances."' "Obvious considerations of fairness in argument demand that the appellant present all . . . points in the opening brief. To withhold a point until the closing brief would deprive the respondent of [the] opportunity to answer it or require the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission. Hence the rule is that points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before." '" (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764, quoting Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8; accord, Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) In the absence of any showing of good cause, we do not consider Zochlinski's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his requests for continuances.
IV
Preclusive Effect of the Order
One paragraph of the order from which Zochlinski appeals stated: "This Order is binding on all parties to the receivership, as well as all others with notice of the Motion/Stipulation that might be impacted by this Court's Order. In accordance with California Rule of Court[, rule] 3.1184(c), notice of the motion was provided to all parties, and all others that might have an interest in the property. Any non-party that is impacted by this Order was required to be heard at the discharge hearing. This Order will not impact a non-party's due process rights; however, all actions of the receivership, even those impacting non-parties with notice, are now res judicata and cannot be challenged in a later action." The order also stated the "actions of Adams and California Receivership Group as Receiver are approved and ratified, thus they are freed from any potential liability. Adams and California Receivership Group are not to be found liable in their capacity as Receiver, and under no circumstances is Adams to be found liable in his personal capacity. This Order will serve as res judicata to all challenges to the actions of the receiverships, and any challenges to the Receiver's work, or this Court's oversight and direction on that work are barred."
Zochlinski asserts he retains the right to sue the Receiver, the City, and others for violations of his civil rights. He states we may "decide to permit [him] to file a separate suit against the Receiver as to his property losses ...." Zochlinski "asks for the lifting of res judicata and the right to sue, as well as having [the Receiver, among others] pay for his rent and the destruction and theft of property ...."
"As a general proposition a receiver has no official duties and is not a proper party to any action after being discharged by the court." (Vitug v. Griffin (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 488, 494, citing Brockway Land &Water Co. v. County of Placer (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 371, 375.) "The discharge order operates as res judicata as to any claims of liability against the receiver in her official capacity." (Vitug, at p. 494, citing Aviation Brake Systems, Ltd. V. Voorhis (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 230, 234.)
Zochlinski has not provided any compelling reason why, notwithstanding the foregoing case law, this language of the discharge order is erroneous and the discharge order should not have preclusive effect as to any claims against the Receiver.
Zochlinski asserts that federal law preempts state law. Therefore, according to Zochlinski, we should "reverse the res judicata aspect so as to allow suit against [the Receiver] under Federal Civil Rights statutes, as well as against [the] City ...." However, Zochlinski offers no analysis addressing what federal law preempts state receivership law, and relies on no authority relevant to that issue. As stated, we" 'may disregard legal arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority [citation] or are conclusory.'" (County of Sacramento, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 861.)
In the absence of any other specific argument, Zochlinski has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the order providing that "all actions of the receivership, even those impacting non-parties with notice, are now res judicata and cannot be challenged in a later action" constituted reversible error. (See Del Real, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.)
To the extent Zochlinski also contends this provision should be reversed inasmuch as it afforded preclusive effect with respect to claims against the City, he misreads the order. The order specifies that "all actions of the receivership . . . are now res judicata and cannot be challenged in a later action." (First italics added.) The order further states that "[t]his Order will serve as res judicata to all challenges to the actions of the receiverships, and any challenges to the Receiver's work, or this Court's oversight and direction on that work are barred." (Second and third italics added.) The language of the order does not have a preclusive effect as to any actions taken by the City. That the order states it is "binding on all parties to the receivership" does not establish the actions of the City are afforded preclusive effect.
Zochlinski maintains he has the right to sue the City and others, and advocates for the viability of claims he could assert. The City responds by asserting that one or more cases brought by Zochlinski resulting in unpublished appellate opinions involved the same parties and the same claims and were resolved against Zochlinski and "thus serve as res judicata to claims related to the same."
We need not address these contentions. Any contentions concerning Zochlinski's ability to sue the City, or anyone else, and the viability of any claims or causes of action he might assert, are not before us on this appeal from the order granting the Receiver's motion for discharge and denying Zochlinski's motion for reimbursement. "We may not render an advisory opinion [citation] or adjudicate the merits of a case not pending before us [citation]." (Nordstrom Com. Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 591, citing Branick v. Downey Savings &Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 243 & In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 57, fn. 4.) Accordingly, we do not further address Zochlinski's contentions concerning the viability of such claims and actions.
V
Judicial Bias
Zochlinski repeatedly accuses the trial court judges of bias, negligence, and dereliction of duty. "Disparaging the trial judge is a tactic that is not taken lightly by a reviewing court. Counsel better make sure he or she has the facts right before venturing into such dangerous territory because it is contemptuous for an attorney to make the unsupported assertion that the judge was 'act[ing] out of bias toward a party.'" (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.) Zochlinski is not excepted from these principles as a party appearing in propria persona. (County of Sacramento, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 861 [propria persona litigant entitled to same but no greater consideration than other litigants].)
Zochlinski has not identified anything supported by the record to establish his claims of judicial bias beyond disagreeing with the trial court's rulings and determinations. Even if any of those rulings or determinations were erroneous, such would not constitute a ground for a charge of judicial bias. (McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. (1916) 172 Cal. 6, 11 ["Erroneous rulings against a litigant, even when numerous and continuous, form no ground for a charge of bias or prejudice, especially when they are subject to review"].) Accusations that the trial judge is biased are inappropriate unless supported by compelling evidence. We find no support in the record for Zochlinski's repeated accusations of judicial bias.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Zochlinski's motion for reimbursement and granting the Receiver's motion for discharge is affirmed. The City and the Receiver shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
We concur: HULL, Acting P. J., ROBIE, J.
[*] Judge of the Placer County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.